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AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION, GENDER EQUALITY AND THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This study is interested in questions of law and social change, with a particular focus 
on how litigation can be used strategically to change the law to benefit women. 
Given law’s patriarchal nature, feminist litigators have often asked questions about 
whether, and how the law can be used to reflect women’s experience and to improve 
women’s lives. In this sense, the feminist project in law considers how feminist 
theory and methodology can be used in constructing legal arguments that seek the 
improvement of women’s rights and gender equality.  
The focal point of this study is amicus curiae participation and how this 
participation is employed by means of feminist litigation strategy so that it enhances 
rights-claiming and advances gender equality for women within the court system. I 
examine the way in which amicus curiae participation promotes litigation from a 
feminist and gendered viewpoint and validates the employment of feminist method to 
create effective arguments. 
The main body of the dissertation is dedicated to a case analysis of the 
Constitutional Court’s core gender jurisprudence and the amici curiae that have 
participated in these matters. The case discussions are divided into three categories: 
violence against women, women as part of cultural communities, and specific areas 
of vulnerability including prostitution and domestic partnerships (between 
heterosexual couples). The purpose of this analysis is to establish whether the amici 
curiae that have participated in these matters were able to influence judicial 
decisions, and how the amici used litigation to communicate a feminist and gendered 
viewpoint.  
The study concludes that, whether the relevant amici curiae participation had 
a direct or indirect impact on judicial decisions or not, its importance lies in engaging 
the law from a feminist and gendered viewpoint to create awareness of gender 
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This study is interested in questions of law and social change, with particular focus 
on how litigation can be used strategically to change the law to benefit women. 
Given law’s patriarchal nature, feminist litigators have often asked questions about 
whether, and how, the law can be used to reflect women’s experience and how to 
improve women’s lives.1 This study examines the feminist project in law and how it 
enables litigators to use feminist theory and methodology to construct legal 
arguments that seek to improve women’s rights and gender equality.  
Conaghan has questioned how feminist theory can be used by those engaged 
in concrete legal struggles and she believes that it is important to adopt a general 
feminist perspective instead of being bound by a specific theoretical approach:   
 
‘To adopt a feminist perspective is, first and foremost, to bring a gendered perception 
of legal and social arrangements to bear upon a largely gender neutral understanding 
of them. The object is to highlight the gendered assumptions embedded in such 
arrangements, assumptions too often rendered invisible by, among other things, the 
allegedly ‘objective’ analysis of traditional academia. Feminism thus presupposes that 
gender has a much greater structural and/or discursive significance than is commonly 
assumed, a significance which is ideologically but not practically diminished by its 
relative invisibility. In this sense, feminism purports to offer a better understanding of 
the social world by addressing aspects which have hitherto been ignored or 
misrepresented, while at the same time, countering the ideological effects to which 
such misrepresentations give rise.’2  
 
This study will explore the importance of employing a feminist perspective in litigation 
and specifically how amicus curiae participation can and has contributed to the 
engagement of the law in enhancing women’s lives.3 
                                               
1 Ruth Colker ‘Feminist litigation: An oxymoron? A study of the briefs filed in William L. Webster V. 
Reproductive Health Services’ (1990) 13 Harv. Women’s L.J. 137; Naomi R. Cahn ‘Defining feminist 
litigation’ (1991) 14 Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 at 2. 
2 Joanne Conaghan ‘Reassessing the feminist theoretical project in law’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and 
Society 351 at 359 (footnotes omitted). 
3 Amicus curiae is a Latin term and literally means friend of the court. Traditionally an amicus curiae, 
at the court’s discretion, provided information on areas of law that the court regarded as complex. 
Take note that the singular, amicus curiae, refers to a single party, whilst the plural, amici curiae 
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As an introduction to the study, I explore the enabling role of law and litigation in 
effecting social change and the unique role of public interest litigation in contributing 
to this change. The first chapter explores the feminist project in law and establishes 
how feminist lawyers who rely on the Constitution’s equality right have developed a 
substantive legal methodology in the adjudication of equality cases.4 This 
methodology is often employed through amicus curiae participation and focuses on 
the context and impact of an alleged rights violation and employs constitutional 
values and rights in its resolution.  
Chapter two describes the history of amicus curiae participation and the 
relevance of this participation to influence judicial decision-making. The focus is on 
the amici curiae’s new-found role in the representation of public interest, specifically 
within the context of gender litigation, and on the usefulness of amici curiae 
participation in its representation of women’s voices and the complexity of women’s 
lives in litigation. In doing this, I attempt to show that amicus curiae participation, as 
part of litigation strategy, has the potential to assist courts in reaching decisions that 
would be more representative of women’s lives and realities. 
The main body of the thesis is dedicated to a case-based analysis of the 
Constitutional Court’s core gender jurisprudence and the amici curiae that have 
participated in these matters. The case discussions are divided into three categories, 
namely: violence against women, women as part of cultural communities and 
specific areas of vulnerability including prostitution and domestic partnerships 
(between heterosexual couples). The purpose of this analysis is to establish whether 
the amici curiae that have participated in these matters were able to influence the 
judicial decisions that were reached in any way and how the amici used this litigation 







                                                                                                                                                  
refers to more than one party. In chapter 2 of this study the purpose and relevance of amicus curiae 
participation will be analysed. 
4 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution). 
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1  FEMINISM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
 
1.1 Law and Change 
It is important with the introduction of this study, to provide some insight into debates 
about law and social change, especially whether changing the content of law can 
have a positive impact on the lives of individuals and/or groups, and thus on society. 
The question is often asked whether law can encourage social change, 
specifically, the way in which a society thinks and reacts. Socio-legal scholars have 
long debated the power of law to effect such change, and many conclude that it 
cannot since law, with all its complexity, is viewed as a separate entity, that 
prescribes to society, rather than an intrinsic part of society.5 In this sense, law is 
perceived as an instrument of state power, independent of other aspects of social 
regulation, and when viewed as such, law becomes a purely technical regulation that 
lacks any moral authority.6 
 On the other hand, scholars have argued that law is an expression of 
society’s values and concerns and that it has the power, not only to set and alter 
rules, but also to change the way in which a society thinks and reacts.7 What is clear 
is that law’s power is enticing and not something that should be underestimated. 
Pellat describes the power of law as follows: 
 
‘Law is quite clearly, an unlikely means of effecting fundamental social change. It is, 
after all, the law. Its primary purpose – as many legal theorists have pointed out and as 
is patently clear – is to sustain and maintain the status quo and not to promote 
alternatives. It is wrong to suggest, however, that law is simply a monolithic reflection 
of the social and political standard and that it therefore must speak the same language 
and carry the same vision and ethic as that promoted in the social and political 
spheres. To adopt the position there is no room in law for political manoeuvre 
whatsoever is to deny the very real impact that legal reform initiatives have had 
historically on the structure and fibre of social life.’8 
 
                                               
5 Roger Cotterrell The sociology of law: An introduction (Butterworths 1992) 44; also see Brian Burtch 
The sociology of law: Critical approaches to social control (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992); Joel F. 
Handler Social movements and the legal system: A theory of law reform and social change (Academic 
Press 1978).  
6 Cotterrell op cit note 5 at 45. 
7 Thomas B. Stoddard ‘Bleeding heart: Reflections on using the law to make social change’ (1997) 72 
New York University Law Review 967 at 971. 
8 Anna S. Pellatt ‘Equality rights litigation and social transformation: A consideration of the women’s 
legal education and action fund’s intervention in Vriend v. R.’ (2000) 12 CJWL 117 at 120. 
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Stoddard, who supports the role of law in effecting change, confirms the ability of the 
law to alter and enforce rules, but emphasises its ability to effect social change that 
“transcends mere rulemaking and seeks, to improve society in fundamental and 
extra-legal ways” which he calls “culture shifting” change.9 Stoddard identifies five 
general goals that he described as the law’s “rule shifting” capacity, namely to set, 
alter and enforce specific rules.10 These include the power to create new rights and 
remedies for victims; to alter the conduct of government; to alter the conduct of 
citizens and private entities; to express a new moral ideal or standard; and to change 
cultural attitudes and patterns.11 
Most important to Stoddard, however, is the possibility of using the law to 
advance the rights and interests of people who are being mistreated by the law and 
enabling law’s “rule shifting capacity” to become “culture shifting”.12 Stoddard refers 
to the implementation of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an example of 
legal reform that was both “rule shifting” and able to initiate social change – therefore 
“culture shifting”.13 The Act enabled law’s rule shifting capacity, as it gave victims of 
racial discrimination new rights and remedies; it instructed government to promulgate 
and enforce new rules of conduct for itself; it altered the conduct of private entities 
and citizens; and it expressed a new moral standard.14 Although Stoddard 
acknowledges that it is difficult to measure actual social change and law’s culture 
shifting capacity, to him the change in racial interactions over time pointed at the 
Act’s social impact.15 
From his analysis of the Civil Rights Act, Stoddard identifies four factors that 
should be engaged in order to harness law’s “rule shifting” capacity to become 
“culture shifting”. These include: a change that is very broad or profound; public 
awareness of that change; a general sense of legitimacy of the change; and overall 
continuous enforcement of the change.16 Stoddard mainly focuses on the power of 
legislation to engage social change, because the legislative process is more likely to 
                                               
9 Stoddard op cit note 7 at 973. 
10 Ibid 973. 
11 Ibid 980. 
12 Id. 
13 Ibid 973. 
14 Ibid 974. 
15 Id. 
16 Ibid 978; Nan D. Hunter ‘Lawyering for social justice’ (1997) 72 New York Law Review 1009 at 
1019; includes a fifth dimension - public engagement beyond a small cadre of litigators or lobbyists. 
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promote public discussion and knowledge.17 However, he acknowledges the 
relevance and importance of litigation, specifically strategically planned litigation, to 
enable social change since it highlights problems and inequalities and forces 
government to face up to these factors that initiate the process of change.18  
This study and the discussion that follows focus predominantly on the power 
and value of litigation to influence law’s rule shifting capacity, but also considers the 
possibility of this influence to contribute to social and cultural change.  
 
1.2 Litigation and Change 
Similar to the general debates concerning law and social change, a diverse range of 
opinions have warned against the illusion that litigation could have a substantive 
impact on society.19 Whilst legal realists and critical legal scholars, have been 
sceptical about the ability of law and specifically litigation to “change society”,20 legal 
mobilisation scholars have been more optimistic about the potential of litigation to 
initiate, or play a role in, change.21  
Legal realists have pointed to the disparities between formal litigation 
outcomes and the actual implementation of these outcomes. They believe that 
government input and/or legislation is necessary to effect “real” social change.22 
They believe that social change activists would achieve more by interacting with 
government when policies are being formulated rather than to engage in litigation.23 
Supporting the legal realist position, some critical legal scholars have argued that 
litigation could weaken social movements, as a result of law’s ideological bias that 
reinforces current and dominant social structures and hierarchies.24 Both realists and 
                                               
17 Stoddard op cit note 7 at 981. 
18 Ibid 985. 
19 Alan Hunt ‘Rights and social movements: Counter-hegemonic strategies’ in Michael McCann (ed) 
Law and social movements (Ashgate 2006) 309. 
20 For a discussion of the viewpoints of a legal realist see Gerald N. Rosenberg The hollow hope: Can 
courts bring about social change? (University of Chicago Press 1991); for the viewpoints of critical 
legal scholars see Peter Gabel ‘The phenomenology of rights consciousness and the pact of the 
withdrawn selves’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1563 and Mark Kelman A guide to critical legal 
studies (Harvard University Press 1987).  
21 Cheryl Holzmeyer ‘Human rights in an era of neoliberal globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and 
grassroots mobilization in Doe v. Unocal’ (2009) 43 Law & Society Review 271 at 273; also see J 
Klaaren, J Dugard & J Handmaker ‘Public interest litigation in South Africa: A special issue 
introduction’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 1. 





these critical legal scholars believe that litigation is not able to address actual social 
inequality and injustice.25 
At the other end of the spectrum, legal mobilisation scholars locate litigation 
within a wider struggle for change and focus on the indirect impact of litigation and 
not just judicial outcome.26 In this sense indirect impact refers to spurring on or 
supporting movement-building efforts, generating public support for new rights 
claims, providing pressure to supplement political tactics and garnering media 
attention.27 In his reference to the American civil rights movement, McCann also 
illustrates the importance of the indirect impact of litigation, as early school 
desegregation cases had little impact on white southern racial practices, but the 
court cases were highly instrumental in “raising expectations and catalyzing political 
commitment among Blacks for the civil rights cause.”28 Legal mobilisation scholars 
acknowledge that judicial victories may fail to bring desired relief or immediate social 
change, but realise the potential that even unsuccessful or indeterminate court 
actions may generate important legal resources for broader political campaigns.29 
In the South African context, the Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign case is a good example where litigation was only used as a part of the 
Treatment Action Campaign’s (TAC’s) strategy to address government’s policy on 
the prevention of mother to child transmission of the HIV virus.30 More important than 
the actual judgment itself was the political leverage and moral authority gained by it 
that the TAC subsequently used as a lobbying tool in the face of lagging government 
                                               
25 Id. 
26 Klaaren, Dugard & Handmaker op cit note 21 at 2; Michael W. McCann ‘Reform litigation on trial’ 
(1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry 715 at 716. 
27 Michael W. McCann ‘Legal mobilization and social reform movements: Notes on theory and its 
application’ in Michael W. McCann (ed) Law and Social Movements (Ashgate 2006) 225 at 230. Also 
see Jackie Dugard & Malcolm Langford ‘Art or science? Synthesising lessons from public interest 
litigation and the dangers of legal determinism’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 39 at 55; Peter Houtzager & Lucie 
E. White ‘The long arc of pragmatic economic and social rights advocacy’ in Lucie E. White & Jeremy 
Perelman (eds) Stones of Hope: How African activists reclaim human rights to challenge global 
poverty (Stanford University Press 2011) 172. 
28 McCann ‘Legal mobilization and social reform movements’ op cit note 27 at 230. 
29 Id, Holzmeyer op cit note 21 at 275. 
30 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (hereinafter the TAC 
case); William Forbath, Zacki Achmat, Geoff Budlender & Mark Heywood ‘Cultural transformation, 
deep institutional reform and ESR practice’ in Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman (eds) Stones of 
Hope: How African activists reclaim human rights to challenge global poverty (Stanford University 
Press 2011) 51 at 56. 
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implementation of the judgment.31 In this sense the judgment was used to promote 
pro-poor health policy changes and institutional reform well after the judgment was 
handed down.32  
What emerges from the work of legal mobilisation scholars is that law, and 
specifically litigation, is only a single stepping stone to social change. The key seems 
to be to devise a specific litigation strategy that would harness the power of law in 
such a way that it would create meaningful opportunities, despite the outcome of a 
court decision that could subsequently advance a certain social agenda.33  
In this respect, public interest litigation or so called “cause lawyering” is of 
importance and differs from traditional litigation. Whilst the latter is only concerned 
with the relevant client and the successful carrying out of an instruction,34 the former 
is often used as a conscious strategy to influence social policy in fields such as 
health, environment, housing, land, education and gender.35 Gloppen describes the 
importance and purpose of public interest litigation as follows: 
 
‘The aim of public interest litigation is to transform the situation not only for the 
litigants but also for all those similarly situated: that is, to alter structured inequalities 
and power relations in our society in ways that reduce the weight of morally irrelevant 
circumstances, such as socio-economic status, gender, race, religion, or sexual 
orientation. Thus, the success of litigation should be judged not only in terms of how a 
case fares in court but also on whether the terms of the judgment are complied with. 
Even more important is the systemic impact – the broader effects on social policy, 
public discourses on social rights, and the development of jurisprudence.’36 
 
In reference to the practice of public interest litigation before the courts in South 
Africa, Marcus and Budlender have identified several factors which they regard as 
necessary for successful litigation in the public interest.37 These include the proper 
organisation of clients; planned long-term strategy; co-ordination and information 
                                               
31 Forbath, Achmat, Budlender & Heywood op cit note 30 at 68. 
32 Ibid 56. 
33 Holzmeyer op cit note 21 at 274. 
34 Geoff Budlender ‘On practicing law’ in Hugh Corder (ed) Essays on law and social practice in South 
Africa (Juta 1988) 319 at 322.   
35 Siri Gloppen ‘Public interest litigation, social rights, and social policy’ in Anis A. Dani & Arjan de 
Haan (eds) Inclusive states: Social policy and structural inequalities (World Bank 2008) 343. 
36 Ibid 344 (footnotes omitted). 
37 Gilbert Marcus & Steven Budlender A strategic evaluation of public interest litigation in South Africa 
(Atlantic Philanthropies 2008). 
8 
 
sharing with other relevant organisations; timing; thorough research; the 
characterisation of cases; and follow up.38 They argue, similar to the reasoning of 
Stoddard, that if this strategy is coupled with public information campaigns to 
achieve rights awareness; if persons are advised and assisted in claiming their rights 
and there is social mobilisation, public interest litigation could give rise to social 
change citing the TAC case as one of the examples.39 Therefore, when litigating in 
the public interest, lawyers should not only be concerned with the initial outcome of a 
case, but also focus on the use of arguments that further certain goals, once a 
verdict has been given.  
This study will primarily focus on the relevance and importance of litigation 
(specifically public interest litigation) to address gender inequality and possibly spur 
gendered social change. Here the focus will be on amicus curiae participation as 
public interest litigation strategy, and more specifically, as feminist litigation strategy, 
to claim rights and advance gender equality for women within the court system. The 
discussion that follows, explains the connections between law, rights assertion and 
the importance of social change in enhancing women’s lives. 
 
1.3 The Feminist Project in Law 
The connection between law, rights assertion and social change is particularly 
relevant in relation to the promotion of gender equality, as law is regarded as an 
important arena where women’s movements and feminist activists seek to change 
women’s lives.40  
 Because feminist legal thought engages with a wide range of perspectives 
and traditions that can be ascribed to a diversity of thought originating from different 
political, cultural and philosophical traditions, it is not easily characterised by any 
essential or fundamental principles.41 The aim of this study is not to explore the 
                                               
38 Ibid 119. 
39 Ibid 94. 
40 Sharyn Roach Anleu Law and social change (SAGE Publications 2000) 171. 
41 Conaghan op cit note 2 at 357, she refers here to liberalism, socialism, Marxism influences by 
American critical legal studies, critical race theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism and 
psychoanalytic perspectives. Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider ‘Feminist legal theory, 
feminist law making, and the legal profession’ (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 249 at 254; Gayle 
Binion ‘Human rights: A feminist perspective’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 509 at 512. 
For a discussion of the different feminist scholarly approaches see Karin van Marle & Elsje Bonthuys 
‘Feminist theories and concepts’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and justice 
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different scholarly approaches to feminism nor advocate support for one specific 
approach, however, it does embrace a feminist project in law which does have 
certain common features that applies to feminist analysis without essentialising or 
denying its complexity and contestatibility.42 These features include:   
 
‘First, feminist legal scholars seek to highlight and explore the gendered content of law 
and to probe characterizations positing themselves as neutral and, more specifically, 
ungendered. Secondly, they are part of a cross-disciplinary feminist effort to challenge 
traditional understandings of the social, legal, cultural, and epistemological order by 
placing women, their individual and shared experiences, at the center of their 
scholarship. Thirdly, feminist legal scholars seek to track and expose law’s implication 
in women’s disadvantage with a view to bringing about transformative social and 
political change.’43  
 
Of importance to this study is the relationship between theory and practice, more 
specifically how the complexity of women’s lives/experience is translated into legal 
claims.44 
Equal to the discussions on law and change and litigation and change 
discussed above, feminists have also questioned the utility of law and litigation as an 
instrument for voicing women’s inequality, since most feminist scholars agree that 
the law as patriarchal creature is more likely to reproduce existing social and 
economic relations rather than change them.45 Smart articulated certain problems 
when using rights (litigation) as part of a feminist strategy to achieve change.46 
According to her, the acquisition of rights in a given area may over-simplify complex 
power relations and the relevant rights might be appropriated by the more powerful 
party.47 Rights claims are often countered by competing rights claims as litigation is 
centred on individuals, which erodes the intention of fighting for social good.48 
                                                                                                                                                  
(Juta 2007) 15 at 17 and Catherine Albertyn ‘Equality’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 82 at 83. 
42 Conaghan op cit note 2 at 358. 
43 Ibid at 359. 
44 Elizabeth M. Schneider ‘Particularity and generality: Challenges of feminist theory and practice in 
work on women-abuse’ (1992) 67 New York University Law Review 520 at 521. 
45 Catherine Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in 
South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 217 at 220. 
46 Carol Smart Feminism and the power of law (Routledge 1989) 144. 
47 Id. 
48 Ibid 145. 
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However, law is still viewed as an important site of political struggle, despite 
its gendered disparity and it could “be harnessed in a positive way to improve 
women’s lives”.49 Rights claims give women an important sense of collective identity, 
actively shape public discourse and are a source of empowerment.50 The public 
nature of rights assertion is especially significant because of the often private nature 
of discrimination against women.51 Pellat describes the necessity of engaging law 
from a feminist standpoint as: 
 
‘The problem from a feminist standpoint, is that law’s way of envisioning women’s 
reality,  of translating the substance and circumstances of women’s lives, has tended 
to be dominated by the harsh exclusionary gender-based politics marking the social 
realm.  Cultural myths and stereotypes about women and narrow, dualistic 
constructions of difference have dictated the way in which law has historically 
conceptualized and responded to women and women’s subordination. In order to make 
law conscious of, and  responsive to, gender oppression in all its manifestations, it is 
necessary to challenge the signifying rules and conventions that denigrate and erase 
the difference that women represent and, at the same time, to find ways of re-working 
the discourse in order to represent who women are and what they experience in 
palpably real and full terms.’52 
 
It is clear that engagement with law, despite its inherent flaws, is an important 
feminist project, one that should be engaged specifically in addressing women’s 
subordination and inequality. What is important is to consider the implication of 
feminist theory, especially feminist legal method, for strategic litigation choices and 
the importance of judicial decisions for the feminist project in law.53  
Schneider argues that women centred litigation, equated to general public 
interest litigation while heeding the sentiments of legal mobilisation scholars, should 
not be employed as an individualistic strategy to achieve social change, but rather as 
part of a larger struggle to accurately reflect the realities of women’s lives.54 With the 
understanding that, if litigation is to have any real impact, it should be viewed within 
                                               
49 Catherine Albertyn ‘Feminism and the law’ in Christopher Roederer & Darrel Moelendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (Juta 2004) 291 at 295.  
50 Roach op cit note 40 at 172.  
51 Id. 
52 Pellatt op cit note 8 at 121. 
53 Schneider op cit note 44 at 526. 
54 Id; also see Judy Fudge ‘The public/private distinction: The possibilities of and the limits to the use 
of charter litigation to further feminist struggles’ (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 485 at 548. 
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a broader context of political opportunity and social mobilisation, then the actual role 
of courts and the implications of a judgment as vehicle for change, remains 
important.  
As a result of law’s patriarchal nature, one of the challenges faced by feminist 
litigators is how to make the law sensitive to women’s experience and more 
specifically the strategy adopted when identifying to a court how the law affects 
women’s lives.55 I intend to focus on amicus curiae participation as a specific 
feminist litigation strategy to bring women’s voices and experiences to court. Acting 
as amicus curiae and providing specific contextual evidence to the court, provide 
ways of thinking of the law, not in isolation, but in connection with the utilisation of 
the law as a vehicle for change.56 The use of amicus curiae participation as part of 
litigation strategy, could enable feminist litigators to offer evidence of women’s 
contexts and to challenge current constructs of the law, by providing alternate 
interpretation of rights; by proposing the development of current legal rules and in 
defending existing rights protections.57  
The focus of this study will be the briefs of relevant organisations that have 
participated as amici curiae in the South African Constitutional Court’s gender 
matters, in order to establish whether their participation has influenced the relevant 
Court decisions in any way to more effectively represent the complexities of women’s 
lives. However, it is firstly important to explore our constitutional commitment to 
equality, and how the notion of substantive equality has contributed to formulating a 








                                               
55 Sarah E. Burns ‘Notes from the field: A reply to Professor Colker’ (1990) 13 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
189 at 196. 
56 Ann C. Shalleck ‘Feminist legal theory and the reading of O’ Brien v. Cunard’ (1992) 57 Missouri 
Law Review 371 at 387. 
57 Catherine Albertyn ‘Law, gender and inequality in South Africa’ (2011) 39 Oxford Development 
Studies 139 at 143. 
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2 A SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
 
The adoption of the South African Constitution and the acknowledgement of the 
principle of equality as one of its founding values, paved the way for unprecedented 
change concerning women’s rights.58 The Constitution has aptly been described as a 
transformative document,59 and prohibits discrimination on a number of specific 
grounds which include gender, sex, pregnancy and marital status.60  
Legal feminists called for a substantive interpretation of the right to equality, 
one in which courts would assess equality claims in relation to women’s lived 
inequalities which are rooted in deep social and economic differences.61 Such an 
interpretation requires attention to context and, in relation to gender equality, an 
understanding of the patriarchal nature of our society, the social and economic 
                                               
58 Sec 1 of the Constitution states that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the values of inter alia human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. The favorable constitutional climate coupled with a 
strong women’s movement allowed women to advocate for policies and laws that enshrined rights 
that benefited them. The first women-specific laws that were passed related to legalising abortion, the 
Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996; criminalising violence against women, the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 and the tightening up of regulations to ensure that 
defaulters on maintenance payments could be prosecuted, the now Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.  
For a discussion of the importance of the women’s movement in the South African context see 
Shireen Hassim ‘The gender pact and democratic consolidation: Institutionalizing gender equality in 
the South African state’ (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 505; Shireen Hassim ‘Voices, hierarchies and 
spaces: Reconfiguring the women’s movement in democratic South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 175. 
59 Karl E. Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146; Cathi 
Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 249; Justice Yvonne Mokgoro ‘Constitutional 
claims for gender equality in South Africa: A judicial response’ (2003) 67 Albany Law Review 565; 
Penelope E. Andrews ‘Imagine all the women: Power, gender and the transformative possibilities of 
the South African Constitution’ in Muno Ndalo & Margaret Grieco (eds) Power, gender and social 
change in Africa (2009) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1493500. 
60 Sec 9 of the Constitution states ‘(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds 
in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.’ 
61 Albertyn ‘Equality’ op cit note 41 at 82;  Catherine Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in Woolman, 
Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson & Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta, 2nd edition, 
Cape Town, 2008) 35-1 at 35-6. 
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disparities that exist which increase women’s vulnerability to, for example, violence 
and the intersecting nature of inequalities.62  
For a substantive understanding of equality, the focus of a legal inquiry should 
also be on the impact of an act and on the nature of the harm created.63 Albertyn 
and Goldblatt articulated the importance of a substantive understanding of the right 
to equality and how such an understanding would influence a court’s considerations: 
 
‘A legal commitment to substantive equality thus requires a retreat from legal 
formalism. Importantly, the assessment of context and impact should be guided by the 
purpose of the right and its underlying values. While an analysis of the context in 
which the alleged violation occurs enhances a court’s understanding of the legal claim, 
a clear exposition of the purpose of the right to equality, and of the constitutional 
values that underpin it, provide the court with crucial signposts to a decision most 
faithful to the Final Constitution.’64 
 
In its first judgment pertaining to unfair discrimination, the Constitutional Court 
recognised the importance of taking account of context, impact and disadvantage in 
furthering equality ideals.65 In Brink v Kitshoff, the Court stated: 
 
‘Section 8 was adopted then in the recognition that discrimination against people who 
are members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and 
harm. Such discrimination is unfair: it builds and entrenches inequality amongst 
different groups in our society. The drafters realised that it was necessary both to 
proscribe such forms of discrimination and to permit positive steps to redress the 
effects of such discrimination.’66 
 
In the expansion of its interpretation of substantive equality, the Court has given 
prominence to dignity as the value that largely defines the right to equality. This 
approach has been criticised since it creates the possibility of individualising claims 
that derogate from the “actual social and economic disadvantage and the systemic 
                                               
62 Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Equality’ op cit note 61 at 35-4. 
63 Ibid 35-7; Catherine Albertyn ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 
SAJHR 253 at 259. 
64 Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Equality’ op cit note 61 at 35-7 (footnotes omitted). 
65 Albertyn ‘Substantive equality’ op cit note 63 at 253; Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Equality’ op cit note 61 at 
35-8. 
66 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 42 (hereinafter Brink). 
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nature of inequality”.67 However, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right 
to equality has kept on evolving and certain judgments in fact show sensitivity to a 
contextual and systemic understanding of individual and group based inequalities.68  
In interpreting section 9 of the Constitution and in establishing a test for unfair 
discrimination, the Court has also embraced a substantive understanding of the right 
by focusing on the impact of discrimination on the complainant and his or her group, 
which requires the consideration of the position of the complainant in society and 
whether she/he has suffered from past patterns of disadvantage.69 The manner in 
which a court engages with the notions of substantive equality, specifically context 
and impact, “is a key determinant of the outcome of a case and a crucial indicator of 
the achievement of substantive equality through law.”70  
Albertyn stresses the importance of bringing contextual evidence to court to 
support a substantive understanding of the right to equality in relation to promoting 
gender equality: 
 
‘Firstly, the context of an alleged rights violation should be understood to include 
these intersecting social and economic inequalities – the particular complexity of 
                                               
67 Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Equality’ op cit note 61 at 35-9; see for example the Court’s interpretation in 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
68 Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Equality’ op cit note 63 at 35-10 refers to the judgment in Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
69 Albertyn ‘Substantive equality’ op cit note 63 at 259. The test for unfair discrimination in terms of 
sec 9 of the Constitution was laid down in Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (hereinafter 
Harksen). The Court divided the equality analysis into three distinct stages:  
First, one needs to ask if the law/conduct differentiates between people or categories of people. If so, 
is there a rational connection between the differentiation and a legitimate government purpose? If not, 
then there is no violation of section 9(1). If it actually bears a rational connection, there is no violation 
of section 9(1), but it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.  
Secondly, one needs to determine whether the discrimination amounts to unfair discrimination. Does 
the differentiation amount to discrimination? If it is based on a specified ground, that is, a ground 
listed in section 9(3), then, discrimination is established. If it is based on an unspecified ground, the 
applicant must prove the discrimination by showing that the differentiation is based on characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings or to affect 
them adversely in a comparably serious manner. Once discrimination is established, it needs to be 
established whether it is unfair. If the discrimination is based on specified ground, it is presumed to be 
unfair in terms of section 9(5). If the discrimination is based on an unspecified ground, then the 
unfairness will have to be established by the applicant. The test for unfairness focuses on the impact 
of discrimination on the applicant and others in the same situation.  
Lastly if the discrimination is found to be unfair, it will have to be determined whether the provision 
under attack can be justified under sec 36 of the Constitution (the limitation clause); see Ian Currie & 
Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (Juta, 6th edition, 2013) 216:  
70 Albertyn ‘Substantive equality’ op cit note 63 at 259. 
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women’s lives. When (poor) women bring their claims to court, lawyers and judges 
need to understand this context: how gender inequality and poverty intersect, how 
gendered material conditions relate to gendered norms and social attitudes. This 
information needs to be introduced in court as part of the contextual analysis that is 
required in determining whether a right has been violated.’71 
 
It is therefore crucial when bringing an equality claim, to provide a court with 
contextual evidence to make sure it is able to give a decision, conscious of its 
consequences and impact. This contextual evidence allows/enables feminist lawyers 
to frame the law from women’s viewpoint and to suggest legal solutions that address 
women’s subordination through law. Shalleck stresses the importance of properly 
contextualising issues from a feminist viewpoint and identifies key issues that 
feminist litigators should focus on:  
 
‘First, contextualizing involves focusing on the particularity and uniqueness of each 
situation by attending to the richness and complexity of detail found within it. Second, 
it relies upon the recognition of multiple perspectives for understanding any particular 
situation, both at the level of individual participants, as well as the communities those 
participants belong to, Third, contextualizing involves identifying the different norms, 
practices and values that the multiple communities have. Fourth, it acknowledges that 
the interests of individual participants and their communities might be different. Fifth, 
disparities in power among the participants and their communities are acknowledged. 
Sixth, it recognizes that individuals exist not in isolation, but in multiple relationships. 
Those relationships are important in understanding not only a particular event, but 
also in the structure of law. Seventh, it considers the ways that individuals exist within 
and in opposition to institutions. Eighth, it draws upon knowledge from other 
disciplines to help interpret the meaning of particular actions. Psychology, sociology, 
economics, literature, history may all be used.’72 
 
This study will focus on the role of amici curiae participation in the advancement of 
the feminist project in law by providing relevant contextual evidence to court and 
supporting a substantive understanding of the right to equality. The following section 
analyses the importance and relevance of focusing on amicus curiae participation as 
feminist litigation strategy geared towards change. 
                                               
71 Catherine Albertyn ‘Gendered transformation in South African jurisprudence: Poor women and the 
Constitutional Court’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 591 at 600. 
72 Shalleck op cit note 56 at 387-388. 
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3 AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION AS A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE 
 
Litigation is an important vehicle for social change. Indeed, carefully structured 
litigation could have consequences which stretch far beyond the court and its 
decision.73 Although this study does not intend to investigate the impact that litigation 
has on social change, it intends to explore the importance of strategic litigation, in 
representing  women’s lived realties to courts, which might influence the way in 
which a decision is reached and which could ultimately pave the way for future 
change. 
In such a sense amicus curiae participation is important, as it allows 
participation in court by a range of people and represents interests that go well 
beyond those of the actual parties.74 The purpose of this participation is to ensure 
that courts understand the point of view of those who will be affected by their 
decisions and although the amici curiae might not be party to the actual case, its 
participation recognises that the public have a legitimate interest in influencing the 
way in which law is made, which might impact on its legitimacy when influencing 
future change.75  
The different perspective that an amicus curiae brings to a matter provides for 
more informed decisions and might lead a court to decide a matter differently than it 
would have otherwise, conscious of its impact through the “multidimensional and 
anti-foundational representation of people’s lives”.76 Ultimately, amicus curiae 
participation sensitises a court in its decision-making process and ensures that a 
court is better informed when making its decision.77  
As stated, one of the challenges faced by feminist litigators is how to make 
the law sensitive to women’s experience, and specifically, the strategy required to 
identify to a court how the law affects women’s lives. It is here that amicus curiae 
                                               
73 Budlender ‘On practicing law’ op cit note 34 at 323. 
74 The rules of the Constitutional Court, specifically rule 10, promulgated under Government Notice 
R1675 in Government Gazette 25726 of 31 October 2003; provide for amicus curiae participation and 
determine that any person interested in any matter before the Court may be admitted as amicus 
curiae. The Court specifically requires a description of the relevant interests and position to be 
adopted by the amicus curiae and an indication that the relevant submissions will be different from 
those of the other parties. See the detailed discussion of Rule 10 in chapter 2 below. 
75 Philip L. Bryden ‘Public interest intervention in the courts’ (1987) 66 Canadian Bar Review 490 at 
513.  
76 Joanne Conaghan ‘Intersectionality and UK equality initiatives’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 317 at 322. 
77 Christina Murray ‘Litigating in the public interest: Intervention and the amicus curiae’ (1994) 10 
SAJHR 240 at 250. 
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participation can play an important role in providing an avenue for feminist and 
gendered arguments to be heard by a court; to indicate to a court the impact that a 
particular decision might have on women, and to advocate for the necessary change 
through legal action. I intend to explore amicus curiae participation as a specific 
litigation strategy that could best represent the complexity of women’s lives before a 
court, and in this specific instance the South African Constitutional Court.   
I will focus on how these briefs have been and are being used to place the 
necessary gendered, social and economic context before a court and how through 
this evidence it is able to provide a specific or alternative rights interpretation; to 
contest established jurisprudence and to expand on and protect specific rights 
entitlements. The chosen case discussions will analyse the purpose and impact of 
the amici curiae briefs, in an attempt to establish whether they were able to present 
or better represent the complexities of women’s lives to advance equality within the 





















4 THESIS STRUCTURE78 
 
As mentioned, this introductory chapter has explored the enabling role of law and 
litigation in effecting social change and the unique role of public interest litigation in 
contributing to this change. It explored the feminist project in law and established 
how feminist lawyers relying on the Constitution’s equality right have developed a 
substantive legal methodology in order to adjudicate equality cases. 
Chapter two will examine the history of amicus curiae participation focusing 
on the public interest nature of these interventions. I proceed to identify the purpose 
of amicus curiae participation as public interest litigation strategy and the impact that 
this participation could have on judicial decision-making. The focus is on the way in 
which amicus curiae participation could bring women’s lived realities and their voices 
to court and on the importance of feminist method in assisting to establish a 
gendered and feminist litigation strategy. The specific rule allowing for amicus curiae 
participation in the South African Constitutional Court is analysed. 
 Chapter three focuses on violence against women; women’s voice and the 
efficacy of the criminal justice system. The chapter carefully constructs the purpose 
and impact of amici curiae participation in key constitutional violence-related matters. 
The cases selected for discussion include:  
 
(a)  S v Baloyi.79 The case was a constitutional challenge to domestic violence 
legislation and the Court was faced with the complex task of establishing a 
balance between the State’s constitutional duty to provide effective remedies 
against domestic violence, and its simultaneous obligation to respect 
constitutional fair trial rights. The Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) and 
the Minister of Justice participated as amici curiae. 
 
(b)  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another.80 The case 
concerned the possible delictual liability of the State in failing to protect a 
woman from a brutal attack from a man with previous convictions who at the 
time of the attack was out on bail. The case was ground-breaking in the 
                                               
78 The research methodology for the study is set out in Annexure A. 
79 S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) (hereinafter Baloyi). 




establishment of the constitutional duty of all courts to develop the common 
law or customary law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. The Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) participated as amicus 
curiae. The State’s delictual liability is observed in a series of cases decided 
after the Carmichele Constitutional Court decision, in order to confirm, both 
the State’s duty to protect women from violence, and the importance of follow 
up amici curiae participation to build on the set positive precedent.  
 
(c)  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another.81 The case 
questioned the existing common law definition of rape and considered its 
development to include the anal penetration of a victim irrespective of his/her 
gender. CALS and the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre (TLAC) 
participated as amici curiae. 
  
(d)  S v Zuma.82 The case concerned a high profile rape trial and concerns were 
raised regarding the treatment of the complainant in the case. TLAC, CALS 
and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 
attempted to participate as amici curiae. Although not a Constitutional Court 
decision, this was an interesting matter in terms of amicus curiae participation 
in criminal proceedings, which also has important implications for the 
structure of amicus curiae participation in general. 
 
Chapter four focuses on women exercising their constitutional rights within 
customary law and discusses the intricacies of litigating on issues of culture and 
equality, and the role that amicus curiae participation has to play. The cases 





                                               
81 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (hereinafter 
Masiya).   
82 S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W) (hereinafter Zuma). 
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(a) Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South 
African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another.83 Here the Court had to deal with the constitutional 
validity of section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 which 
regulated customary intestate succession, and the constitutionality of the rule 
of male primogeniture in this context. The CGE participated as amicus curiae. 
 
(b) Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa.84 Here the question was whether a 
community could develop its customs and traditions to appoint a woman as 
chief of their community; a position traditionally reserved for men, in line with 
the principle of primogeniture. The CGE and National Movement of Rural 
Women (NMRW) participated as amici curiae. 
 
(c) Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa.85  The case was 
concerned with the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, specifically in the sense 
that it discriminated on the grounds of gender and race. The Women’s Legal 
Centre (WLC) participated as amicus curiae. 
 
(d) MM v MN and Another.86 The case dealt with the recognition of the different 
wives’ rights to equality and dignity in a polygynous customary marriage.87 
The question was whether consent was required from a first wife, when a 
husband decided to conclude a second or subsequent customary marriage, 
and what the consequences would be if no consent was obtained. The WLC, 
CGE and NMRW participated as amici curiae. 
 
 
                                               
83 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African 
Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (hereinafter Bhe). 
84 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) (hereinafter Shilubana). 
85 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (hereinafter Gumede). 
86 MM v MN and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) (hereinafter MM v MN). 
87 Polygyny is ‘polygamy in which a man has more than one wife’ as compared to polyandry which is 
‘polygamy in which a woman has more than one husband.’; see MM v MN op cit note 85 fn 1. 
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Chapter 5 identifies two specific areas, sex work and domestic life partnerships 
between heterosexual couples, as areas where women’s vulnerability is particularly 
pertinent and where there has been considerable work done by organisations to 
address this vulnerability and to provide women with some protection and recourse 
when required. The cases discussed are:  
 
(a) S v Jordan and Others.88 The case was concerned with the decriminalisation 
of prostitution and the constitutional validity of certain sections of the Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957. The Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task 
Force (SWEAT)89 and the CGE participated as amici curiae. 
 
(b) Volks NO v Robinson and Others.90 The case was concerned with extending 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouse Act 27 of 100, to provide for a domestic 
partner in a heterosexual relationship to claim maintenance under the Act. 
CALS participated as amicus curiae. 
 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study, addressing the findings under the relevant themes, 
focusing on the purpose of the amici curiae’s participation, their arguments and the 
impact they had on the judicial decisions reached. It considers the importance of 
amicus curiae participation in enhancing women’s lives through the attainment or 
extension of rights and as platform for possibly influencing future legal change. 
Important recurrent themes are discussed to explore the importance of minority 
judgments; amici participation, democracy and voice; and the importance of drafting 
a proper amicus curiae brief. Lastly, future research possibilities are identified. 
 
                                               
88 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) (hereinafter Jordan). 
89 The SWEAT brief was a collaborative brief between SWEAT, CALS and the Reproductive Health 
Research Unit (RHRU). 





1 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS WITHIN A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE  
 
‘No longer a mere friend of the court, the amicus has become a lobbyist, an advocate, 
and most recently, the vindicator of the politically powerless.’1 
 
Amicus curiae participation has throughout the centuries been integral to the process 
of judicial deliberation. The amici’s role has evolved considerably and today it is 
acknowledged that amici curiae are active participants in litigation, in contrast to their 
historical role as being an impartial assistant to the judiciary.2 
 This chapter examines the history of amicus curiae participation and the 
relevance of this participation in influencing judicial decision-making. The focus is on 
the amici’s new-found role in representing public interest, specifically within the 
context of gender litigation, and on the usefulness of amici curiae participation in 
representing women’s voices and with regard to the complexity of women’s lives in 
litigation. In doing this, I attempt to show that amicus curiae participation, as part of 
litigation strategy, has the potential to assist courts to reach decisions that would 
better represent women’s lives and realities. 
 This potential will be explored from a South African perspective and in terms 
of the importance of amicus curiae participation in the Constitutional Court.  
 
1.1 History of Amicus Curiae Participation: From Friendship to Advocacy 
The amicus curiae is a well-established concept in legal history. Translated literally 
from Latin, the term means “friend of the court”, while the earliest example of this 
participation can be found in Roman law.3 In its most basic form, and at the court’s 
discretion, the amicus curiae provided information on areas of law that the court 
regarded as complex and beyond its expertise.4 From the outset it was clear that the 
amicus curiae was not a litigating party, but merely an assistant to the court. 
                                               
1 Michael K. Lowman ‘The litigating amicus curiae: When does the party begin after the friends leave’ 
(1992) 41 American University Law Review 1243 at 1245 (footnotes omitted). 
2 Samuel Krislov ‘The amicus curiae brief: From friendship to advocacy’ (1963) 72 Yale Law Journal 
694; Lowman op cit note 1 at 1244. 
3 George Williams ‘The amicus curiae and intervention in the high court of Australia: A comparative 
analysis’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 365 at 366. 
4 Lowman op cit note 1 at 1248. 
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Participation by amici curiae became common in many jurisdictions, conforming to its 
traditional role as a disinterested bystander who, at the court’s request or 
permission, informed the court on points of law.5 The value of this kind of 
intervention was obvious in times when factual material, such as law reports, was 
scarce and the amici curiae mainly assisted courts in avoiding error and ultimately 
served to maintain judicial honour and integrity.6  
The common law adversarial system restricted amici curiae participation to a 
select few actions.7 It is only later, and mainly through developments in the American 
legal system, that courts gradually acknowledged that judicial proceedings might 
have repercussions beyond the immediate parties and that amici curiae participation 
could adequately represent third-party interests that were previously ignored under 
the adversarial system.8  
The American legal system, although derived from the English system, has 
set the modern norm concerning the amici’s role as an active participant in litigation, 
in contrast to its previous role as an impartial assistant to the judiciary.9 The complex 
federal structure of the United States of America, coupled with the court’s 
acknowledgment of the power of judicial review, meant that many matters of national 
interest were litigated between private parties.10 The amicus curiae was one of the 
methods developed by the courts to include parties/institutions not involved at the 
outset of the litigation, but who had a direct and significant interest in the outcome of 
the case.11 The new role fulfilled by amici curiae participation has been described as 
follows: 
‘This device represents the prime departure from the traditional adversary system of 
justice. No longer is the system characterized by its triangular-like structure with the 
contesting parties at the base and the court at the apex. If anything the structure would 
                                               
5 Ernest Angell ‘The amicus curiae American development of English institutions’ (1967) 16 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1017; Lowman op cit note 1 at 1248. 
6 Christina Murray ‘Litigating in the public interest: Intervention and the amicus curiae’ (1994) 
10 SAJHR 240 at 241; Lowman op cit note 1 at 1248. 
7 Lowman op cit note 1 at 1249. 
8 Id. 
9 Krislov op cit note 2 at 694; Lowman op cit note 1 at 1244. 
10 Murray op cit note 6 at 245. 
11 Id; In short, the American system allowed for two categories of intervention, the first being 
participation by governmental units which had a strong interest in the case and the second comprised 
of individuals or groups representing private interests, see Lowman op cit note 1 at 1258 and Krislov 
op cit note 2 in this regard. 
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more accurately be described as “multi-sided” since through the amicus technique, 
many more than just the immediate adversaries enter the judicial forum.’12 
 
Despite the developing nature of amici curiae participation, and irrespective of the 
jurisdiction involved, there are still certain traditional common features with which 
they must comply. The amicus curiae is still not viewed as a litigating party and its 
participation is totally reliant on the discretion of the court.13 The amicus is generally 
not allowed to raise a new cause of action and is not allowed to repeat party 
arguments.14 The unique nature of amici curiae participation lies in the court’s 
expectation that it will bring a different perspective to the case than those already 
before it.15 By keeping to the above traditions, the new-found flexibility and versatility 
of these interventions still comply with the amici’s original purpose as being of 
assistance to the court.  
The change from impartial assistant to more active participant has created the 
possibility of using these participations as a tactical instrument to influence judicial 
decision-making.16 Writing in the American context, Collins describes the influence 
that these applications might have on judicial decision-making: 
 
‘By providing the justices with a plethora of information regarding the likely social 
consequences of a decision – at the same time advocating for a specific ideological 
outcome – the amici strengthen the arguments of the direct parties to litigation, 
buttressing the overall persuasiveness of a particular side of the debate. And although 
the justices pursue policy goals, they are also “legal thinkers”, which implies that they 
should be receptive to these goals of persuasion. As instruments of persuasive 
argumentation, it is expected that amicus briefs will lead the justices toward endorsing 
the “correct” policy outcome, within the constraints they face as ultimately legal 
decision makers.’17 
 
                                               
12 Lucius J. Barker ‘Third parties in litigation: A systemic view of judicial function’ (1967) 29 The 
Journal of Politics 41 at 52. 
13 Zeldine O’Brien ‘The courts make a new friend? Amicus curiae jurisdiction in Ireland’ (2004) 7 
Trinity College Law Review 5 at 26. 
14 Ruben J. Garcia ‘A democratic theory of amicus advocacy’ (2008) 35 Florida State University Law 
Review 315 at 321. 
15 Geoff Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ in Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (Juta, 2nd edition, 2008) 8-1. 
16 Krislov op cit note 2 at 704. 
17 Paul M. Collins ‘Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2007) 60 Political Research Quarterly 
55 at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
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In its most basic format, the amicus curiae still assists the court by presenting factual 
material considered necessary for rational decision-making.18 However, three 
additional purposes can be ascribed to amici curiae participation. Firstly, amici 
participation can be used to support litigating parties’ contentions, where it devotes 
its brief to improving the main legal arguments of the party it supports.19 This it does 
by helping the party flesh out arguments it is forced to offer in summary form and to 
present arguments the party wants to put forth, but cannot do so itself.20  
Secondly, it can advance a particular legal position, that it has chosen 
independent from the party’s contentions.21 This type of amicus curiae can be 
described as being “in the public interest”; as it moves beyond the issues specifically 
argued by the parties and provides the court with information fitting the amicus’s 
preferences, or provides the court with information about the potential consequences 
of its decision.22 Providing assistance to the court is of secondary concern in this 
type of application and the purpose is to make sure that the court understands the 
point of view of those who will be affected by its decision and to ensure that those 
who will be affected feel that their voice has been heard.23  
Lastly, a combination of the above is possible where an amicus curiae in fact 
sides with one of the parties, but still advances its own specific interpretation. This 
type of intervention could also generally be described as being in the public interest 
as it attempts to alert the court to the wider societal impact of the decision by aligning 
itself with a specific party’s contentions. 
Thus far, I have advanced arguments in support of the new-found role of 
amici curiae participation within the judicial framework. However, some have 
cautioned against the use and ultimate purpose of amici participation and are 
                                               
18 Barker op cit note 12 equates the amicus curiae brief to the so called Brandeis brief named after 
Louis D. Brandeis who presented the court with a host of social and economic data to assist the court 
in its decision-making process. 
19 Paul M. Smith ‘The sometimes troubled relationship between courts and their “friends”’ (1998) 24 
Litigation 24 at 26; James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Whalbeck ‘Amicus curiae and the role of information at 
the Supreme Court’ (1997) 50 Political Research Quarterly 365. 
20 Bruce J. Ennis ‘Effective amicus briefs’ (1984) 33 Catholic Law Review 603 at 606. 
21 Ibid 603; Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-1. 
22 Alixandra B. Yanus ‘The judiciary as agenda setter: Explaining interest group participation in the 
courts’ Paper prepared for the 2009 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Toronto Canada, September 3-6, (2009); available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1450883; 
Collins ‘Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court’ op cit note 17 at 58. 




concerned that they might be framed with a specific political ideal in mind, which 
could unduly politicise judicial decisions.24 The court’s function could also be shifted 
from judging to legislating, permitting political battles lost elsewhere, to be revisited 
in the courtroom.25 Concern has also been expressed about the neutrality and 
fairness of the research presented to the court, as the research is not subjected to 
examination and cross-examination as it would be during the normal trial procedure, 
and it is argued that judges might not be equipped to see relevant flaws, as they 
would when dealing with legal arguments and materials.26  
Despite these criticisms, amici curiae participation have become essential in 
ensuring that courts are aware of the broader legal and policy ramifications of their 
decisions.27 It is important to explore this new-found role of the amici curiae and the 


















                                               
24 Mona Arshi & Colm O’Cinneide ‘Third-party interventions: The public interest reaffirmed’ (2004) 
Spring Public Law 69 at 73. 
25 Sarah Hannett ‘Third party intervention: In the public interest?’ (2003) Spring Public Law 128. 
26 Smith op cit note 19 at 25. 
27 Paul M. Collins Jr. Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest groups and judicial decision making 
(Oxford University Press 2008) 3. 
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2 INTERVENING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
Here, I explore the importance of public interest amici curiae participation and the 
broader interests they represent, as well as reasons why public interest groups make 
use of the judicial system, the judicial impact of these interventions and their overall 
importance in a judicial setting. 
Public interest law has been described as a focus “on the wider public interest 
rather than the more private interest of a particular individual”.28 A public interest 
group can broadly be defined as a free standing voluntary organisation typically 
established to further a particular cause or simply to provide the poor with access to 
justice.29  
There are many reasons why public interest groups decide to litigate. Collins 
identifies five general, often interrelated, reasons why public interest groups choose 
litigation as a means to an end.30 First, groups might turn to the courts when they 
lack access to alternative venues such as the executive. Secondly, there are certain 
unique benefits that can be ascribed to judicial decisions such as its precedent 
setting capacity, especially in relation to constitutional decisions.31 Third, litigation 
may be a means to protect gains won through other avenues, such as defending a 
specific piece of legislation.32 Fourth, groups “may seek out the judicial arena to 
counterbalance their opposition’s participation.”33 Lastly, organisations may use the 
court system when their goals predispose them to litigate. 34 
Most public interest groups choose not to enter the legal arena and concentrate 
their resources on engaging the executive and general advocacy. When they do 
decide to enter the legal arena, it is often not as a direct party to the litigation and the 
                                               
28 Geoff Budlender ‘On practicing law’ in Hugh Corder (ed) Essays on law and social practice in South 
Africa (Juta 1988) 319 at 322. 
29 Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston ‘The organization of public interest practice: 1975-2004’ 
(2006) 84 North Carolina Law Review 1591. 




34 South Africa’s Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) could be seen as an example. The WLC in its mission 
statement available at http://www.wlce.co.za (last accessed 25 October 2012) states that in order to 
fulfil their objectives they will free of charge litigate cases which advance women’s rights and are in 
the public interest and will attempt to produce briefs to assist courts in constitutional cases which 
concern women’s rights and gender equality.  
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method of participation differs.35 They can set up a test case which usually rests on a 
constitutional issue. Here, organised interests would want to challenge 
legislation/policy or an individual could approach an organisation with the intention of 
challenging legislation or policy.36 This method is not often used, as it is time 
consuming and requires a great deal of resources.37 Public interest groups might 
also decide to sponsor a case brought by others. Here, an organisation will assist 
with costs and resources in exchange for using the case as a means of highlighting 
its own interests.38 Again this is very expensive, and time consuming, and gives a 
group less leeway to structure a case.39  
Another method is described as amicus curiae participation. This type of 
participation is less costly and, as amicus, it might be able to introduce a new or 
alternative legal position and introduce sociological evidence to a court.40 Given the 
low costs and flexibility associated with this form of participation, it is the clear choice 
for public interest groups when they decide to litigate as a non-party.41 
 Within the South African context, groups and organisations have been very 
receptive to utilising amici curiae participation as a cost effective and efficient 
method of representing public interests. Most cases serving before the Constitutional 
Court have groups participating as amici curiae, which indicates that this form of 
participation is seen as an important strategy in public interest litigation. 
 
2.1 Judicial Impact of Public Interest Litigation and Amici Curiae Participation 
A focal point of this study is analysing the impact that amicus curiae participation 
might have on judicial decision-making. This impact needs to be understood within 
the broader context and purpose of public interest litigation (as discussed in chapter 
one). The impact of litigation could be direct and/or indirect. 
Direct impact refers to changing a law and/or policy, especially through the 
extension of rights, which has a direct impact on the applicant’s lives.42 Indirect 
                                               
35 Collins ‘Friends of the Supreme Court’ op cit note 27 at 25. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Ibid 26. 
39 Id. 
40 Ibid 27. 
41 Id. 
42 Jackie Dugard & Malcolm Langford ‘Art or science? Synthesising lessons from public interest 
litigation and the dangers of legal determinism’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 39 at 57; the Court decision in Bhe 
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impact is closely related to the view of legal mobilisation scholars who believe that 
litigation contributes to consciousness raising and political organising.43 The indirect 
impact of a judgment could be multiple including political mobilisation around a 
particular issue; publicising an issue as method of communicating with the public; 
legitimising with the authority of law a particular struggle;44 and/or influencing 
jurisprudence to facilitate future litigation, for example, setting new precedent in 
influencing the writing of obiter dictum statements or a minority judgment.45  
When participating as amici curiae one can, through contextual, technical or 
statistical information, propose a different interpretation regarding the application of a 
specific right; contest established jurisprudence or suggest a specific remedy option. 
With these purposes in mind, and considering the direct and/or indirect impact of 
judicial decisions, the amici’s impact on judicial decision-making could also be 
described as direct and/or indirect.  
Direct impact refers to instances when the amici curiae’s 
arguments/interpretation and/or remedy is reflected in the main judgment.46 Although 
persuading a court to decide a matter differently, is the ultimate prize for an amicus 
curiae, its indirect impact and role as judicial sensitizer should not be overlooked, 
specifically the possibility of influencing the way a matter is decided in future.  
Songer & Reginald aptly capture the indirect impact that amici curiae 
participation might have on judicial decision-making.47 Considering the importance of 
political mobilisation they state: 
 
‘They may hope to convince their own members that they are fighting the good fight 
even if they expect to lose; or, anticipating that the Court will support their group’s 
position, they may want to be able to claim credit for a new policy. Amicus 
                                                                                                                                                  
and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human 
Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 
580 (CC) (hereinafter Bhe) could be used as example. 
43 Michael W. McCann ‘Reform litigation on trial’ (1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry 715. 
44 The Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (hereinafter the TAC 
case) could be seen as an example here. 
45 Dugard & Langford op cit note 42 at 57. 
46 Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire ‘Lawyers, Justices, and issue salience: When and how do legal 
arguments affect the U.S. Supreme Court?’ (2007) 41 Law & Society Review 259 at 261.  
47 Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan ‘Interest group success in the courts: Amicus 
participation in the Supreme Court’ (1993) 46 Political Research Quarterly 339. 
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participation may also provide a vehicle to generate publicity about a case that will 
help to mobilize opinion behind expected future group action in other forums.’48  
 
In considering indirect legal impact they state: 
 
‘Groups may also file briefs in an attempt to shape long-term Court policy; even if they 
do not expect to influence the outcome of a present case, they may hope to plant ideas 
in the justices’ minds that will make them more receptive to groups’ arguments in 
future cases. Another possibility is that amicus briefs may influence the content of 
opinions even though they have little impact on the overall outcome.’49 
 
Based on the above discussion I devised a table to serve as an analytical 
framework, indicating both the direct and/or indirect impact of amici curiae 
participation. The framework is by no means exhaustive, but attempts to illustrate the 
impact of amici curiae participation keeping its purpose and relevance in mind.  
 
 
Although much of the focus of this thesis is on the direct impact of amicus curiae 
participation, it is clear that the impact of amicus curiae participation is much broader 
than just the judgment. One should focus on its enabling potential and how this might 
                                               
48 Ibid 351. 
49 Id. 
DIRECT IMPACT INDIRECT IMPACT 
• Main/majority judgment reflecting the 
amicus’s arguments; rights 
interpretation; suggested remedy. 
• Change in law/policy as advocated 
for by amici curiae. 
 
• Influencing the writing of a minority 
judgment that could affect future 
decision-making. 
• Arguments / interpretation reflected in 
obiter statements. 
• Publicity. This could generate support 
for a specific cause; encourage public 
discourse. 
• Encouraging political mobilisation.  
• Initiating extra-judicial responses, for 
example, capturing the attention of 
government and the executive. 
• Influencing future jurisprudence. 
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influence later decisions, impact on policy considerations, and raise awareness for a 
specific cause. The above analytical framework will be of particular importance in the 
subsequent chapters where I will be analysing the purpose, relevance and impact of 

































3  GENDER LITIGATION AND AMICI CURIAE PARTICIPATION 
 
Colker, poses the question whether one can be a feminist, and consistent with that 
perspective, make use of the courts and litigation.50 According to her, we are often 
told the correct feminist position on a particular issue, but we are rarely told whether 
the way to achieve that position is through legal argumentation, and, if legal 
argumentation is appropriate, how to offer legal arguments from a feminist 
perspective.51 What is so called feminist litigation and what role can amicus curiae 
participation play within feminist litigation strategy? Pellat describes the relevance of 
a feminist voice in litigation: 
 
‘The problem, from a feminist standpoint, is that law’s way of envisioning women’s 
reality, of translating the substance and circumstances of women’s lives, has tended to 
be dominated by the harsh exclusionary gender-based politics marking the social 
realm. Cultural myths and stereotypes about women and narrow, dualistic 
constructions of difference have dictated the way in which law has historically 
conceptualized and responded to women and women’s subordination. In order to make 
law conscious of, and responsive, to gender oppression in all of its manifestations, it 
is necessary to challenge signifying rules and conventions that denigrate and erase 
the difference that women represent and, at the same time, to find ways of re-working 
the discourse in order to represent who women are and what they experience in 
palpably real and full terms.’52 
 
Pellat poses the question whether it is it possible to counteract law’s tendency to 
mirror social mores, values and perspectives through the legal process, which would 
possibly provide leeway and opportunities that could champion for change.53  
According to Conaghan, feminist litigation, first and foremost, could bring a 
gendered perception of legal and social arrangements to a largely gender-neutral 
way of thinking.54 She argues that the object of feminist litigation is to highlight 
                                               
50 Ruth Colker ‘Feminist Litigation: An oxymoron? – A study of the briefs filed in William L. Webster V. 
Reproductive Health Services’ (1990) 13 Harv. Women’s L.J. 137. 
51 Id. 
52 Anna S. Pellatt ‘Equality Rights litigation in social transformation: A consideration of the women’s 
legal education and actions fund’s intervention in Vriend v. R.’ (2000) 12 CJWL 117 at 121. 
53 Id. 
54 Joanne Conaghan ‘Reassessing the feminist theoretical project in law’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law 
and Society 351 at 359.  
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gendered assumptions that are too often rendered invisible by an apparently 
objective analysis of law: 
 
‘Feminism thus presupposes that gender has a much greater structural and/or 
discursive significance that is commonly assumed, a significance which is 
ideologically but not practically diminished by its relative invisibility. In this sense, 
feminism purports to offer a better understanding of the social world by addressing 
aspects which have hitherto been ignored or misrepresented, while, at the same time, 
countering the ideological effects to which such misperceptions give rise.’55 
 
One of the challenges faced by feminist litigators, and specifically those who work 
within the public interest sphere, is how to make the law sensitive to women’s 
experiences and specifically the strategy involved in identifying to a court how the 
law affects women’s lives.56 As feminist lawyers, we try “to improve women’s social 
and economic status; to reach those women most in need; and to enhance women’s 
self-respect, power and ability to alter existing institutional arrangements.”57 But how 
should we go about doing this? The following discussion attempts to answer this 
question. 
 
3.1  Strategically Litigating from a Feminist and Gendered Viewpoint  
Legal interpretation in common law countries has a tendency to be formalistic, 
technical and rule bound, especially in South Africa when considering our apartheid 
history.58 Justice Langa has described this approach to legal reasoning as: 
 
‘This formal reasoning prevents an inquiry into the true motivation for certain 
decisions and presents the law as neutral and objective when in reality it expresses a 
particular politics and enforces a singular conception of society.’59 
                                               
55 Ibid 360 (footnotes omitted). 
56 Sarah E. Burns ‘Notes from the field: A reply to Professor Colker’ (1990) 13 Harv. Women’s L.J 189 
at 196. 
57 Deborah Rhode ‘Feminist critical theories’ (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev 617 at 637. 
58 South Africa used to follow the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty which allowed Parliament to 
pass legislation that could not be challenged. See Ian Currie & Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (Juta, 6th edition, 2013) 2 and I.M Rautenbach & E.F.J Malherbe Constitutional Law (Lexis 
Nexis, 5th edition, 2009) 52 for a discussion of the doctrine. Also see Karl E. Klare ‘Legal culture and 
transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 at 168. 
59 Justice Pius Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 at 357. 
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Much of this formalistic reasoning is based on traditional legal method that relies on 
relevant and persuasive legal evidence to determine facts; and on set precedent to 
provide a framework for analysis which then should lead to a rational legal 
decision.60 The feminist project in law challenges this traditional and formalistic legal 
method that is often employed by judicial decision makers.  
Feminist litigators focus on the context and impact in which rights violations or 
denials occur and focus attention on the capability of law to represent multiple 
interpretations that should be taken into account when making a legal decision.61 
However, the challenge lies in presenting these issues in such a way that it warrants 
judicial attention and here litigation strategy is the key.62 Mossman states that this is 
a tricky challenge and requires feminist to acknowledge the complexity of law, to 
recognise the relationship between law and social arrangements and to persist to 
seek justice in spite of law’s preference to constrict issues that separate the legal 
from the social effectively, so creating different categories for law and justice.63  
The question that should then be asked is, how should we litigate to make the 
law conscious of feminist reasoning when we address women’s inequality in society? 
Examining the place of feminism within the general context of legal method, Bartlett 
identified certain methods that could be used to place a feminist viewpoint before a 
court.64 For Bartlett, being feminist and presenting a feminist voice means “owning 
up to the part one plays in a sexist society: it means taking responsibility – for the 
existence and for the transformation of “our gendered identity, our politics, and our 
choices.”65 Identifying methods or practices as feminist, locates them as “part of a 
larger, critical agenda originating in the experiences of gender subordination.”66 
Writing about equality and gendered transformation within South African 
jurisprudence, Albertyn states that gendered opportunities through legal action may 
be presented in different ways and have multiple outcomes.67 These could take the 
form of general legal rights and remedies that, when properly utilised, could affect 
                                               
60 Mary Jane Mossman ‘Feminism and legal method: The difference it makes’ (1987) 3 Wisconsin 
Women’s Law Journal 147 at 153.  
61 Mary Jane Mossman ‘Feminism and the law: Challenges and choices’ (1998) 10 CJWL 1 at 3. 
62 Ibid 13. 
63 Id. 
64 Katharine T. Bartlett ‘Feminist legal methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829 at 831. 
65 Ibid 833. 
66 Ibid 834. 
67 Catherine Albertyn ‘Gendered transformation in South African jurisprudence: Poor women and the 
Constitutional Court’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 591 at 597.  
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the lives of those most in need, or the stance could be more normative “restating the 
values and norms that shape social and economic inequalities”, or it could politicise 
a particular issue with a range of outcomes.68 Gendered and feminist arguments 
could therefore be presented to a court in multiple ways.69  
In this context, the three feminist methods identified by Bartlett, which include 
the “women question”, “feminist practical reasoning” and “consciousness-raising”, 
provide a starting point in the decision on how to litigate from a feminist and 
gendered viewpoint. The first method described as the “women question”, represents 
how the substance of law is often used to suppress the perspectives of women and 
other excluded groups.70  
 
‘Once adopted as a method, asking the woman question is a method of critique as 
integral to legal analysis as determining the precedential value of a case, stating the 
facts, or applying law to facts. “Doing law” as a feminist means looking beneath the 
surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules and the assumptions 
underlying them and insisting upon applications of rules that do not perpetuate 
women’s subordination.’71 
 
Through the “women question” one would ask how existing legal standards and 
concepts might disadvantage women.72 Here, certain questions would become 
relevant, such as, have women been left out of consideration? If it is so, in what 
way? How might this be corrected? and, what difference would this make?73 The 
women question is intended to reveal “how the position of women reflects the 
organisation of society rather than the inherent characteristics of women.”74 Without 
these questions, differences associated with women would be taken for granted, 
justifying unequal treatment.75 Focusing attention on the “women question” does not 
mean that a decision should be reached that favours women, but that there should 
                                               
68 Id.  
69 This links with the discussion of Collins op cit note 27 why public interest groups decide to litigate 
and the options available to them.  
70 Bartlett op cit note 64 at 836. 
71 Ibid 843. 
72 Ibid 837. 
73 Id. 




be an awareness of “gender bias” and a decision should be defensible in light of this 
“bias”.76  
The second method refers to “feminist practical reasoning” which seeks to 
identify perspectives not represented in the dominant culture.77 Bartlett captures the 
essence of this method by stating: 
 
‘Feminist rationality acknowledges greater diversity in human experiences and the 
value of taking into account competing or inconsistent claims. It openly reveals its 
positional partiality by stating explicitly which moral and political choices underlie that 
partiality, and recognises its own implications for the distribution and exercise of 
power. Feminist rationality also strives to integrate emotive and intellectual elements 
and to open the possibilities of new situations rather than limit them with prescribed 
categories of analysis.’78  
 
This method’s impact resides in revealing insights about gender exclusion within 
existing legal rules and principles.79 Mostly, feminists do this by providing contextual 
evidence to expose that which would otherwise go unnoticed and unaddressed.80 In 
the case discussions that follow in the subsequent chapters, we see this method 
being employed to advocate for the development of the common law and for the 
extension of rights protection and to strengthen existing protection.81 
The third method, “consciousness-raising” complements the above two 
methods and provides a platform for women’s voices to be heard. Bartlett describes 
this as an “interactive and collaborative process of articulating one’s experiences and 
                                               
76 Ibid 846; Bartlett further at 848 takes note that the question could be widely framed to avoid 
essentialist tendencies including questions such as what assumptions are made by law? What 
assumptions are made about those whom it affects? Whose point of view do these assumptions 
reflect? Whose interests are invisible or peripheral? How might excluded viewpoints be identified and 
taken into account? The women question therefore requires great sensitivity to multiple, invisible 
forms of exclusion faced by a multitude of women.  
77 Bartlett op cit note 64 at 855. 
78 Ibid 858 (footnotes omitted). 
79 Id. 
80 Ibid 862-863. 
81 See specifically the cases of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 
938 (CC)(hereinafter Carmichele); Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another  
2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (hereinafter Masiya); S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) (hereinafter Jordan); 
Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (hereinafter Volks); Bhe op cit note 42; S v 
Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W) (hereinafter Zuma); Gumede v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (hereinafter Gumede); and MM v MN and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) 
(hereinafter MM v MN). 
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making meaning of them with others who also articulate experiences.”82 In litigation 
this can be particularly relevant in deposing to affidavits or supporting affidavits to 
share a particular experience with the court, and public at large, ultimately politicising 
the personal.83 
By using these methods Bartlett envisages that feminists would be able to 
challenge assumptions about women that underlie several laws and they would be 
able to demonstrate that laws based upon these assumptions are not rational and 
neutral, but irrational and discriminatory and in need of remedial action.84 To me, the 
three methods discussed by Bartlett are important when considering litigation 
strategy and, coupled with amicus curiae participation, could be the ideal starting 
point from which to introduce feminist arguments, that are aimed at addressing 
societal hierarchies and the subordination of women into otherwise neutral legal 
doctrine. By participating as amicus curiae, the “women question” allows us to 
consider the gendered impact of law, whilst “feminist practical reasoning” coupled 
with the method of “consciousness-raising”, allow us to bring contextual evidence to 
court that reflects women’s lived realities and voice, that highlight inequalities. 
Feminist engagement with the law, whether the intended purpose is to provide 
context, interpret a right or advocate for a specific outcome, is nuanced and 
complex. Amici curiae are in a unique position to assist courts in deciding matters 
conscious of the impact it might have on the women involved. When hearing a 
matter, courts are often focused on the characteristics and circumstances of the 
individual applicant before them, despite the fact that a decision based on these 
individual characteristics might have broader implications for a specific group.85 An 
amicus curiae is not bound to a specific party or factual scenario and is in an ideal 
position to represent broader interests.86 This participation might shift the focus of a 
court to the complex and intersectional nature of a claim, although the case before it 
may be individualistic and narrowly defined.87  
                                               
82 Bartlett op cit note 64 at 863. 
83 Ibid 864. 
84 Ibid 869. 
85 Marius Pieterse ‘Finding for the applicant? Individual equality plaintiffs and group-based 
disadvantage’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 397 at 398. 
86 Harriet Samuels ‘Feminist activism, third party interventions and the courts’ (2005) 13 Feminist 
Legal Studies 15 at 25.  
87 Pieterse op cit note 85 at 405. 
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This study aims to analyse the nature of the arguments presented and the 
responsiveness of courts to feminist and gendered arguments, as presented or 
expanded upon by amici curiae. The most obvious way to measure the 
responsiveness of courts to amici curiae arguments is to measure, in accordance 
with the analytical table discussed above, the impact of amici curiae participation on 
judicial decision-making. In considering impact, one has to focus on both direct and 
indirect influences. Referring to direct impact one would question if the court paid 
attention to arguments presented by the amici and if this is reflected in the decision 
and whether the law/legal provisions were reinterpreted or expanded in accordance 
with these arguments, that ultimately directly impact on the applicant and those 
similarly situated.88 In considering indirect impact, one would question how the amici 
curiae’s arguments influenced future decision-making or policy outcomes; was it able 
to politicise specific grievances or further organisational goals? 
 Amicus curiae participation has the potential to introduce feminist method to a 
court and to enable a court to make a decision within a gendered and feminist 
framework ensuring a more substantive outcome. It is possible, through the analysis 
of amicus curiae participation in gender matters, to gain some insight about the 
process of attempting to secure change through legal action.89 An analysis of 
specific decisions and amici curiae participation are called for to determine their 
impact in relation to the furthering of a feminist agenda in law. Before the case 
analysis is undertaken, it is necessary to establish the relevance and role of amicus 









                                               
88 F.L. Morton & Avril Allen ‘Feminists and the courts measuring success in interest group litigation in 
Canada’ (2001) 34 Canadian Journal of Political Science 55 at 64.  
89 Pellatt op cit note 52 at 119. 
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4 THE RELEVANCE OF AMICI CURIAE PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
4.1 Amicus Curiae Participation in the New Constitutional Order  
Although not unknown in South African law, amicus curiae participation was 
previously restricted to the English common law understanding of primarily assisting 
the court, or a litigating party, with regard to a specific legal requirement.90 The 
Constitution of South Africa entrenched a new constitutional democratic order in 
which the principle of participatory democracy was firmly established.91 This allowed 
the voices of those who have been traditionally excluded to be heard and provided 
for a dialogue between citizens and those they elected. It also required the State to 
take positive steps to ensure that citizens could exercise their rights of democratic 
participation.92 The Constitution, entrenched a broad concept of standing allowing a 
group of people to bring an action that alleges an infringement of the Bill of Rights. 
Previously a prospective litigant had to be personally affected by an alleged wrong, 
                                               
90 The common law position regarding amicus curiae participation was confirmed in Connock’s (SA) 
Motor Co Ltd v Pretorius 1939 TPD 355 at 357 where the court stated: 
‘So far as concerns the position of amicus curiae, I have looked into the matter and I find the definition 
of the term is to be found in several legal dictionaries, such as Sweet and Bouvier and Whorton. They 
all speak of an amicus curiae as a bystander – someone who is present in Court and not concerned 
with the matter in hand, who may be counsel or may not. He is a person who, if he observes the judge 
is in doubt about something, or likely to fall into error through failure to recollect a fact of which he 
ought to take cognizance, such as a legal decision or a statute, asks leave to come to his assistance 
and to mention it, and thus helps the judge by pointing out what appears to be in danger of being 
overlooked. But the point is also made that it is not the function of an amicus curiae to seek to 
undertake the management of a cause….I think we should be laying down a dangerous precedent if 
we were to allow intervention of this kind.’ 
Murray op cit note 6 at 242 identified certain categories of amici curiae participation allowed for before  
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa came into effect in 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution) 
including: 1) A lawyer appointed in terms of section 304(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
to argue a case on review; 2) a member of the Attorney-General’s staff who appears for a 
complainant in a maintenance case which is taken on appeal if the person does not have his/her own 
legal representation or wishes to appear in person; 3) an advocate who presents the case of an 
administrative body when decisions are taken on review; 4) representation for a Bar Council or the 
Law Society in a matter concerning the profession; 5) a court requesting representation for an 
unrepresented defendant or respondent in a matter involving complex points of law. 
91 Sec 57(1)(b) of the Constitution recognises the importance of participation in the law making 
process and states that the National Assembly may make rules and orders concerning its business, 
with due regard to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and 
public involvement. Sec 70(1)(b) & 116(1)(b) contains similar provisions in respect of the National 
Council of Provinces and the provincial legislatures. 
92 Henk Botha ‘Representing the poor: Law, poverty and democracy’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 521 at 522; 
Ian Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (Juta, 5th edition, 2005) 15. 
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but now a prospective litigant needs only to demonstrate, with reference to the listed 
categories in the Constitution, that there is sufficient interest in obtaining the remedy 
sought.93 
This favourable constitutional climate and the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court as the highest court in all constitutional matters, played an 
important role in establishing and developing the new-found role of amici curiae.94  
The Constitutional Court was the first to adopt specific rules that regulated amicus 
curiae participation and has set the benchmark for amicus participation, remaining 
the preferred court in which to lodge these applications.95 An analysis of the relevant 
                                               
93 Currie & de Waal op cit note 92 at 83-84; Sec 38 of the Constitution states that: 
‘anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the 
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a 
declaration of rights. The persons who may approach the court are: 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
94 Sec 167(3)(a) of the Constitution states:  
The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters.’ 
The Constitutional Court is first and foremost an appellate court hearing constitutional appeals. It only 
has non-appellate jurisdiction in three areas: Firstly, in terms of sec 167(5) of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court has to confirm any order of invalidity of an act of parliament, a provincial act or 
conduct of the President made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar 
status before that order will have any force. Secondly, in terms of sec 167(4) certain matters fall within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and only it may: 
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the 
constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of state; 
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill, but may do so only in 
circumstances anticipated in Chapter 4 or 6;  
(c) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to comply with a constitutional duty; or 
(d) certify a provincial constitution in terms of section 144. 
 Lastly, sec 167(6)(a) empowers the Constitutional Court to function as a court of first instance by 
allowing direct access when it is in the interest of justice to do so and with leave of the Court. 
95 According to Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 4 the Constitutional Court was the first to 
introduce a rule which made provision for the participation of amici curiae and which regulated this 
participation. The rules adopted by other courts are based on the model established by the 
Constitutional Court and use similar concepts. See rule 10 of the Constitutional Court promulgated 
under Government Notice R1675 in Government Gazette 25726 (31 October 2003) (hereinafter rule 
10 of the Constitutional Court Rules); rule 16A of the Uniform Court Rules first promulgated under 
Government Notice 315 in Government Gazette 19834 (12 March 1999); rule 16 of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal Rules first promulgated under Government Notice 1523 in Government Gazette 
19507 (27 November 1998); rule 7 of the Labour Court Rules first promulgated under Government 
Notice 1665 in Government Gazette 17495 (14 October 1996); rule 7 of the Labour Appeal Court 
Rules first promulgated under Government Notice 1666 in Government Gazette 17495 (14 October 
1996); rule 14 of the Land Claims Court Rules first promulgated under Government Notice 300 in 
Government Gazette 17804 (21 February 1997). 
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Constitutional Court rule is called for to establish the function and relevance of 
amicus curiae participation. 
 
4.2 Rule 10 of the Constitutional Court 
Rule 10 of the Constitutional Court specifies that admission as amicus curiae lies 
solely within the discretion of the Court. Although the text of the rule suggests that 
admission as amicus curiae can be sought with the consent of the parties, or via the 
permission of the Chief Justice,96 the Court has unequivocally stated that the Court’s 
permission is the only requirement pertaining to admission, irrespective of the 
consent obtained by the parties.97 In the Institute for Security Studies: In re Basson 
case, the Court analysed the rule regarding amicus curiae participation and provided 
clarity for all subsequent applications.98 In this case, the Court stressed that in 
exercising its discretion whether to allow a person or organisation to act as amicus 
curiae, it would consider whether the submissions were relevant and useful to the 
Court and, most importantly, different from those of the other parties.99  
 This is very relevant, as an amicus curiae does not have the right to raise a 
new cause of action, and is limited to the record of appeal, unless the new material 
is, in accordance with rule 31, common cause or otherwise incontrovertible or is of 
an official, scientific, technical or statistical nature and capable of easy verification.100 
If an amicus relies on new material, the material should be of such a nature that it 
does not lead to a serious factual dispute and typically should consist of statistical 
                                               
96 See rule 10(1) and 10(4) of the Constitutional Court Rules op cit note 95.  
97 Institute for Security Studies: In re S v Basson 2006 (6) SA 195 (CC) para 6 (hereinafter Institute for 
Security Studies: In re Basson); Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-8. 
98 Institute for Security Studies: In re Basson op cit note 97; the judgment dealt with the application for 
admission as amicus curiae by the Institute for Security Studies. The respondent declined the 
necessary consent to act as amicus, upon which the Institute applied to the Court for admission as 
amicus curiae.   
99 Institute for Security Studies: In re Basson op cit note 97 para 7. 
100 Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-11; Rule 31 of the Constitutional Court Rules op cit 
note 95 states:  
‘(1) Any party to any proceedings before the Court and an amicus curiae properly admitted by the 
Court in any proceedings shall be entitled, in documents lodged with the Registrar in terms of these 
rules, to canvass factual material that is relevant to the determination of the issues before the Court 
and that does not specifically appear on the record: Provided that such facts are— 
(a) common cause or otherwise incontrovertible; or 
(b) are of an official, scientific, technical or statistical nature capable of easy verification. 
(2) All other parties shall be entitled, within the time allowed by these rules for responding to such 
document, to admit, deny, controvert or elaborate upon such facts to the extent necessary and 
appropriate for a proper decision by the Court.’ 
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information from reliable sources, articles from learned journals, reports from 
government or other official bodies, and empirical data relevant to the matter.101 The 
Court has followed a strict approach to the type of evidence allowed and has stated: 
 
‘The role of an amicus is to draw the attention of the court to the relevant matters of 
law and fact to which attention would not otherwise be drawn. In return for the 
privilege of participating in proceedings without having to qualify as a party, an amicus 
has a special duty to the court. That duty is to provide cogent and helpful submissions 
that assist the court. The amicus must not repeat arguments already made but must 
raise new contentions; and generally these new contentions must be raised on the 
data already before the court. Ordinarily it is inappropriate for an amicus to try and 
introduce new contentions based on fresh evidence.’102  
 
According to Budlender, the restrictions placed on an amicus curiae by the Court 
rules are not necessarily steadfast and the Court has discretion to permit an amicus 
to adduce additional evidence outside the ambit of rule 31.103 In a recent decision 
related to the interpretation of whether Rule 16A of the Uniform Court Rules104 
allowed for new evidence to be introduced by an amicus curiae, the Court found that 
the uniform rule provided for a great deal of discretion, and that allowing an amicus 
to adduce statistical evidence in an important public interest matter, would best 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.105 The admissibility of 
new evidence should be determined in accordance with whether it is in the interest of 
justice to do so, and on a case-by-case basis.106 
Rule 10 indicates that proper planning and drafting of an amicus curiae brief is 
essential. An organisation or person that wishes to enter as amicus curiae should 
                                               
101 Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-11. 
102 In Re: Certain Amicus Curiae Applications: Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 713 (CC) para 5.  
103 Whether the submission of new evidence will be permitted will depend on what is just and 
expedient in terms of rule 32(2) of the Constitutional Court Rules op cit note 95. Budlender ‘Amicus 
curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-12 sets out the factors that a court should take into account in allowing new 
factual material as: ‘(a) the delay caused by giving the other parties an opportunity to respond to the 
new evidence; (b) the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to deal with evidential material without having 
the benefit of the views of another court; (c) the cogency of the evidence; and (d) the importance of 
the evidence to the matters which the Court has to decide.’ 
104 The Uniform Court Rules op cit note 95 above. 
105 Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp and Others 
2013 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 27. 
106 Ibid para 32. 
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write to the relevant parties as soon as possible to obtain their consent.107 The 
request letter should give the parties some knowledge of the relevant case that the 
amicus would like to bring in order to ensure a good relationship with the parties, and 
possibly to strengthen an application to the Chief Justice for admission, if the parties 
refuse consent.108 The application for admission should be carefully drafted and 
provide a summary of the written submissions to be advanced, as it is not 
necessarily easy to assess the relevance of arguments from the supporting affidavit 
or letter requesting consent.109 Although the rules state that an amicus curiae shall 
not present oral argument, in practice, a person admitted as amicus is usually 
permitted, on application, to present oral argument to the Court.110 
 The role that amicus curiae participation has played in the Constitutional 
Court has evolved, since the Court has developed its jurisprudence and familiarity 
with the use of these participations. In its first case,111 the Court, keeping to the 
traditional role of the amicus curiae, invited certain groups to participate.112 Later, in 
Hoffman v South African Airways,113 the Court stated: 
 
‘An amicus curiae assists the Court by furnishing information or argument regarding 
questions of law or fact. An amicus is not a party to litigation, but believes that the 
Court’s decision may affect its interest. The amicus differs from an intervening party, 
who has a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation and is therefore permitted to 
participate as a party to the matter. An amicus joins proceedings, as its name 
suggests, as a friend of the Court. It is unlike a party to litigation who is forced into the 
litigation and thus compelled to incur costs. It joins in the proceedings to assist the 
Court because of its expertise on or interest in the matter before the Court. It chooses 
the side it wishes to join unless requested by the Court to urge a particular position.’114 
 
Although the Court’s direct references to the role of amici curiae are in keeping with 
its more traditional role, the rules of the Court and amici that have appeared before 
                                               
107 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Becoming friendly with the Constitutional Court: An interpretation of the Court’s 
amicus curiae rules’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 499 at 502. 
108 Ibid 103. 
109 Institute for Security Studies: In re Basson op cit note 97 at para 10. 
110 See rule 10(8) of the Constitutional Court Rules op cit note 95. 
111 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). The case concerned whether the death penalty infringed 
certain rights in the Bill of Rights. 
112 Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit note 15 at 8-3. 
113 Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
114 Ibid para 63. 
44 
 
the Court, are in most instances not traditional - an interested person/organisation 
that chooses at its own initiative to intervene in the proceedings, to advance a 
particular legal position of its choice.115 In gender related matters heard by the Court, 
amici curiae participation has played a significant and important role in shaping the 
purpose and impact of these participations in South African law. 
 
4.3 Amici Curiae Participation and the Constitutional Court’s Gender 
Jurisprudence 
In post-apartheid South-Africa, the women’s movement adopted a two-pronged 
strategy to achieve gender equality.116 The first concern was policy development and 
law reform through the executive and parliament, but as the pace of law reform 
slowed down, attention shifted to the courts as a possible vehicle to implement the 
desired change.117 The Constitutional Court was targeted to test arguments and 
attempt reform, as the Court gives effect to the rights enshrined in the Constitution, 
of which the right to equality is central. This Court, operating within the new 
constitutional dispensation, was also perceived to be more progressive and more 
receptive to gendered arguments.118 The Constitutional Court also makes the final 
decision in considering whether legislation is constitutional and its decisions are 
therefore the ultimate authority on a particular topic.119  
Feminists called for a substantive approach to equality and welcomed the 
Court’s acceptance of this approach in constitutional interpretation.120 The support for 
a substantive approach enabled feminist method to be employed in legal reasoning, 
which allowed for an understanding of inequality within its social and historic context; 
                                               
115 See rule 10(1) of the Constitutional Court Rules op cit note 95; Budlender ‘Amicus curiae’ op cit 
note 15 at 8-2. 
116 Shireen Hassim ‘Voices, hierarchies and spaces: Reconfiguring the women’s movement in 
democratic South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 175; Shireen Hassim ‘The gender pact and democratic 
consolidation: Institutionalizing gender equality in the South African State’ (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 
505. 
117 Catherine Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in 
South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 217 at 222. See the first women-specific laws, chapter 1 fn 57.  
118 Elsje Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments: The example of the 
South African Constitutional Court’ (2008) 20 CJWL 1 at 3; Jackie Dugard ‘Court of first instance: 
Towards a pro-poor jurisdiction for the South African Constitutional Court’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 261. 
119 See sec 167(5) of the Constitution. 
120 See section 2 chapter 1; Catherine Albertyn ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South 
Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 253. 
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a focus on difference and attention to the purpose of the rights and the underlying 
values supported by the Constitution.121 
With the Court’s apparent support for a substantive and feminist inspired 
interpretation of equality, it was hoped that there would be a greater degree of 
openness to feminist arguments in the Court.122 Despite the Court’s interpretation of 
the right as being substantive, and some decisions reflecting feminist thought, 
certain cases decided by the Court “used a formalistic a-contextual reasoning” and 
“refused to acknowledge the interaction between legal rules on the one hand and 
socio-economic conditions and stereotypes on the other hand”.123  
In several of the gender cases brought before the Constitutional Court, 
amicus curiae applications were filed and a range of women’s and public interest 
organisations where allowed to make submissions to the Court. The important 
question is whether amici curiae participation had any influence on the decisions 
reached by the Court or whether these briefs were able to sensitise the Court in its 
subsequent decisions. It is important to analyse whether women’s litigation 
strategies have been successful in properly contextualising claims, interpreting rights 
and constructing remedies, and whether and how, these strategies should be 
constructed to adequately represent the complexity of different women’s situations 
and interests.124  
Litigation strategy, specifically amicus curiae participation as strategy is the 
key in attempting to give feminist content to rights by using feminist methods and 
outcomes and so expand traditional concepts of them.125 The subsequent chapters 
will focus on certain key decisions of the Constitutional Court and the amici curiae 
that participated in these matters, to establish the purpose of these briefs and 
whether they were able to better represent the complexities of women’s lives to 
advance gender equality for women within the court system. The contextual and 
factual background of the cases will be discussed, including the contentions of each 
                                               
121 Catherine Albertyn ‘Substantive equality’ op cit note 120 at 257; Catherine Albertyn ‘Equality’ in 
Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 82 at 92-93. 
122 Beth Goldblatt ‘The right to social security – Addressing women’s poverty and disadvantage’ 
(2009) 25 SAJHR 442 at 449; Bonthuys op cit note 118 at 3. 
123  Bonthuys op cit note 118 at 4; specifically the judgments of Volks op cit note 81 Jordan op cit note 
81 comes to mind. 
124 Radha Jhappan ‘Introduction: Feminist adventures in law’ in Radha Jhappan (ed) Women’s legal 
strategies in Canada (University of Toronto Press 2002) 28. 
125 Goldblatt op cit note 122 at 449. 
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of the parties, followed by the arguments of the amicus curiae. The Court’s decision 
will be analysed in relation to the amicus curiae participation, and finally, the purpose 
and impact of the amicus participation will be established. The ultimate purpose of 
the case analysis will be to establish the purpose and impact of amici curiae 
participation in gender litigation matters and to question whether they were able to 
present a feminist and/or gendered perspective to court which influenced the 
decision reached or shaped subsequent law. 
 
4.4 The Participating Amici Curiae 
Before starting with the case analysis, it is important to provide a short background 
on the institutions and organisations that regularly participate as amici curiae in the 
Constitutional Court’s gender cases, in order to understand their participation in 
relation to their organisational goals. Participation is well represented by 
constitutional bodies, university and legal entities, non-governmental organisations 
and civil society representatives, all with the objective of engaging the law to change 
women’s lives. 
 
 4.4.1 The Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) 
CALS was founded in 1978 as an applied research centre within the faculty of law at 
the University of the Witwatersrand.126 The organisation conducts research and 
engages in advocacy, litigation and training for the promotion and protection of 
human rights in South Africa.127 The Gender Research Project of CALS focuses on 
questions of women’s human rights, sex and gender equality, with particular focus 
on the promotion of equality for disadvantaged groups of women.128  
CALS participated as amicus curiae in Carmichele, Volks and as part of 




                                               
126 Information obtained from 
http://www.wits.ac.za/academic/clm/law/cals/abpoutus/16860/our_history.html (last accessed on 15 
August 2013). 
127 Amicus curiae notice of motion, supporting affidavit deposed to by Shereen Winifred Mills, case 




 4.4.2 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 
The CSVR is an independent non-profit organisation that carries out research and 
interventions around issues relating to violence and reconciliation in South Africa.129 
One of the goals of the CSVR’s gender-based violence programme is advocating 
about policy and laws, to prevent gender-based violence and to protect the rights of 
victims of gender-based violence.130 The CSVR participated as amicus curiae in a 
combined brief in the Zuma matter. 
 
 4.4.3 The Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) 
The CGE is a specific constitutional body established to promote respect for gender 
equality and aid its protection and attainment.131 It is an independent institution 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, and has the power to monitor, 
investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise and report on issues concerning 
gender equality.132  
To understand the CGE’s litigation strategy and its participation as amicus 
curiae it should be noted that the CGE, from its inception, has been plagued by 
structural and strategic tensions. There were differences of opinion whether its 
identity should be feminist, as opposed to implementing a general gender 
framework.133 The CGE moved toward a more general framework and focused on 
poor rural women, despite its broad mandate, which created tension in achieving a 
balance between the practical needs of people living in poverty, as opposed to a 
more specific strategic focus, challenging gender power relations.134 This lack of 
clear strategy coupled with internal personal politics, derogated much of the CGE’s 
work and its research has often been described as weak, with research reports that 
reflect a simplistic understanding of gender inequality.135  
                                               
129 Notice of motion in the joint application of TLAC, CALS & CSVR to be admitted as amici curiae, 
affidavit deposed to by Lisa-Anne Mae Vetten, case number: SS321/05. 
130 Information obtained from http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/programmes/gender-based-
violence.html (last accessed 14 Augustus 2013). 
131 Sec 181 & 187 of the Constitution. 
132 Sec 181(2) & 187(2) of the Constitution. The mandate and further regulations pertaining to the 
CGE is set out in the Commission for Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996. 
133 Amanda Gouws ‘The state of the national gender machinery: Structural problems and personal 
politics’ in Sakhela Buhlungu, Johan Daniel, Roger Southall & Jessica Lutchman (eds) State of the 
nation: South Africa 2005-2006 (HSRC Press 2006) 143 at 152. 
134 Sheila Meintjies ‘Gender equality by design: The case of South Africa’s Commission on Gender 
Equality’ (2005) 32 Politikon 259 at 270; Gay W. Seidman ‘Institutional dilemma: Representation 
versus mobilization in the South African Gender Commission’ (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 541. 
135 Meintjies op cit note 134 at 271. 
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The CGE participated as amicus curiae in S v Baloyi,136 and in Jordan. It played an 
important role in relation to women and customary law, consistent with its focus on 
poor rural women when it participated as amicus curiae in Bhe, Shilubana and 
Others v Nwamitwa137 and MM v MN. 
 
 4.4.4 The National Movement of Rural Women (NMRW) 
The NMRW is a national membership organisation that serves the interests of rural 
women.138 It was established to create a network where rural women could gather, 
discuss their problems and take action and its main objective is the empowerment of 
rural women.139 The NMRW participated as amicus curiae in Shilubana and in a 
combined brief in the MM v MN matter. 
 
 4.4.5 The Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Taskforce (SWEAT) 
SWEAT is a non-governmental service organisation that focuses on the health and 
wellbeing of sex workers.140 SWEAT actively works towards the empowerment of 
sex workers, the decriminalisation of adult commercial sex work and equal access to 
police-, legal-, health- , and social welfare services, fair and safe working conditions 
and the promotion of safer sex work practices.141 SWEAT participated as amicus 
curiae in the Jordan matter. 
 
 4.4.6 The Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre (TLAC) 
TLAC is a non-profit organisation that promotes and defends the rights of women to 
be free from violence and to have access to adequate services.142 A key objective in 
achieving its goals is litigation to ensure that the State enforces its laws and policies 
in addressing violence.143 TLAC participated as amicus curiae in combined briefs in 
Zuma and Masiya. 
                                               
136 S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC). 
137 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) (hereinafter Shilubana). 
138 Information obtained from http://www.nmrw.org/?page_id=2 (last accessed 14 August 2013). 
139 Application for admission as amicus curiae of the NMRW, affidavit deposed to by Likhapha 
Mbatha, case number: CCT 03/07 para 4. 
140 Information obtained from http://www.sweat.org.za/index.php/about-sweat (last accessed on 14 
August 2013). 
141 Notice of motion to be admitted as amici curiae, SWEAT brief, affidavit deposed to by Jayne 
Arnott, case number: CCT 31/01 para 11. 




 4.4.7 The Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) 
The WLC is a non-profit, independently funded law centre that seeks to achieve 
equality for women in South Africa through litigation.144 Its litigation strategy is 
outcomes based and a case will be taken on if it has the potential to benefit a 
substantial group of women in the overturning of discriminatory legislation; creating 
new jurisprudence or extending existing jurisprudence and creating the possibility of 
positive orders that would enforce women’s human rights.145 The WLC focuses on 
issues relating to violence against women, fair access to resources in relationships, 
access to land and housing, access to fair labour practices and women’s access to 
health care.146 
 The WLC participated as amicus curiae in Gumede and in MM v MN. It 
represented Bhe and was an applicant in the Bhe case as well as in Volks where it 
represented Robinson and acted as an applicant. 
  
                                               
144 Information obtained from http://www.wlce.co.za/ (last accessed 15 August 2013). 
145 Id. 





1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, WOMEN’S VOICE AND THE EFFICACY OF 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, feminists have actively engaged the legal system to 
address gender-based violence.1 Women’s organisations strongly lobbied for the 
inclusion of rights that protect women’s bodily and psychological integrity in the 1996 
Constitution, which led to the achievement of a series of rights that protected women 
against violence, as well as their right to reproductive decision-making, security and 
control over their bodies.2 During the early stages of democracy, important legislative 
and policy gains occurred concerning bodily autonomy and protection from gendered 
based violence; this entrenched a legal framework for the enforcement of the 
constitutionally protected rights.3  
However, the levels of violence against women remain alarmingly high, and 
confronts us with the contradiction of having a progressive constitutional and 
legislative framework that supposedly protects women against violence on the one 
end with on the other end of the continuum, seemingly unyielding levels of violence 
                                               
1 Lillian Artz & Dee Smythe ‘Feminism vs. the State?: A decade of sexual offences law reform in 
South Africa’ (2007) Agenda 6 at 8. 
2 Catherine Albertyn, Lillian Artz, Helene Combrinck, Shereen Mills & Lorraine Wolhuter ‘Women’s 
freedom and security of the person’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and 
justice (Juta 2007) 295 at 297. Sec 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter the Constitution) reads: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right: 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body, and 
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.’  
3 Some of the early legislative gains include the promulgation of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996; the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (hereinafter the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act); the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (hereinafter the Domestic 




that are perpetrated.4 This has led to questions about the efficacy of the legal 
framework that has been implemented to curb violence against women.5  
Feminists have long viewed the criminal justice system - the system that 
women access to gain protection from or recourse against violence - as the ultimate 
gendered institution, often reinforcing “deeply sexist assumptions about women, their 
sexual and social identities and their relation to the social (male) world”.6 The 
harmful reproduction of certain notions of masculinity and femininity, especially 
prevalent in sexual violence matters, not only affects those caught up in the criminal 
justice system but reinforces social conceptions of appropriate gender behaviour.7 
One can therefore say that the criminal justice system, the very source of protection 
against violence for women, often reinforces violent behaviour by serving to maintain 
a patriarchal social order.8 
 
‘These images of women produced in and through the law have powerful ideological 
and social significance. Law is, among other things, an authoritative language or form 
                                               
4 Statistics provided by the South African Police Service (SAPS) puts the combined reported rape and 
sexual assault figures at 54 126 for 2008/2009; 55 097 for 2009/2010; 56 272 for 2010/2011. Locating 
these crimes within the general framework a total of 191 842 crimes against women older than 18 
years were reported during the 2010/2011 period including murder, attempted murder, sexual 
offences and assault. Statistics obtained from SAPS Crime Report 2010-2011 available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za (last accessed 4 December 2012). 
The 2012/2013 crime statistics as discussed and interpreted by the Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) 
places the number of reported sexual offences at 66 196 see http://www.wlc.co.za (last accessed 4 
November 2013). 
Also see Helene Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow: Violence against women in South Africa 
after ten years of democracy’ (2005) Acta Juridica 171; Dee Smythe ‘Moving beyond 30 years of 
Anglo American rape law reforms: Legal representations for victims of sexual offences’ (2005) 18 
SACJ 167. 
5 Lloyd Vogelman & Gillian Eagle ‘Overcoming endemic violence against women in South Africa’ 
(1991) 18 Social Justice 209.  
6 Artz & Smythe ‘Feminism vs. the State?’ op cit note 1 at 8. 
7 According to Janice Du Mont & Deborah Parnis ‘Judging women: The pernicious effects of rape 
mythology’ (1999) 19 Canadian Women Studies 102 common held myths concerning rape includes: 
‘women mean “yes” when they say “no”; women are “asking for it” when they wear provocative 
clothes, go to bars alone, or simply walk down the street at night; only virgins can be raped; women 
are vengeful, bitter creatures “out to get men”; if a women says “yes” once, there is no reason to 
believe her “no” the next time; women who “tease” men deserve to be raped; a woman who goes to 
the home of a man on the first date implies she is willing to have sex; women cry rape to cover up an 
illegitimate pregnancy; a man is justified in forcing sex on a woman who makes him sexually excited; 
a man is entitled to sex if he buys a woman dinner; [and] women derive pleasure from victimisation.’ 
Also see in this regard Donald Nicholson’s ‘Criminal law and feminism’ in Donald Nicholson’s & Lois 
Bibbings (eds) Feminist perspectives on criminal law (Cavendish Publishing 2000) 1 at 14; Artz & 
Smythe ‘Feminism vs. the State?’ op cit note 1 at 7.  
8 Vogelman & Eagle op cit note 5 at 213. 
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of discourse. It has a potent ability to shape popular and authoritative understanding 
of situations. The laws, institutions and ideologies of the criminal justice system are 
particularly powerful in their ability to define appropriate ‘feminine’ behaviour, morality 
and roles, especially those concerned with women’s sexuality and reproduction. In this 
way, certain images are affirmed at the same time as others are censured through 
criminalisation, marginalisation and the silencing of alternative accounts of social 
reality.’9 
 
With this contradiction in mind, feminists have used the law as a site of struggle to 
address legal rules, doctrines and principles that reflect the stereotypes and myths 
that have contributed to entrenching a culture of violent behaviour.10 The law, 
specifically criminal law, is seen as an important site of struggle “in shifting, or at 
least acknowledging inequalities” that entrench gender-based violence.11 The 
importance of engaging the legal system, from a feminist viewpoint, in violence 
issues has been described as follows: 
 
‘Perhaps feminist jurisprudence – as a theoretical framework for changing  women’s 
social realities of violence – can provide a starting point from which the state, the law 
and society can be viewed as both exercising power which sometimes nullifies women 
and their experiences with violence as well as serving an instrumental function of 
protection and one that is intrinsically symbolic. At the very least, our continued 
participation in the law reform process can expose the state and the criminal justice 
system which upholds largely masculinist interpretations of justice. It may also have 
the potential to address some seemingly intractable questions about women’s 
engagement with the law.’12 
 
Feminist methods and strategies have played an important role in addressing this 
supposed contradiction and the central focus has been that of placing women’s 
actual experience of violence before courts, in an attempt to redefine the gendered 
construction of the criminal justice system and women’s rights to be free from 
violence.13 In the Constitutional Court, women have defended attacks on progressive 
                                               
9 Cathi Albertyn ‘The discriminatory and gendered nature of the law and institutions of criminal justice’ 
in Saras Jagwanth, Pamela-Jane Schwikkard & Brenda Grant (eds) Women and the law (HSRC 
Publishers 1994) 15 at 20.  
10 Lillian Artz & Dee ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ in Lillian Artz & Dee Smythe (eds) Should we 
consent? Rape law reform in South Africa (Juta 2008) 1 at 13; Nicholson’s op cit note 7 at 14.  
11 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ op cit note 10 at 15. 
12 Ibid 14. Smythe 
13 Ibid 16. 
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laws and have attempted to extend protection against violence under common and 
statutory law,14 and in the High Courts women continue to struggle to address a 
prejudicial criminal justice system.15 Most importantly, the amici curiae participating 
in these matters have contributed to highlighting the way in which the law sustains 
inequality and violence against women, whilst at the same time providing protection 
and empowering women in different ways.16  
An important question is how amici curiae participation has influenced the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court in the relevant matters and how it enabled 
women’s voices to be heard. The case analysis that follows carefully formulates the 
usefulness of amici curiae participation in violence matters through a consideration 
of certain pertinent questions like: Does the amici employ a specific feminist strategy 
or method? Does the Court interpret and use the evidence and arguments of the 
amici curiae and how have the relevant cases created a platform to lobby for change 
















                                               
14 S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) (hereinafter Baloyi); Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (hereinafter Carmichele); Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (hereinafter Masiya). 
15 See S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W) (hereinafter Zuma); although not a Constitutional Court 
matter an important matter concerning amicus curiae participation in criminal proceedings concerning 
sexual violence. 
16 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ op cit note 10 at 18. 
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2 CASE DISCUSSIONS 
 
2.1 Defending Legislative Gains: S v Baloyi (Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE) and Minister of Justice as amici curiae).  
  
2.1.1 Contextual and factual background 
In 1993, the Prevention of Family Violence Act was enacted to provide women with 
their first accessible legal remedy against domestic violence.17 Women’s 
organisations criticised government for the implementation of the Act as they argued 
that the legislative process was undertaken without consultation and discussion and 
therefore did not accurately reflect women’s needs.18 However, the Act did make a 
difference, by introducing an interdict system which enabled an abused woman to 
seek protection from a judge or magistrate.19 In terms of the Act, a suspended 
warrant of arrest would be issued with the interdict which, if breached, allowed a 
woman to present herself to a police station calling the warrant of arrest into 
operation.20  
The Act, specifically section 3(5), raised important questions of tensions 
between women’s rights to be protected from violence and men’s rights as accused 
persons, as the section seemingly created a reverse onus of proof that required the 
violator of the interdict to prove his innocence.21 Although the supposed reverse 
                                               
17 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 2 at 322. 
18 Sheila Meintjies ‘The politics of engagement: Women transforming the policy process – Domestic 
violence legislation in South Africa’ in Anne Marie Goetz & Shireen Hassim (eds) No shortcuts to 
power: African women in politics and policy making (Zed Books 2003) 140 at 149. 
19 Ibid 150. 
20 See sec 2 of the Prevention of Family Violence Act; Joanne Fedler ‘Lawyering domestic violence 
through the Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 – An evaluation after a year in operation’ (1995) 
112 SALJ 231 at 233. 
21 Sec 3(5) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act states: 
'The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, relating to the procedure which shall be 
followed in respect of an enquiry referred to in s 170 of that Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis in 
respect of an enquiry under ss (4).  
Sec 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states: 
'(1) An accused at criminal proceedings who is not in custody and who has not been released on bail, 
and who fails to appear at the place and on the date and at the time to which such proceedings may 
be adjourned or who fails to remain in attendance at such proceedings as so adjourned, shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable to the punishment prescribed under ss (2).  
(2) The court may, if satisfied that an accused referred to in ss (1) has failed to appear at the place 
and on the date and at the time to which the proceedings in question were adjourned or has failed to 
remain in attendance at such proceedings as so adjourned, issue a warrant for his arrest and, when 
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onus could be seen to negatively impact on a person’s right to be presumed innocent 
and to have his/her guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State,22 it was 
seen as a fair restriction, considering a victim’s and specifically women’s, urgent 
need for protection from harm and imminent violence.23  
Important lessons in defending legislative gains could be gained from the 
Canadian experience where the fair trial rights of men were used in early Charter 
litigation to discredit progressive legal gains made by women. In R v Seaboyer; R v 
Gayme two male accused successfully relied on their fair trial rights to challenge 
certain sections of the Canadian criminal code, which protected women who testified 
as the primary witnesses in a rape trial against questions regarding her past sexual 
history. 24 The case resulted in the voiding of legislation which was of specific benefit 
to women and alerted South African feminists to the importance of defending 
progressive legislative gains, despite the possibility that a case might be lost, as the 
risk of not engaging the law when such claims are made would trivialise and 
marginalise women’s rights and advances.25  
In the Baloyi case, the complainant, a wife of an army officer obtained an 
interdict in terms of the Act against her husband (Baloyi) who was ordered not to 
assault her or her child, and not to prevent them from entering or leaving the marital 
home.26 Baloyi ignored the interdict and assaulted the complainant after which he 
                                                                                                                                                  
he is brought before the court, in a  summary manner enquire into his failure so to appear or so to 
remain in attendance and, unless the accused satisfies the court that his failure was not due to 
fault on his part, convict him of the offence referred to in ss (1) and sentence him to a fine not 
exceeding R300 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.' (emphasis added); see 
Penelope Andrews ‘The Constitutional Court provides succor for victims of domestic violence – S v 
Baloyi’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 337 for a discussion of the case. 
22 Sec 35(3)(h) of the Constitution provides for a presumption of innocence in that ‘every accused 
person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, 
and not to testify during the proceedings’. 
23 Lisa Vetten ‘Addressing domestic violence in South Africa: Reflections on strategy and practice’ 
(2005) expert paper for the UN division for the Advancement of Women delivered 17-20 May 2005, 
Vienna Austria. 
24 R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme (1991) 48 O.A.C. 81 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter the Seaboyer case). See 
Elizabeth A. Sheehy ‘Feminist argumentation before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Seaboyer; 
R. v. Gayme: The sound of one hand clapping’ (1991) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 450 and 
Elizabeth A. Sheehy ‘Legal responses to violence against women in Canada’ (1999) 19 Canadian 
Woman Studies 62 for a discussion of the case. 
25 Margaret Denike ‘Sexual violence and “Fundamental Justice”: On the failure of equality reforms to 
criminal proceedings’ (2000) 20 Canadian Woman Studies 151. 
26 Baloyi op cit note 14 para 3. 
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was arrested.27 He proceeded to challenge the relevant sections of the Act, as he 
believed it breached his constitutionally protected fair trial rights.28 
The High Court found in favour of Baloyi which order had to be confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was faced with the complex task of 
establishing a balance between the State’s constitutional duty to provide effective 
remedies against domestic violence, and its simultaneous obligation to respect 
constitutional fair trial rights.29 To assist it with its task the Court invited amici curiae 
to participate.30 The CGE and the Minister of Justice responded and joined the case.  
 
2.1.2 The amici curiae 
The CGE had special interest in the matter, as its powers and functions included the 
monitoring and evaluating of legislation that impacted on gender equality, including 
South Africa’s compliance with international conventions concerning gender 
equality.31 For the CGE it was important to ensure that victims of domestic violence 
were adequately protected.32 The Minister of Justice’s purpose in participating was 
to publicly confirm the government’s commitment in addressing gender-based 
violence.  
 
The Commission for Gender Equality: 
The CGE’s main focus was to interpret section 3(5) of the Act, which imported from 
the Criminal Procedure Act a summary enquiry that required the accused to satisfy 
the court, that his failure to comply with the interdict was not due to his own fault. 
According to the CGE there were four possible interpretations to the section.  
First, section 3(5) could be interpreted not to relate to the substantive enquiry 
into the breach of an interdict, but merely to regulate what takes place if a person 
who is not in custody or on bail, fails to appear at the time or place to which a family 
violence enquiry has been adjourned.33 Secondly, the section could be interpreted to 
                                               
27 Id; Andrews op cit note 21 at 339. 
28 Baloyi op cit note 14 paras 3-8. 
29 Ibid para 3. 
30 Directions of the Constitutional Court dated 27 August 1999, case number: CCT 29/1999. 
31 Sec 11 of the Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996; Written submissions of the CGE, as 
drafted by Gilbert Marcus (SC), Matthew Chaskalson & Aneesa Kalla, case number: CCT 29/1999 
para 1.3. 
32 Written submissions of the CGE op cit note 31 para 1.4. 
33 Ibid para 2.3.1. 
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import from the Criminal Procedure Act the provisions of a summary enquiry and not 
a reverse onus.34 Thirdly, it could be interpreted to import a reverse onus requiring 
the respondent to show a lack of wilfulness in breaching the interdict, once the 
breach has been proved.35 Lastly, it could import a reverse onus to disprove both the 
alleged breach of the interdict and the wilfulness of that breach.36 
The CGE supported the second scenario and argued that section 3(5) only 
imported the provisions for a summary enquiry from the Criminal Procedure Act and 
confirmed the purpose of the Prevention of Family Violence Act by stating: 
 
‘Section 3 of the Act provides for a species of contempt proceedings specifically 
designed to compel compliance with a family violence interdict. In this context, 
provision for a summary enquiry is essential. If breaches of a family violence interdict 
could be addressed only through the ordinary machinery of a criminal trial, the Act 
would defeat its own purpose: it would not afford any speedy protection to an 
applicant with a family violence interdict in her favour.’37 
 
The CGE mentioned, in not much detail, the need for special measures to protect 
women against violence and focused on South Africa’s international obligations to 
eliminate violence against women.38 For the CGE, the primary purpose of the Act 
was not penal, but to create preventative measures in situations where the parties 
are in close proximity and where there is a threat of on-going violence.39 
 
The Minister of Justice: 
In contrast to the CGE, the Minister argued that section 3(5) indeed created a 
reverse onus that was unconstitutional but that the breach was justifiable in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution, specifically considering the nature of domestic 
violence and the need for special measures to protect women against violence.40 
The Minister’s arguments lacked detail and substance and were more symbolic of its 
commitment to address violence against women. 
                                               
34 Ibid para 2.3.2. 
35 Ibid para 2.3.3. 
36 Ibid para 2.3.4. 
37 Ibid para 3.7. 
38 Ibid paras 4.4-4.9. 
39 Ibid para 4.12. 
40 Written submissions of the Minister of Justice, as drafted by H.J Fabricius (SC) & S Lebala, case 




2.1.3 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
The Court, with Sachs J writing the judgment, declined to confirm the order of the 
High Court and upheld the legislation, demonstrating sensitivity to the social context 
of domestic violence and its gendered nature by stating: 
 
‘All crime has harsh effects on society. What distinguishes domestic violence is its 
hidden, repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and, in 
particular, on family life. It cuts across class, race, culture and geography and is all the 
more pernicious because it is so often concealed and so frequently goes unpunished. 
......... In my view, domestic violence compels constitutional concern in yet another 
respect. To the extent that it is systemic, pervasive and overwhelmingly gender 
specific, domestic violence both reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, and 
does so in a particularly brutal form.’41 
 
The judgment was victim-centred, detailing the effects of domestic violence on its 
victims and stressing the State’s responsibility in terms of the Constitution.42  The 
Court stressed the private nature of domestic violence and noted that the procedures 
provided for in the Act were tailored to address the complex private nature of 
domestic violence.43 Sachs J further relied on feminist scholarship in pointing to the 
unique character of domestic violence and the need for appropriate remedies to 
address its prevalence (through the interdict).44  
The Court supported the CGE’s interpretation of section 3(5) of the Act in that 
the section only imported the summary procedure of section 170 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and not a reverse onus.45 Accordingly the Court argued that this 
interpretation best supports the States obligation in terms of section 12 of the 
Constitution and most appropriately balances the complainant’s right to protection 
and the right of the accused to a fair trial.46 
 
                                               
41 Baloyi op cit note 14 paras 11-12 (footnotes omitted). 
42 Ibid para 11; Andrews op cit note 21 at 340. 
43 Baloyi op cit note 14 paras 16-19 and 33. 
44 Ibid para 16; the Court specifically referred to an academic article by Jennifer Nedelsky ‘Violence 
against women: Challenges to the liberal state and relational feminism’ in Ian Shapiro & Russel 
Hardin (eds) Political order (New York University Press 1998) 454 and to the article by Fedler op cit 
note 20. 
45 Baloyi op cit note 14 para 25. 




2.1.4 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
Both the amici curiae in this instance focused on interpreting section 3(5) of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act, stressing the need for special measures to 
protect women against violence. However, both the amici’s arguments lacked 
contextual depth, which might be ascribed to the fact that it was one of the first amici 
curiae interventions in a gender matter before the Constitutional Court, with the amici 
still uncertain as to its strategy, or it could be ascribed to the defensive nature of the 
brief, defending a specific piece of legislation where an interpretative stance of the 
relevant sections could have been perceived to be the best strategy. 
 Justice Sachs, using the amici’s arguments as background, skilfully 
contextualised the problem, delivering a progressive judgment that recognised the 
interaction between legal rules and social stereotypes that expanded on the 
arguments of the amici curiae.47 The Court specifically relied on the CGE’s 
interpretation of section 3(5), and also drew on its arguments in relation to the social 
context of domestic violence and the importance of the legislation in light of our 
international obligations.48  
Combrinck captures the importance of the Baloyi judgment by stating: 
 
‘The significance of the judgment lies firstly in its unequivocal identification of the 
constitutional obligation resting on the state to deal effectively with domestic violence 
through the enactment of appropriate legislation. Secondly, the recognition that 
domestic violence is a concern from the perspective of gender equality (in addition to 
violating the right to freedom and security of the person) is an important one. Thirdly, 
Sachs J clearly demonstrates how the constitutional imperatives are amplified by the 
standards set in international human rights law.’49 
 
Baloyi, with assistance of the amici curiae (all be it limited), set positive precedent for 
future litigation in relation to violence against women. In most of the case 
                                               
47 Andrews op cit note 21 at 339. 
48 The Court in Baloyi took account of the CGE’s arguments concerning the range of possible 
interpretations of sec 3(5) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act - see the written submissions of 
the CGE op cit note 31 para 3 as referred to in Baloyi op cit note 14 paras 24-29; the social context of 
domestic violence – see the written submissions of the CGE op cit note 31 para 4.3 – 4.5 as referred 
to in Baloyi op cit note 14 para 11–13; the international obligations of South Africa – see the written 
submissions of the CGE op cit note 31 para 4.6–4.9 as referred to in Baloyi op cit note 14 para 13. 
49 Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow’ op cit note 4 at 176 (footnotes omitted). 
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discussions that follow, the parties or the Court, referred to Baloyi and specifically 
the section quoted above by Sachs J that refers to the gendered nature of domestic 
violence.50 This sets strong legal precedent by which future cases are judged, and 
the positive rhetoric serves as a reminder to the Court that violence against women 
















                                               
50 For example see: Carmichele op cit note 14 where the Court refers to the applicant’s reliance on 
the judgment in relation to its argument that it would encourage the police and prosecuting authorities 
to act positively to prevent violent attacks against women; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) para 13 (hereinafter Van Eeden) where the Court, in referring to 
Baloyi, states that freedom from violence is recognised as fundamental to the equal enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; Masiya op cit note 14 para 36 fn 80, where the Court 
quoting the dicta in Baloyi, states that rape, like domestic violence, is ‘systemic, pervasive and 
overwhelmingly gender-specific.....[and] reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, and does so in 
a particularly brutal form.’ 
51 Baloyi op cit note 14 paras 11- 12. It should be noted that a similar matter with almost identical facts 
were again heard by the Court in Omar v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2006 (2) SA 
289 (CC) under the Domestic Violence Act which replaced the Prevention of Family Violence Act. The 
CGE was also admitted as amicus curiae and played an important role in highlighting the gendered 
dynamics of domestic violence and the context in which it usually takes place. The Omar judgment 
relied heavily on the decision in Baloyi and highlighted the prevalence of domestic violence, the scant 
protection by the criminal justice system and the negative impact domestic violence had on the 
women concerned. The CGE in Omar provided the Court with more contextual evidence, relating to 
the prevalence of domestic violence in South Africa, the gendered nature and effects of abuse, as 
well as the lack of effective support structures available to abused women. 
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2.2 State Liability and Violence Against Women: Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) as amicus 
curiae). 
 
 2.2.1 Contextual and factual background 
The State is constitutionally obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights, particularly in section 12(1)(c) the right of women to have their 
safety and security protected.52 This imposes a positive duty on the State to protect 
individuals against violence by the implementation of legislative measures that target 
violence and through the conduct of law enforcement agencies in the criminal justice 
system.53 
 The Carmichele case originated under the Interim Constitution which did not 
have an explicit counterpart to section 12(1)(c) of the Final Constitution.54 
Nevertheless, the case sets an important precedent in the development of the law of 
delict to acknowledge the State’s positive duty to protect women against violence.55 
Carmichele was brutally attacked by Coetzee, who had previously been 
convicted on charges of housebreaking and indecent assault. At the time of the 
attack Coetzee was out on bail on a charge of rape. At his first court appearance for 
the rape charge, Coetzee was granted unconditional bail, in spite of a previous 
conviction for indecent assault.56 The police and prosecutor did not oppose bail, in 
spite of being aware of his previous conviction. Coetzee subsequently attacked 
Carmichele.  
                                               
52 Sec 7(2) of the Constitution states: 
‘The state must respect, protect and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’ sec 12(1)(c) states:  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right to be free from 
all forms of violence from either public or private sources.’ 
53 Ian Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (Juta, 6th edition, 2013) 282; Marius 
Pieterse ‘The right to be free from public or private violence after Carmichele’ (2002) 119 SALJ 27 at 
29. 
54 Sec 11 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (hereinafter the Interim 
Constitution) states: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which shall include the 
right not to be detained without trial.  
(2) No person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall 
any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
55 Currie & De Waal op cit note 53. 




Carmichele instituted proceedings in the High Court against the State for damages, 
and claimed that the police and public prosecutors negligently failed to comply with 
the legal duty they owed her - to take steps to prevent her assailant from causing her 
harm (the so called delictual duty of care).57  
The High Court found that that there was no evidence upon which it could 
reasonably be found that the State had acted wrongfully and granted an order of 
absolution from the instance.58 Carmichele appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA), where the appeal was dismissed on similar grounds, upon which she 
approached the Constitutional Court.  
 
2.2.2 Carmichele’s arguments 
Carmichele argued that the High Court and SCA did not apply the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution in determining whether a legal duty existed to protect 
her, and stated that a constitutional obligation rested on all courts to develop the 
common law with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.59 
She argued that the legal relationship between women, the police and prosecutors 
was a special one and that women particularly relied on these institutions to protect 
them against violence and sexual assault.60 She referred to the fact that the SCA 
should have considered previous decisions by the Constitutional Court and itself, 
which highlighted the disadvantaged position and vulnerability of women towards 
sexual violence.61  
According to Carmichele, the release on bail of her assailant and the 
subsequent attack on her, create fear of attack (by a similar offender) amongst 
women which increases the apprehension and insecurity which constantly 
diminishes the quality and enjoyment of women’s lives, and entrenches existing 
patterns of disadvantage.62 She contended that, in failing to take account of these 
arguments, the High Court and the SCA did not comply with their obligation to 
                                               
57 Carmichele op cit note 14 para 3. 
58 Id. 
59 Ibid para 28; Carmichele relied on sec 8 the right to equality; sec 9 the right to life, sec 10 the right 
to human dignity, sec 11 the right to freedom and security of the person and sec 13 the right to 
privacy of the Interim Constitution. 
60 Applicant’s notice of application for special leave to appeal, supporting affidavit deposed to by Alix 
Jean Carmichele, case number: CCT 48/00 para 10. 
61 Ibid para 12; Carmichele specifically referred to the judgments of Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 
197 (CC); S v Chapman 1997 (3) 341 (SCA) and Baloyi op cit note 14 .   
62 Applicant’s notice of application for special leave to appeal op cit note 60 para 12. 
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promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, by giving effect to the 
rights enshrined therein.63 
 
2.2.3 The amicus curiae 
CALS entered as amicus curiae in support of Carmichele, to provide the Court with 
the relevant contextual evidence pertaining to violence against women, and to offer 
arguments about the need to develop the common law to acknowledge the State’s 
positive duty in this regard.64 For CALS, participation as amicus curiae posed some 
difficult questions. How do you challenge a core principle of the law of delict while 
focusing on the gendered dimensions of the case?65 CALS was also concerned 
about the two tier jurisdiction system created by the Interim Constitution, which made 
the Constitutional Court the court of final instance in constitutional matters and the 
SCA, the court of final instance in all other matters, specifically those dealing with 
common law disputes.66 CALS was not certain that the SCA would be receptive to 
their arguments.67 
CALS wanted to focus the Court’s attention on the vulnerability of women to 
violent crime and the link between gender violence and gender inequality. For CALS 
such an understanding would be crucial in promoting the notion of substantive 
equality.68 In its submissions to the Court, CALS framed the relevant constitutional 
duty owed by the State from a gendered perspective: 
 
‘The police and the prosecuting authority bear a particular duty to protect the equality, 
dignity, personal security and freedom of all women against sexual violence and the 
threat of sexual violence and especially those whose vulnerability to sexual violence is 
aggravated by circumstances known to those authorities. It is of course the duty of 
these authorities to protect all members of the community against violent crime. They 
bear an enhanced duty to protect women against the sexual violence precisely 
because of the particular vulnerability and exposure of women to sexual violence and 
the impact of sexual violence upon every facet of their lives. This enhanced duty of 
                                               
63 Ibid para 14. 
64 Amicus curiae notice of motion, supporting affidavit deposed to by Shereen Winifred Mills, case 
number: CCT48/00 para 3.1 
65 Interview with Shereen Mills, CALS (20 November 2012). 
66 Sec 98 & 101 of the Interim Constitution; also see Currie & De Waal op cit note 53 for a discussion 
of the relevant jurisdictions of the courts under the Interim Constitution. 
67 Interview with Shereen Mills op cit note 65. 
68 Amicus curiae notice of motion op cit note 64 para 6.3.4. 
64 
 
protection is necessary to ensure that women enjoy “the equal protection of the laws” 
promised by section 8(1) of the interim Constitution. In this context, “equal concern 
and respect” for women requires the state to give greater care and attention to the 
protection of women against sexual violence. This is consistent with the substantive 
conception of equality embraced by the Constitution and acknowledged and applied by 
this Court.’69 
 
Ultimately, for CALS, if the common law was to be developed in line with the purport, 
spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights, it would mean “doing so in a way which 
counters women’s characteristic vulnerability to sexual violence and fortifies their 
claim” against the protection from violence.70  
The application for admission as amicus curiae and submissions were 
carefully structured to address the substantive issues before the Court, but also 
cleverly directed the Court to a possible interpretation that considered the 
vulnerability of women in society, specifically in relation to gendered violence.   
 
2.2.4 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
The Carmichele judgment is one of the most important judgments in our 
constitutional jurisprudence, as it firmly broke the two tier system of jurisdiction with 
the SCA as the chosen court to adjudicate on matters concerning common law, 
placing all law under the scrutiny of the Constitution and, where necessary its 
development to comply with Constitutional norms.71 Another important aspect of the 
judgment was the acknowledgment that there is a positive duty on the State to 
comply with certain rights in the Bill of Rights.72 
The Constitutional Court clearly stated that in terms of section 39 of the Final 
Constitution there was an obligation on all courts to develop the common law to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.73 The Court identified a 
                                               
69 Written submissions of the amicus curiae, as drafted by Janet Kentridge, Shereen Mills & Catherine 
Albertyn, case number: CCT 48/00 para 17 (footnotes omitted). 
70 Ibid para 18. 
71 Currie & De Waal op cit note 53. 
72 Ibid 282. 
73 Carmichele op cit note 14 paras 32-41; sec 39 of the Constitution states: 
‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
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two stage process to establish if development was required. First, it needed to be 
determined whether the existing common law, with regard to section 39(2), should 
be developed and if yes, the second requirement is concerned with how such a 
development should take place to meet the section 39(2) objectives.74 In this 
instance the law of delict, had to be “replaced or supplemented and enriched by the 
appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied in the Constitution.”75 
However, the Constitutional Court argued that it, as a Court of last instance, did not 
have the benefit of any assistance of the High Court or SCA in considering the 
wrongfulness element of delictual liability for an omission, and that it was not the 
ideal forum to undertake such a development: 
 
‘The proper development of the common law under s 39(2) requires close and sensitive 
interaction between, on the one hand, the High Courts and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal which have particular expertise and experience in this area of the law and, on 
the other hand, this Court. Not only must the common law be developed in a way which 
meets the s 39(2) objectives, but it must be done in a way most appropriate for the 
development of the common law within its own paradigm’.76  
 
In reference to the rights to life, dignity and freedom and security of the person, the 
Court acknowledged that these rights could not only be enforced negatively, but that 
positive enforcement was required.77 Although the United States of America and 
United Kingdom placed restrictions on the positive enforcement of constitutional 
rights, our Constitution allows for a different approach and interpretation.78 This 
positive duty had to be considered in developing the law of delict in order to “cast the 
net of unlawfulness wider because constitutional obligations are now placed on the 
State to respect, protect and promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights and, in 
particular, the right of women to have their safety and security protected.”79 
                                                                                                                                                  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised 
or conferred common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Bill.’ 
74 Carmichele op cit note 14 para 40. 
75 Ibid para 56. 
76 Ibid para 55. 
77 Ibid para 44. 
78 Ibid paras 44-49. 
79 Ibid para 57; Currie & De Waal op cit note 53 at 282. 
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The Court acknowledged the gendered arguments of Carmichele and CALS. It 
considered the powers and functions of the police and found that a positive 
obligation rested on the police to protect women against violence.80 Here, the Court 
directly quoted the amicus’s submissions and stated: 
 
“As it was put by the counsel of the amicus curiae: ‘Sexual violence and the threat of 
sexual violence goes to the core of women’s subordination in society. It is the single 
greatest threat to the self determination of South African women.’”.81  
 
Ultimately, the Court found that the case had sufficient merit and that the complex 
legal issues required careful consideration and it referred the matter back to the High 
Court to consider the relevant facts and legal issues.82 
 From the above, it is clear that the Court’s main concern was sending the 
message to all high courts that they were obliged to take account of section 39(2) of 
the Constitution and to develop the common law when needed.83 The gendered 
arguments of Carmichele and CALS were not its main concern, and did not have a 
significant impact on the legal decision. However, by referring to these arguments, 
the Court indicated their importance and to an extent considered the gendered 
implications of violence. The Court clearly suggested that the violence in our society 
created a special relationship between law-enforcing authorities and women, and 
that there was a duty on these institutions to prevent violence, specifically sexual 
violence.84 This legal duty will not lead to delictual liability in every instance, but it 
requires law-enforcement authorities to be aware of this duty and not to act in 




                                               
80 Carmichele op cit note 14 para 62. 
81 Id (footnotes omitted). 
82 Ibid para 81-83.  
83 For different opinions on the relevant judgment see Pieterse op cit note 53; Johan Van der Walt 
‘Horizontal application of fundamental rights and the threshold of the law in view of the Carmichele 
saga’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 517; Anton Fagan ‘Reconsidering Carmichele’ (2008) 125 SALJ 659. 
84 Johan Van der Walt ‘A special relationship with women: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA); CCT 48/00’ 




  2.2.5 Purpose and impact of the amicus curiae submissions 
Although the women’s rights arguments in Carmichele were not central to the Court’s 
decision, the arguments pushed the Court to stress the need to develop the common 
law in line with constitutional rights, drawing its attention to the fact that the law also 
needs to be developed to take account of women’s rights.86 The fact that the Court 
referred to CALS’s arguments by directly quoting from their submissions, is a 
positive indication that the Court considered the brief to have value.87  
CALS wanted to focus the Court’s attention on the importance of taking 
account of the gendered nature of violent crime. These arguments provided a 
gender-sensitive context that the Court took account of, although the final outcome 
was not solely gender-based. The Carmichele judgment “resulted in considerable 
development of the normative framework relating to state responsibility to prevent 
acts of violence against women.”88 The judgment enhanced the ability of courts to 
respond to the experiences of women, specifically in relation to delictual claims 
against the State and it is important to follow the trail of cases after the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in Carmichele, to establish whether the positive duty of the State to 
protect women from violence was confirmed, as well as the development of this 
obligation in subsequent decisions.89  
 
2.2.6 Developments after the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Carmichele 
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Carmichele was welcomed since it confirmed 
the positive duty that the State had to protect individuals, including women from 
violence and the possibility of accountability if they failed to do so. Particularly 
relevant is the impact that the judgment could have on the police service, as the 
police’s response to victims of gender-based violence has been problematic.90  
                                               
86 Catherine Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in 
South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 217 at 232. 
87 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill ‘The influence of amicus curiae briefs on the Supreme 
Court’ (2000) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 745 at 811. 
88 Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow’ op cit note 4 at 176. 
89 Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law’ op cit note 86 at 232. 
90 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 2 at 308; Dee Smythe & Samantha 
Waterhouse ‘Policing sexual offences: Policies, practices and potential pitfalls’ in Lillian Artz & Dee 
Smythe (eds) Should we consent: Rape law reform in South Africa (Juta 2008) 198.  
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The police have been described as the “gatekeepers” to the criminal justice system 
because they are the first point of entry for victims of violence, deciding the 
seriousness of a complaint, a decision which is often influenced by patriarchal and 
sexist beliefs.91 This is especially relevant to sexual violence as research has shown 
that the police’s response to victims of rape is often associated by prevalent rape 
myths and stereotypes, and the notion that women easily lie about rape, especially if 
no signs of violence is present.92  
It is important to follow the trail of cases decided after the Constitutional 
Court’s judgment in Carmichele in order to establish whether the gendered 
arguments of Carmichele and CALS were followed in later judgments, and how they 
assisted in creating a positive framework and precedent concerning State and police 
protection from violence. 
 
2.2.6.1 Carmichele’s second High Court decision93 
The Constitutional Court’s referral of the Carmichele matter back to the High Court, 
unequivocally identified the issues to be: whether the police/prosecutors were under 
a legal duty to protect Carmichele, whether that duty was negligently breached, and 
whether the law of delict should be developed, in light of the Constitution, to afford 
her the right to claim damages from the State.94 Surprisingly, the gender arguments 
that featured quite prominently in the Constitutional Court were diluted and for the 
most part absent in the High Court decision. There was no amicus curiae 
participation in this trial which might indicate the absence of any gendered 
arguments or at the least an awareness of these arguments. 
Carmichele’s counsel argued that the constitutional duty imposed on the 
State, and particularly the State’s duty to protect women against violence, required 
the court to revisit the wrongfulness test in order to determine whether the State 
owed the plaintiff a legal duty to protect her against violence.95 Except for this 
meagre statement, no other gendered arguments nor the dicta established in the 
Constitutional Court decision, were referred to. Despite this, the High Court found 
                                               
91 Smythe & Waterhouse op cit note 90 at 198. 
92 Ibid 199; also see the discussion of rape myths in fn 7 above. 
93 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (C) (hereinafter 
Carmichele High Court). 
94 Justice Daylin Chetty ‘The perspective of a high court judge’ (2004) 121 SALJ 493. 
95 Carmichele High Court op cit note 93 paras 31-32. 
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that certain officials indeed owed the plaintiff a legal duty to protect her against the 
risk of violence and that they had negligently failed to do so. The State was held 
liable for delictual damages, a decision which it later appealed.  
 
2.2.6.2 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden96  
The Constitutional and High Court decisions in Carmichele were followed by Van 
Duivenboden in the SCA. In this case Brooks shot and killed his wife and daughter 
and wounded his neighbour, Van Duivenboden, during a domestic dispute. Van 
Duivenboden sought to recover damages from the Minister of Safety and Security for 
the injuries he suffered. He argued that the police were aware of Brooks’s violent 
behaviour and that they should have confiscated his firearm in light of previous 
incidences. 
 There was no amicus curiae participation in Van Duivenboden and the court, 
on its own accord, confirmed the State’s positive duty to protect individuals from 
violence. It stated: 
 
‘[i]t must also be kept in mind that in the constitutional dispensation of this country the 
State (acting through its appointed officials) is not always free to remain passive. The 
State is obliged by the terms of s 7 of the 1996 Constitution not only to respect but also 
to 'protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights' and s 2 demands that the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. As pointed out in Carmichele 
our Constitution points in the opposite direction to the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution, which was held in De Shaney v Winnibago County 
Department of Social Services not to impose affirmative duties upon the State. While 
private citizens might be entitled to remain passive when the constitutional rights of 
other citizens are under threat, and while there might be no similar constitutional 
imperatives in other jurisdictions, in this country the State has a positive constitutional 
duty to act in the protection of the rights in the Bill of Rights. The very existence of that 
duty necessarily implies accountability and s 41(1) furthermore provides expressly that 
all spheres of government and all organs of State within such spheres must provide 
government that is not only effective, transparent and coherent, but also government 
that is accountable (which was one of the principles that was drawn from the interim 
Constitution).’97 
 
                                               
96 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (hereinafter Van 
Duivenboden). 
97 Ibid para 20 (footnotes omitted). 
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The SCA found that the test for wrongfulness should now be informed by the norms 
and values embodied in the Constitution, and that these norms included a positive 
duty that rested on the State to act to protect rights in the Bill of Rights.98 Ultimately, 
where the constitutionally protected rights to human dignity, life and security of the 
person are in peril, the State, represented by its officials, has a constitutional duty to 
protect them and when they fail to do so could be held liable.99  
Van Duivenboden thus positively reinforced the dicta of Carmichele and in no 
uncertain terms established the State’s duty to take appropriate action to prevent 
violence. 
 
2.2.6.3 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 
 Carmichele and Van Duivenboden were followed by Van Eeden. In this case a 
young woman was violently raped by a dangerous known criminal and serial rapist, 
who had escaped from police custody. Van Eeden instituted an action for delictual 
damages against the State, claiming that members of the police owed her a legal 
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the prisoner from escaping and causing her 
harm and that the State negligently failed to comply with this duty.100  
The Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) participated as amicus curiae and 
supplemented Van Eeden’s arguments ensuring that the SCA were aware and took 
account of the precedent set in Baloyi and Carmichele that concerned the gendered 
nature of violent crime. 
The SCA found that the law of delict was subject to the rights in the Bill of 
Rights and had to be given content in light of these imperatives and further, that 
section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution placed a positive duty on the State to protect 
everyone from violent crime.101 Consequently, Van Eeden’s delictual claim against 
the State succeeded. Citing Baloyi and Carmichele, the SCA explicitly acknowledged 
the State’s obligations, in terms of international law, to protect women against violent 
crime and acknowledged the gendered nature of violent crime:  
                                               
98 Van Duivenboden op cit note 96 as interpreted by Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow’ op cit 
note 4 180. 
99 Van Duivenboden op cit note 96 para 22. 
100 Van Eeden op cit note 50 para 3. 
101 Ibid paras 12-13. Sec 12(1)(c) states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the 




‘The Constitutional Court has held in Baloyi and Carmichele that the State is, 
furthermore, obliged under international law to protect women against violent crime 
and against gender discrimination inherent in violence against women. This obligation 
was imposed on the State by s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, read with the preamble to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; art 4(d) of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women and art 2 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.’102  
 
2.2.6.4 Carmichele’s final SCA decision 103  
When the Carmichele matter finally came before the SCA, the legal landscape 
concerning delictual liability of the State had developed considerably in light of the 
Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden decisions.104 The State’s appeal was thus 
dismissed, as the SCA found that there was no reason to depart from the general 
principle which established that the State would be held liable for its failure to comply 
with its constitutional duty to protect a person that required protection. 
Interestingly, there was no reference to or acknowledgement in the judgment 
of the gendered nature of violent crime, rather the SCA made a somewhat gender-
neutral statement: 
 
‘This aspect may have bearing on some remarks in Carmichele (CC) paragraphs 29 and 
62 and in Carmichele (CPD) paragraph 30. Both emphasised, quite rightly, the special 
constitutional duty of the State to protect women against violent crime in general and 
sexual abuse in particular. But this should not be seen as implying that the State’s 
liability in a case such as this is necessarily determined by or dependant on the sex of 
the victim or the nature of or motive behind the assault.’105   
 
In light of the Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden decisions, the court’s interpretation 
could have expanded the duty to include everyone and thus employed gender-
neutral reasoning. However, participation by an amicus curiae could have ensured 
that the Court still took account of the importance of protecting women from violence 
in considering its gender-based nature.  
                                               
102 Van Eeden op cit note 50 para 15 (footnotes omitted). 
103 Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Carmichele 2004 (2) BCLR 133 (SCA) (hereinafter 
Carmichele SCA). 
104 Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow’ op cit note 4 at 182. 
105 Carmichele SCA op cit note 103 para 42. 
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2.2.6.5 K v Minister of Safety and Security106 
The K judgment differed slightly from the above cases in that it dealt with the 
vicarious liability of the State. In K the question was whether the Minister of Safety 
and Security could be held vicariously liable for a rape committed by policemen 
whilst in full uniform and on duty. With K being represented by the WLC, the Court 
was well aware of the State’s ensuing responsibilities, because of cases such as 
Baloyi and Carmichele and separate amicus curiae participation was not required.  
The Court found that, against the backdrop of the Constitution, and in 
particular the constitutional rights of K and the constitutional obligations of the State, 
the connection between the conduct of the policemen and their employment was 
sufficiently close to render the State liable.107  
The Court referred to the importance of protecting K’s rights to security of the 
person, dignity, privacy and most importantly her right to substantive equality, which 
lead the Court to quote the dicta in Carmichele’s Constitutional Court judgment, 
referring to the amicus’s argument regarding the gendered nature of violent crime.108  
The judgment was welcomed after the SCA’s judgment in Carmichele, 
indicating that the Constitutional Court was at least developing its gender-sensitive 
jurisprudence concerning violence against women as well as its legal approach to 
substantive equality in understanding the specific context of violent crime toward 
women and the need to address it.109 
 
2.2.6.6 F v Minister of Safety and Security110 
Very similar to K, the case of F was concerned with the vicarious liability of the 
Minister for damages, arising from a brutal rape of a thirteen year old girl by a 
policeman who was on standby duty.111 Relying on the dicta in K, the High Court 
found that there was a sufficiently strong link between the actions of the police officer 
and his employer - the police - to justify the imposition of vicarious liability.112 The 
                                               
106 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) (hereinafter K). 
107 Ibid para 53. 
108 Ibid para 18. 
109 Catherine Albertyn ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 
at 258. 
110 F v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) (hereinafter F). 
111 Ibid para 1. 
112 Ibid para 18. 
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decision of the High Court was overturned by the SCA and F approached the 
Constitutional Court.  
The Constitutional Court focused on the vulnerability of women and children 
to sexual violence and the fact that this violence entrenched patriarchal structures 
that jeopardized women’s freedom and self-determination, substantiating this 
statement with reference to the K and Carmichele judgment.113  
The Court was assisted by the Institute for Security Studies, the Institute for 
Accountability in Southern Africa Trust and the WLC as amici curiae. The WLC 
highlighted the specific constitutional rights of the victim and expanded on the law of 
vicarious liability in light of the above mentioned developed precedent. 
The Court found that common law rules, such as vicarious liability, had to be 
applied through constitutional norms, norms that had to ensure that the fundamental 
rights of women and children were respected and held the Minister vicariously liable: 
 
‘It follows more that the State, through its foremost agency against crime, the police 
service, bears the primary responsibility to protect women and children against this 
prevalent plague of violent crimes. Courts, too, are bound by the Bill of Rights. When 
they perform their function, it is their duty to ensure that the fundamental rights of 
women and girl-children in particular are not made hollow by actual or threatened 
sexual violence. They must acknowledge the policy-drenched nature of the common-
law rules of vicarious liability, that it is the courts that have in the past fashioned and 
favoured them, and that now the rules must be applied through the prism of 
constitutional norms.’114 
 
From the above case discussions it is clear that, since the initial Constitutional Court 
decision in Carmichele, the law pertaining to the State’s duties to protect women 
against violence has grown considerably and most cases show a positive trend in 
acknowledging the unique gendered nature of violent crime in a South African 
context.115 The gender-sensitive precedent set by the Constitutional Court in 
Carmichele definitely found resonance in subsequent decisions and these decisions 
indicate the importance of participation by women’s organisations and amicus curiae 
in order to build on and to protect this precedent. 
                                               
113 Ibid para 56 and fn 40 of the judgment. 
114 Ibid para 57. 
115 Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow’ op cit note 4 at 185. 
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The approach followed in Carmichele’s Constitutional Court decision was stronger in 
subsequent matters that were supported by amicus curiae or where the applicants 
were represented by a women’s organisation than in those that were not.116 This 
indicates the need for amici curiae to build on already established precedent to 
“remind” courts of an approach followed and the importance of defending and 
strengthening the existing protection afforded to women.  
This established precedent has had a positive impact on the legal fight 
against violence against women. Although not addressing the pervasive social 
acceptance of violence against women, it does acknowledge that women have the 
right to be protected from violence by the State, and that if the State fails to comply 
with this duty that it could be held liable. By infusing delictual claims with 
constitutional norms, Carmichele has set a new standard for police behaviour 


















                                               
116 See Van Eeden op cit note 50; K op cit note 106 and F op cit note110. 
117 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 2 at 335. 
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2.3 Extending the Common Law Definition of Rape: Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another (CALS and Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy 
Centre (TLAC) as amici curiae). 
 
 2.3.1 Contextual and factual background 
For many years activists have advocated for the creation of new laws, policies and 
practices in relation to the treatment of rape survivors and punishment of sexual 
offenders.118 A focal point has been to develop the definition of rape to eradicate its 
archaic and patriarchal character and to acknowledge rape as a form of sexual 
violence that violates the dignity and autonomy of a person.119 The requirement of 
vaginal penetration was one of the identified problem areas as it sexualised the 
crime instead of focusing on the use of violence in order to preserve male control 
and power, and further entrenched hierarchical gender relations.120  
The law reform process that addressed the definition of rape was a 
particularly long and cumbersome project. In 1998, the South African Law Reform 
Commission (SALRC) was tasked with investigating sexual offences by and against 
children, which mandate was later extended to include sexual offences committed 
against adults, with the aim of drafting a Sexual Offences Bill.121 The Sexual 
Offences Bill proposed a gender-neutral definition with no distinction between the 
different forms of penetrative assault. It also removed the reference to consent, 
replacing it with a concept of coercive circumstances.122 However, the 2003 version 
of the Bill tabled before Cabinet, dramatically departed from the SALRC proposals, 
especially with regard to the removal of consent from the definition.123 Civil society 
actively lobbied against the implementation of the Bill in its suggested form, but after 
                                               
118 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ op cit note 10 at 1. 
119 Rape as common law crime was defined as the intentional, unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
female without her consent; Nikki Naylor ‘The politics of a definition’ in Lillian Artz & Dee Smythe (eds) 
Should we consent? Rape law reform in South Africa (Juta 2008) 22. 
120 Ibid 23. 
121 Romi Fuller ‘Bureaucracy versus democratisation: The promulgation of the criminal law (sexual 
offences and related matters) amendment bill’ (CSVR 2007); also see the discussion paper of the 
SALRC the South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: The substantive law: Discussion 
Paper 85 Project 107 (1999). 
122 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ op cit note 10 at 6. 




national elections in 2004, rape law reform appeared to fall off the legislative 
agenda.124  
When the Masiya matter came before the Constitutional Court, TLAC and 
CALS, saw an opportunity to use the court system as a public forum to voice their 
dissatisfaction with the delay in the legislative revision of the Sexual Offences Bill 
and the lack of participation allowed for by interested groups.125 The case also 
provided an opportunity to start to develop the rape definition through litigation and to 
test the boundaries of the legal system in terms of how far it would go in extending 
and reconceptualising the definition.126   
Masiya was brought before a regional court on a charge of rape. It was 
alleged that he raped a nine year old girl but during the trial it was established that 
the complainant was penetrated anally.127 The State applied that he had to be 
convicted of indecent assault, a competent verdict on a charge of rape. However, the 
regional court and later the High Court found him guilty of rape, stating that the 
common law definition was unconstitutional and should be extended to include the 
anal penetration of a victim irrespective of gender.128  
The Constitutional Court was asked to confirm the judgment of the High 
Court, in particular its development of the common law definition of rape and the 
consequent changes to the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, and to consider Masiya’s appeal against the High 








                                               
124 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent?’ op cit note 10 at 7. 
125 Interview Lisa Vetten, TLAC (14 December 2012). 
126 Id. 
127 Masiya op cit note 14 para 6. 
128 Masiya op cit note 14 as discussed by Elsje Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to 
feminist arguments’ (2008) 20 CJWL 1 at 15. 
129 Masiya op cit note 14 as discussed by Stu Woolman ‘The amazing vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 
124 SALJ 762 at 766. 
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2.3.2 The parties 
Masiya focused on his fair trial rights, specifically the principle of legality provided for 
in the Constitution.130 He stressed the importance of the separation of powers 
doctrine, in light of the already proposed Sexual Offences Bill and argued that the 
common law definition of rape was neither archaic nor discriminatory and that it 
specifically protected women from rape:  
 
‘We submit that the definition of rape and the punitive consequences that follow upon 
the perpetration of that crime, reflect an age old expression of society’s fundamental 
regard for the sanctity, respect and honour of the physical core of womanhood. 
Women incidentally enjoy special protection by the Constitution. The unique aspect of 
rape, pertaining only to women, expresses simply what is still, in the most liberal mind, 
an urge to protect the very cradle of life itself and stems from an ethical, religious and 
biological perspective of mankind at large that this is the origin of human existence, 
most intricately linked to the ethical sphere of romantic love. Women and society in 
general are entitled to the utmost protection against violation of that part of the 
woman’s physique that in the view of mankind in its broadest sense transcends mere 
biological existence or the privacy of the individual involved.’131 
 
This perspective reflected exactly what feminists and organisations had worked 
towards countering. By focusing on the sex of the particular victim and ensuing 
social stereotypes,132 the crime is sexualised thereby ignoring the actual reasons 
and implications of rape, by portraying women as the classical victim.133 MacKinnon 
stresses that rape is perpetrated against those with less social power and that its 
intricate power relations should be understood:  
                                               
130 Masiya referred to sec 35(3)(l) and (n) of the Constitution which states: 
 ‘Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right – (l) not to be convicted of an 
act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was 
committed or omitted; (n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the 
prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was 
committed and the time of sentencing.’; written submissions of the applicant, as drafted by P.J.J De 
Jager (SC) & J Bauer, case number: CCT 54/06 para 2.3; 
131 Written submissions of the applicant op cit note 130 para 11.  
132 Colleen Hall ‘Rape: The politics of definition’ (1988) 105 SALJ 67 at 72 describes these 
stereotypes as: ‘Male sexuality is linked to aggression, forcefulness and initiative, and female 
sexuality is constructed as passive and receptive. These sexual ‘scripts’ for normal sexuality cast men 
in the role of predators and prime women for the role of victims.’ (footnotes omitted); According to 
Judith A. Howard ‘The “normal” victim: The effects of gender stereotypes on reactions to victims’ 
(1984) 47 Social Psychology Quarterly 270 at 273, women are for example seen as weak, vulnerable, 
influenceable, submissive, irrational and excitable. 
133 Catharine A. Mackinnon Women’s lives, men’s laws (Harvard University Press 2005) 241. 
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‘The gendered inferiority attributed to sexual victims, and used to target them, and the 
gendered superiority attached to sexual prowess, along with the erotization of 
subordination and dominance, are socially imbricated with established and inculcated 
notions of masculinity and femininity respectively. A prominent observable regularity 
is that men more often perpetrate, women are more often victimized. Even more of the 
variance is explained by the observation that sexual atrocities are inflicted on those 
who have less social power by those who have more, among whom gender is the most 
significant cleavage of stratification.’134 
 
In reference to the South African context, Artz & Combrinck describe the common 
misperception of rape as reflected in our criminal justice system: 
 
‘There is a popular tendency to place human sexual behaviour on a continuum, with 
seduction on the one end and rape on the other, with varying degrees of sexual 
overtures, persuasion and coercion and the threat of physical force in between. This 
construction allows society to perceive rape as ‘sex gone wrong’ and allows one to 
overlook the fact that rape and sex do not belong on the same continuum at all. It also 
allows one to overlook the force or coercion that is essentially what the criminal law 
claims to be punishing.’135 
 
The emphasis on penile and vaginal penetration was seen to reinforce the 
perception that rape is about sex and not violence, and was thus considered to be a 
starting point in the reconceptualisation of the crime.136  
   
2.3.3  The amici curiae 
CALS, and TLAC, applied for admission as amici curiae to address the gendered 
and discriminatory nature of the current rape definition.137  
 In their substantive submissions, the amici curiae provided the Court with 
information regarding the historical development of the definition. They focused on 
the gendered nature of the definition in early Roman and English law where women 
were viewed as possessions and a certain value was attached to their chastity - 
                                               
134 Id. 
135 Lillian Artz & Helene Combrinck ‘‘A wall of words’: Redefining the offence of rape in South African 
law’ (2003) Acta Juridica 72 at 80 (footnotes omitted). 
136 Ibid at 84. 
137 Notice of application to intervene as amicus curiae, founding affidavit deposed to by Shereen 
Winifred Mills, case number: CCT 54/06 para 12. 
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therefore the focus on vaginal penetration.138 For the amici a contrary understanding 
of rape that would focus on the specific power relations at play and not solely the 
mode of penetration was necessary: 
 
‘Once rape is properly understood as an act of power by which a man asserts his 
power over a woman the distinction between anal penetration and vaginal rape is 
meaningless. Regardless of what orifice of a female is penetrated, the man has 
achieved his goal, which is to exert power over the female.’139 
 
The amici curiae further argued that the definition did not reflect the experiences of 
sexual assault of men and boys, which reinforced the conception that rape was an 
act of sexuality rather than an act of force and coercion.140 In light of these 
contentions, the amici argued that the definition was unconstitutional as it infringed 
the rights of both men and women to equality and dignity.141  
In referring to the principle of legality, the amici curiae argued that the case 
merely involved a reinterpretation of the existing elements of the crime of rape and 
did not involve the declaration of previously lawful conduct to be unlawful.142 The 
amici provided the Court with a comparative perspective on the development of the 
definition of rape in foreign jurisdictions focusing on developments in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States of America.143  
 
2.3.4 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
The judgment, delivered by Nkabinde J, is difficult to follow and is a peculiar 
combination of the amici curiae and Masiya’s arguments.144 
In considering the constitutionality of the definition, the Court discussed the 
historical evolution of the definition as the amici curiae did in its submissions.145 The 
Court maintained that the definition was not discriminatory, as it criminalised conduct 
                                               
138 Written submissions of the amici curiae, as drafted by Kameshni Pillay, case number: CCT 54/06 
paras 31-36. 
139 Ibid para 43. 
140 Ibid para 39-42. 
141 Ibid para 45. 
142 Ibid para 57. 
143 Ibid paras 27-35.  
144 Moseneke DCJ, Kondile J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Van der Westhuizen J, Yacoob J and 
Van Heerden AJ concurred. 
145 Masiya op cit note 14 paras 20-24 in relation to the written submissions of the amici curiae op cit 
note 138 paras 31-36. 
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that was morally and socially unacceptable and that it was not necessary to consider 
the amici’s arguments that viewing women as victims would enforce patriarchal 
interests in women’s sexuality.146 For the Court, it would be counterproductive to 
invalidate the definition for under-inclusivity and the question should rather be the 
possible extension of the definition to include both male and female penetration to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.147 The Court justified the 
gender specific focus of the definition by stating:  
 
‘The evolution of our understanding of rape has gone hand in hand with women’s 
agitation for the recognition of their legal personhood and right to equal protection. To 
this end, women in South Africa and the rest of the world have mobilised against the 
patriarchal assumption that underlay the traditional definition of rape. They have 
focused attention on the unique violence visited upon women. Much of this activism 
focused on creating support systems for women, such as rape crisis centres and 
abuse shelters; and also on the process whereby rape is investigated and prosecuted. 
It is now widely accepted that sexual violence and rape not only offend the privacy and 
dignity of women but also reflect the unequal power relations between men and 
women in our society.’148 
 
Although not clearly stated, I think that the Court tried to support a more radical 
feminist approach that concentrated on women’s subordination as a possible 
justification of the need for a gender specific definition.149 However, the Court failed 
to acknowledge that power or control could be exercised irrespective of the gender 
of the victim.150 
The Court found it was not desirable to extend the definition to reflect gender-
neutral standards and deferred this responsibility to Parliament.151 Here it repeated 
Masiya’s arguments that it was not unconstitutional to have a gender-specific 
                                               
146 Masiya op cit note 14 para 27. In fn 51 the Court stated: 
‘Some protagonists of women’s rights, however, argue that the focus on the woman only as the victim 
of rape still perpetuates patriarchal interests in controlling a woman’s sexuality. It is not necessary to 
consider that argument for the purpose of this case.’ See Bonthuys’s interpretation of this statement 
‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 128 at 19. 
147 Masiya op cit note 14 para 27. 
148 Ibid para 28. 
149 See Catharine A. Mackinnon ‘Feminism, marxism, method, and the State: Toward feminist 
jurisprudence’ (1983) 8 Signs 635 for a discussion of the radical feminist approach toward rape law. 
150 Written submissions on behalf of the amici curiae op cit note 138 para 41. 
151 Masiya op cit note 14 paras 28-30. 
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definition and that women needed special protection.152 This inadvertently reinforced 
the stereotypes of victimhood which the amici curiae attempted to bring to the 
Court’s attention. These stereotypes ignored the intricate power relations at play in a 
rape scenario.153 The Court here confirmed its use of traditional legal method, where 
it is a mere interpreter of law, ignoring the broader analysis of context necessary for 
its development and disregarding its impact on rape survivors.154 
Although not extending the definition to include gender-neutral terms, the 
Court extended the definition to include female anal penetration by a penis with the 
specific intention of protecting women as a traditionally vulnerable and 
disadvantaged group.155 The definition was developed prospectively so as not to 
infringe the principle of legality.156 
 The minority judgment by Langa CJ (with Sachs J concurring), addressed 
some of the shortcomings of the main judgment. The minority believed that the 
developments should have included the anal rape of men and supported the 
arguments of the amici curiae without directly referring to it by stating: 
 
‘To my mind the problem is not about males and females: it is about altering our 
understanding of why rape is prohibited. There are two elements to this: first that rape 
is about dignity and power and second, that anal rape is equivalent to vaginal rape.’157 
 
It is important that the minority acknowledged that a gender specific definition might 
entrench the vulnerable position of women in society, by perpetuating the stereotype 
of women’s vulnerability which enforces cycles of abuse and degradation.158 
According to the minority, male rape is equally associated with a need for male 
gender-supremacy, as men who are raped are most often equally vulnerable (young 
boys, prisoners and homosexuals).159 The fact that men lack a vagina does and 
should not make the crime less gender-based.160 
                                               
152 Ibid para 30. 
153 Ibid para 36. 
154 Mary Jane Mossman ‘Feminism and the law: Challenges and choices’ (1998) 10 CJWL 1 at 5; see 
the discussion of traditional legal method in chapter 2. 
155 Masiya op cit note 14 para 39. 
156 Ibid para 51. 
157 Ibid para 77. 
158 Ibid para 85. 




The majority judgment of the Court was justifiably criticised by many legal 
scholars.161 The Court failed to recognise that legal rules played a role in 
perpetuating harmful stereotypes.162 Although the majority hinted at the importance 
of gender domination in rape, they ended up focusing on the sex of the victim 
“ignoring the fully gender implications of rape”.163 Bonthuys ascribes this to the 
Court’s failure to understand the intersecting nature of gender, sex and sexual 
orientation: 
 
‘As a result of the failure to appreciate the intersection of gender and sexual 
orientation issues in male rape, the judgment reiterates and strengthens the very 
stereotypes of female and male sexuality – that women can only be passive victims 
and that men can only be perpetrators – which form the basis of violent, sexual 
aggressive masculinity. The argument is not that the court should not have recognised 
that most victims of rape are women but that, in failing to see the similarities between 
male and female rape victims, it did not go far enough and ended up reinforcing, rather 
than transcending, gendered stereotypes of sexuality.’164 
 
Sexual violence is fuelled by social hierarchy “inflicted on those who have less social 
power by those who have more”.165 The Constitutional Court failed to recognise this 
fully. The amici curiae wanted to alert the Court to this reality, but its arguments were 
inverted to support the Court and criminal justice system’s own understanding and 
interpretation of rape. Although the judgment was inclusionary in extending the 
definition to include the anal penetration of women, it did not address the social 
conditions that create and perpetuate systemic inequalities.166 It could have done 
this by adopting the arguments of the amici curiae that took into account the 
                                               
161 See for example C.R. Snyman ‘Extending the scope of rape – A dangerous precedent’ (2007) 124 
SALJ 677; Kelly Phelps ‘A dangerous precedent indeed – A response to C.R. Snyman’s note on 
Masiya’ (2008) 125 SALJ 648; Kelly Phelps and Sha’ista Kazee ‘The Constitutional Court gets anal 
about rape – gender neutrality and the principle of legality in Masiya v DPP’ (2007) 20 SACJ 341; 
Solomon A. Dersso ‘The role of courts in the development of the common law under s 39(2): Masiya v 
Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and Another CCT Case 54/06 (10 May 2007)’ 
(2007) 23 SAJHR 373; Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit 
note 128; Woolman op cit note 129. 
162 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 128 at 19. 
163 Elsje Bonthuys ‘Putting gender into the definition of rape or taking it out?’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal 
Studies 249 at 257.  
164 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 128 at 28. 
165 MacKinnon ‘Women’s lives, men’s laws’ op cit note 133 at 240. 
166 Bonthuys ‘Putting gender into the definition of rape or taking it out?’ op cit note 163 at 259. 
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contextual evidence that considers the power relations associated with rape and thus 
accurately reflects the actual impact of rape on its victims.  
 
2.3.5 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
The amici curiae wanted to present the Court with the gendered and social context of 
rape and to focus renewed attention on the development of the definition in light of 
Parliament’s delay in enacting the Sexual Offences Bill.  
The use of the amici curiae brief was distorted as the Court relied on their 
general and introductory arguments, but reverted to Masiya’s arguments concerning 
content and context. The Court’s reasoning for wanting to focus on women as the 
overwhelming victims of rape, and therefore the need for a gender specific crime, is 
understandable and defensible but badly articulated and argued.   
Dersso describes the majority’s reasoning as “reductionist and partial”, and 
from reading the relevant Court documents one wonders whether it could be, in 
addition to employing traditional legal method, a misrepresentation of the relevant 
parties pleadings that lead to such a constrained interpretation.167 My interpretation, 
after reading the relevant pleadings and judgment is that it could be partly assigned 
to a reworked “cut and paste” job from the parties’ submissions where the Court 
relied on several arguments of the parties but without any substantial analysis that 
lead to peculiar conclusions.  
Although the amici curiae were disappointed with the decision in relation to 
extending the definition of rape, Masiya provided women’s organisations with an 
opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the legislative process concerning the 
enactment of the Sexual Offences Bill.168 The court case put pressure on the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, as he had to depose to an 
affidavit regarding the status of the Bill and, although the affidavit did not provide any 
answers as to when the Bill would be finalised, it granted women’s organisations the 
opportunity to engage with the Minster in a public forum.169 The Court, as vocal as it 
could be on the subject, expressed concern with the delayed implementation of the 
                                               
167 Dersso op cit note 161 at 381. 
168 Interview Lisa Vetten op cit note 125. 




Bill.170 Shortly after the Masiya judgment (10 May 2007) the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, the rephrased Sexual 
Offences Bill, was implemented (13 December 2007).  
In this sense Masiya provided a platform for concerned organisations to 
pressurise government to engage with the public regarding the status of an important 
piece of legislation and also highlights the importance of the indirect impact of amici 






















                                               
170 Specifically the Court stated: 
‘The Court, while not unmindful of the fact that the 2003 Bill is before Parliament, cannot delay, defer 
or refuse to deal with an extension of the definition when the facts before it demand such an 
extension and when it is clearly in the public interest to do so. A further delay in or suspension of the 
extension of the current definition will constitute an injustice upon survivors of non-consensual anal 
penetration such as the nine-year-old complainant in this case.’; Masiya op cit note 14 para 44. 
171 See the second respondent’s affidavit op cit note 169. 
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2.4 Sexual Violence and Amicus Curiae Participation in Criminal Proceedings: 
S v Zuma (attempted amici curiae intervention by TLAC, CALS and the Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)). 
 
2.4.1 Contextual and factual background 
The Zuma trial needs to be viewed against the backdrop of one of the most “fractious 
periods of internal struggle in the history of the African National Congress (ANC) 
over the ideological direction and leadership of the movement.”172 When a charge of 
rape was laid against Zuma, he was in the midst of a succession battle over the 
leadership of the ANC and possible presidency of the country. Zuma’s supporters 
was of the opinion that the rape charge was a political ploy to discredit him and used 
the trial as a platform to draw attention to the failings of the new democracy and the 
leadership of then President Thabo Mbeki.173  
It is clear from the ensuing trial that a woman who decides to lay a charge of 
rape still faces insurmountable challenges.174 The complainant, Khwezi, and Zuma 
were family friends and during an overnight visit to Zuma’s home Khwezi was 
allegedly raped.175 Zuma pleaded not guilty to the charge, admitting that he and 
Khwezi had sex, but claiming that the intercourse was consensual. 
Supporters for both Zuma and Khwezi gathered outside the courthouse which 
resulted in an extremely hostile and often violent environment that required a strong 
police presence.176 Zuma’s supporters were dressed in traditional Zulu clothing and 
sported banners and T-shirts with slogans such as ‘burn the bitch’, ‘100% Zuluboy’ 
and ‘Zuma for President’.177  
                                               
172 Shireen Hassim ‘Democracy’s shadows: Sexual rights and gender politics in the rape trial of Jacob 
Zuma’ (2009) 68 African Studies 57 at 58. 
173 Vasu Reddy & Cheryl Potgieter ‘Real men stand up for the truth: Discursive meanings in the Jacob 
Zuma rape trial’ (2006) 24 Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies 511 at 513; 
Hassim op cit note 172 at 59.  
174 Helene Combrinck ‘Claims and entitlements or smoke and mirrors? Victims’ rights in the sexual 
offences act’ in Lillian Artz & Dee Smythe (eds) Should we consent? Rape law reform in South Africa 
(Juta 2008) 262. 
175 Zuma op cit note 15 facts as portrayed in the headnote. 
176 Hassim op cit note 172 at 59; also see Mmatshilo Motsei The kanga and the kangaroo court: 
Reflections of the rape trial of Jacob Zuma (Jacana Media 2007) for a general discussion of the trial. 
177 Hassim op cit note 172 at 59. 
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The One-in-Nine Campaign was established to support Kwhezi and all women who 
spoke out about rape and sexual violence.178 Its banners highlighted women’s 
constitutional rights; the need to pass the Sexual Offences Bill and the 
ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system in protecting rape victims and it 
provided a public platform, considering the amount of media attention garnered, to 
address issues that have long plagued women’s organisations who work in this 
area.179  
Inside the courtroom, the main question was whether there had been consent 
to the sexual intercourse.180 After Khwezi’s evidence, Zuma’s defence team brought 
an application to cross-examine Khwezi on her past sexual history and to lead 
evidence in connection therewith.181 The High Court granted the request stating it 
                                               
178 A report of the Medical Research Council showed that only one out of every nine rape survivors 
spoke out about rape and sexual violence – resulting in the name One-in-Nine adopted by its 
founders People Opposing Women Abuse (POWA). For a discussion of the One-in-Nine campaign 
see Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala ‘“Come rape us!” The everyday trauma of sexual violence in South 
Africa’ in Dovile Budryte, Lisa M. Vaughn & Natalya T. Riegg (eds) Feminist conversations: Women, 
trauma, and empowerment in post-transitional societies (University Press of America 2009) 63 at 68; 
Meghan Cooper ‘Preventing the gendered reproduction of citizenship: The role of social movements 
in South Africa’ (2011) 19 Gender & Development 357. 
179 Hassim op cit note 172 at 59. 
180 Zuma op cit note 15 facts as portrayed in headnote. 
181 Ibid p 198; the application was brought in terms of sec 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 which states:  
‘(1) Evidence as to the character of an accused or as to the character of any person against or in 
connection with whom a sexual offence as contemplated in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, is alleged to have been committed, shall, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (2), be admissible or inadmissible if such evidence would have been 
admissible or inadmissible on the 30th day of May, 1961. 
(2) No evidence as to any previous sexual experience or conduct of any person against or in 
connection with whom a sexual offence is alleged to have been committed, other than evidence 
relating to sexual experience or conduct in respect of the offence which is being tried, shall be 
adduced, and no evidence or question in cross examination regarding such sexual experience or 
conduct, shall be put to such person, the accused or any other witness at the proceedings pending 
before the court unless- 
(a) the court has, on application by any party to the proceedings, granted leave to adduce such 
evidence or to put such question; or 
(b) such evidence has been introduced by the prosecution. 
(3) Before an application for leave contemplated in subsection (2)(a) is heard, the court may direct 
that any person, including the complainant, whose presence is not necessary may not be present at 
the proceedings. 
(4) The court shall, subject to subsection (6), grant the application referred to in subsection (2)(a) only 
if satisfied that such evidence or questioning is relevant to the proceedings pending before the court. 
(5) In determining whether evidence or questioning as contemplated in this section is relevant to the 




would give reasons for its decision at a later time.182 Zuma’s defence team 
proceeded to lead evidence regarding Khwezi’s childhood during which time she was 
sexually abused, and also later in her life where she made allegations of rape 
against certain individuals.183 Most of the evidence lead was accepted by the High 
Court as relevant.184  
The Zuma trial was a particularly difficult case for women’s rights activists as 
the case questioned whether ongoing advocacy for rape law reform had any 
effect.185 The admission of evidence regarding Khwezi’s past sexual history and her 
cross-examination in this regard were particularly worrisome and served to publicise 
and reinforce several rape stereotypes (women should forcefully resist; if a 
complainant does not conform to traditional sex norms she might be the sexual 
deviant; rape is about sex and not intricate power relations exercised in a violent 
manner).186  
It was after the closing of the State’s case that the amici curiae lodged an 
application to intervene with the intention to lead expert evidence in the matter and to 
present written and oral argument regarding certain issues.187 They thought it was 
important to provide the High Court with evidence that would explain Kwezi’s 
behaviour and that would attempt a balance between her and Zuma’s constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                  
(a) is in the interests of justice, with due regard to the accused's right to a fair trial; 
(b) is in the interests of society in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; 
(c) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in issue; 
(d) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution; 
(e) is fundamental to the accused's defence; 
(f) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and 
right to privacy; or 
(g) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of pregnancy or disease or any injury to 
the complainant, where it is relevant to a fact in issue. 
(6) The court shall not grant an application referred to in subsection (2)(a) if, in its opinion, such 
evidence or questioning is sought to be adduced to support an inference that by reason of the sexual 
nature of the complainant's experience or conduct, the complainant- 
(a) is more likely to have consented to the offence being tried; or 
(b) is less worthy of belief. 
(7) The court shall provide reasons for granting or refusing an application in terms of subsection 
(2)(a), which reasons shall be entered in the record of the proceedings.’ 
182 See Zuma op cit note 15 pages 198-204 for the reasons provided in the final judgment. 
183 Zuma op cit note 15 p 220. 
184 Id. 
185 Combrinck ‘Claims and entitlements or smoke and mirrors’ op cit note 174 at 262. 
186 David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick ‘Rape in the criminal justice system’ (1997) 87 The Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 1194. 
187 Notice of motion in the joint application of TLAC, CALS & CSVR to be admitted as amici curiae, 
founding affidavit deposed to by Liesl Gerntholtz, case number: SS321/05. 
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rights. The High Court refused the amici’s application for admission, arguing that it 
was ill-conceived and not necessary. The High Court proceeded to adopt certain 
universal assumptions about women’s agency and voice.188 The fact that Khwezi did 
not exhibit a “normal response” to the rape, in other words physically resisting and 
immediately reporting the incident, lead to the conclusion that she was lying about 
the rape and that the sex was consensual.189  
 
2.4.2 The amici curiae 
The amici curiae were uncertain whether their participation would be wise as a result 
of the politically charged atmosphere and the possibility that their involvement could 
be misconstrued as a publicity stunt.190 However, after seeing how Khwezi was 
treated in and outside the courtroom, and the extent to which every possible rape 
stereotype was being brought to the fore, the amici curiae was of the opinion that its 
participation was required to address these common stereotypes and to support 
Khwezi.191 There was also considerable external pressure on the participating 
organisations to intervene, considering the manner in which the trial was run.192 The 
final decision to intervene led to a division amongst women’s organisations working 
in the area, as some thought that the amici could do little to assist, and that they 
would not be able to influence the court when considering the patriarchal nature of 
the criminal justice system.193 
The organisations, after their decision to enter as amici curiae, were faced 
with a difficult strategic choice on how they were going to frame their arguments to 
balance the individual and broader issues of the case.194  In their application for 
admission they stated that they intervened not only in their own interests, but in the 
interest of the community, which included women and children who were victims of 
sexual violence or who could be victims; and on behalf of women and children who 
as a result of the criminal justice system were unable or afraid to prosecute their 
                                               
188 Steven Robins ‘Sexual politics and the Zuma rape trial’ (2008) 34 Journal of Southern African 
Studies 411 at 424. 
189 Id; specifically see Zuma op cit note 15 p 216-218 for the judge’s interpretation of Khwezi’s 
response to the alleged rape. 
190 Interview Lisa Vetten op cit note 125. 
191 Id. 
192 Interview Catherine Albertyn, CALS, (29 January 2013). 




cases and, in the public interest, in order to promote the protection and development 
of the rights to equality, dignity and privacy for complainants in sexual offence 
cases.195 The amici curiae argued that the case raised important constitutional 
issues that went to the heart of the enjoyment of women’s constitutional rights and 
that their participation would: 
 
‘enable substantive issues of social and legal significance to be properly ventilated in 
the interest of a fair trial and will also ensure utilisation of common law processes in a 
manner consistent with the constitutional principles;’196 
 
The amici curiae maintained that the social context evidence that they would bring 
would place the High Court in a better position to make a decision “confident of its 
social consequences”.197 The expert evidence was tailored to Khwezi’s specific 
circumstances and focused on the effects of childhood sexual abuse and the power 
dynamics associated with a personal relationship as the one Kwezi and Zuma 
had.198 The amici also wanted to provide a comparative perspective on the 
promotion of constitutional values within trial proceedings.199 Although the amici 
wrote to the parties to gain their permission/support to enter as amici curiae, all the 
parties refused their support.  
 
2.4.3 Decision by the High Court 
The High Court rejected the admission of the amici curiae on two main grounds. 
Firstly, it found that the proposed expert evidence would delay the matter 
unnecessarily and that a delay would have a profound negative effect on Khwezi as 
she most probably will have to be recalled as a witness.200 Secondly, the High Court 
regarded the expert evidence provided by the State as sufficient and found that the 
amici curiae could not bring anything new that could be of assistance.201 
 
                                               
195 Notice of motion in the joint application of TLAC, CALS & CSVR op cit note 187 para 12. 
196 Ibid para 14. 
197 Ibid para 14.7. 
198 Ibid para 16. 
199 Ibid para 17. 
200 Unreported judgment delivered by Van der Merwe J in S v Zuma case number: SS321/05 (27 
March 2006).  
201 Ibid p 699. 
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2.4.4 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
The amici curiae made a strategic decision to construct the brief around Khwezi, as 
counsel advised that criminal courts were more receptive to a person with a face and 
name than broader social context.202 The individualised nature of the brief turned out 
to be problematic and the submissions were seen as supplementing the State’s 
evidence rather than being of assistance to the court.203 According to Brickhill, the 
amici curiae participation in Zuma failed, as it threatened the bilateral adversarial 
nature of criminal trials.204 In hindsight, the choice to focus on Khwezi might not have 
been the best one, but it seemed viable at the time, specifically considering the way 
in which she was treated in and outside the courtroom.  
A further problem was the impression that the amici curiae saw the judge as a 
lay person regarding the intricacies of rape law and that they were the only ones able 
to assist him in this regard. The amici, in its submissions stated: 
 
‘I respectfully aver that the submissions to be made by Tshwaranang will assist the 
Court in that the rape of a woman is unlikely to be an issue within the general 
knowledge or experience of judicial officers. Rape has frequently been described as a 
crime that seldom sees the light of day, let alone comes under the scrutiny of our 
courts. Rape victims or rape survivors have usually endured their experience in 
silence, and the particular and somewhat unique character and features of rape have 
long gone unstudied;’205 
 
The tone and way in which the brief was drafted was understandable in a sense, as 
the amount of attention drawn and publicity surrounding the case created a hostile, 
oppositional environment in which it was difficult to distance oneself from the 
particular factual scenario. However, one can deduce an attitude of resentment from 
the judge towards the amici curiae in his final judgment where he stated: 
 
‘A disconcerting aspect of this trial is the fact that all and sundry were prepared to, and 
apparently claimed the right to, comment on my decision in terms of s 227 of the Act, 
even before they knew the bases on which and the reasons why leave was granted to 
cross-examine the complainant on her past sexual experience, and to lead evidence 
                                               
202 Interview Lisa Vetten op cit note 125. 
203 Jason Brickhill ‘The intervention of amici curiae in criminal matters: S v Zuma and S v Basson 
considered’ (2006) 123 SALJ 391 at 396. 
204 Ibid 398. 
205 Notice of motion in the joint application of TLAC, CALS & CSVR op cit note 187 para 14.4. 
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concerning aspects of that past. People commented on the ruling without having been 
in Court or knowing anything about the contents of the application, or the provisions 




‘This case is, in my judgment, a good illustration why pressure groups and individuals 
should not jump to conclusions and express criticism before having heard all the 
evidence. At the time when I allowed the complainant to be cross-examined on her 
sexual history, and evidence to be led in that respect, I was fully aware of what was 
contained in Hully’s affidavit. I realised that there was at least a possibility that, at the 
end of the case, it could be said that a false accusation of rape was made against the 
accused. Instead of waiting, some people stated categorically that rape victims, would 
as a result of this case, be hesitant to report an incident of rape because of the 
treatment the complainant received, apparently also from this Court.’207 
 
It is clear that the judge viewed the amici’s submissions and planned participation as 
a personal attack on his judicial integrity and that the purpose of the participation 
was misconstrued. The court would most certainly have benefited from the proposed 
amici curiae participation and contextual evidence it planned to bring. As Robins 
stated: 
 
‘A close reading of the Zuma judgment suggests that the Judge uncritically accepted 
gender stereotypes about rape victims and Zuma’s version of ‘traditional’ Zulu 
masculinity. While the Judge accepted Zuma’s essentialist rendition of ‘Zulu 
masculinity’ he did not unpack the way in which the gendered power relations between 
accused and complainant were culturally construed; instead he opted for a thoroughly 
decontextualised and standardised conception of the ‘rape victim.’208  
 
According to Robins the court should have considered the possibility that the 
relationship between Zuma and Khwezi could have been culturally and politically 
structured in such a way as “to make it extremely difficult for the latter to reject or 
resist the sexual advances and demands of the accused.”209  
                                               
206 Zuma op cit note 15 p 198. 
207 Ibid p 222-223. 
208 Robins op cit note 188 at 423. 
209 Ibid 424. 
92 
 
Towards the end of the amici’s submissions they stated that they would have liked to 
provide the High Court with an analysis of the constitutional rights of complainants in 
sexual offences cases, which would have required and attempted a balance between 
the fair trial rights of the accused and the constitutional rights of the complainant/s.210 
This point is of specific interest and could have been the new and relevant issue that 
the court was looking for, had the judge not interpreted the participation to be an 
attack on his judicial integrity. 
The fact that the brief was rejected by all the parties concerned, and in this 
specific instance also the prosecution, could not have been in the amici’s favour 
when the High Court considered the application. Although consent is not a 
requirement for admission, as admission solely lies with the discretion of the court, a 
brief supported by the parties is more likely to be supported by the court. Brickhill 
advises against amicus curiae participation in criminal matters stating that the unique 
nature of these proceedings should be considered and that organisations should 
rather focus on prosecutorial support by contacting the State and offering assistance 
in compiling expert evidence on their behalf.211 The amici curiae participation and the 
way in which it was framed in Zuma was unfortunate, but it raised important issues 
that potential amici should note.  
The way in which an amicus curiae brief, especially the application for 
admission, is framed is of utmost importance. Amici curiae should play at their 
traditional role as “friend of the court” and should carefully structure subsequent 
submissions to objectively frame the relevant context and issues it would like to draw 
to the court’s attention. The key is to frame controversial arguments/ideas in such a 
way that it would be accepted by a court, possibly influencing the way in which a 
decision is reached or the way in which a decision is reached in future.   
The hostilities outside the High Court and extensive media coverage polarised 
the public (and court) to such a degree that there was little room for thoughtful 
debate around the actual issues on the historical and cultural constructions of sexual 
agency and the conditions of sexual consent.212 The amici curiae was also 
lambasted in the press for being mere publicity hounds, which negatively impacted 
                                               
210 Notice of motion in the joint application of TLAC, CALS & CSVR op cit note 187 para 20.5. 
211 Brickhill op cit note 203 at 397. 
212 Reddy & Potgieter op cit note 173 at 513; Hassim op cit note 172 at 73. 
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public perception and support for the actual purpose of the brief and the amici’s 
planned participation.213  
However, the criminal justice system continues to be an important arena 
where women’s activists contest for women’s voices to be heard. Although the 
adversarial nature of the criminal justice system limits the role of amicus curiae 
participation, it does not mean that there is no role to be played by amici curiae in 
criminal matters. The Zuma matter was not the ideal matter to test the waters and 
another matter, less politicised and publicly hostile, might be able to establish a role 
for amici curiae participation within the criminal justice system, especially in the 























                                               
213 Mathatha Tsedu Rapport Newspaper, 2 April 2006. 
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3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
‘Women who work with law have learned that while legal change may not always make 
social change, sometimes it helps, and law unchanged can make social change 
impossible.’214 
 
Women and organisations, working in the field of gender-based violence, have 
engaged the law and criminal justice system to defend legislative gains, extend legal 
protection and expose discriminatory practices and structural inadequacies.215 As 
part of this strategy, amici curiae participation has been vital in developing legal 
arguments that challenged gendered “assumptions and perspectives underlying 
legal rules, terms and concepts.”216 
These legal challenges and amici curiae participation were aided by the 
employment of feminist research and feminist method and a key strategy has been 
to place women’s experience before the courts in an attempt to re-define their 
experience and their right to be free from violence.217 By asking the “women 
question”, the amici curiae have been able to focus attention on women and their 
specific experience relating to violence.218 The need to justify protection was 
explored (Baloyi); questions were asked such as, why women were not afforded 
protection (Carmichele) and why protection should be extended (Masiya) and how 
one’s position as a woman reinforced harmful perceptions (Zuma). “Feminist 
practical reasoning” featured prominently and the amici curiae focused on placing 
contextual evidence before the Court that highlighted women’s experience and 
exclusion within the legal system. The amici’s participation in Masiya and Zuma 
created opportunities for feminist activists to educate the public and legislators about 
the nature and extent of sexual violence to which some South African women are 
subjected and to call for the enactment of the Sexual Offences Bill.219  
                                               
214 MacKinnon ‘Women’s lives, men’s laws’ op cit note 133 at 103. 
215 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent’ op cite 10 at 13. 
216 Albertyn ‘The discriminatory and gendered nature of the law and institutions of criminal justice’ op 
cit note 9 at 23. 
217 Ibid 15. 
218 See feminist method as discussed by Katharine T. Bartlett ‘Feminist legal methods’ (1990) 103 
Harvard Law Review 829 in chapter 2. 
219 Artz & Smythe ‘Feminism vs. the State?’ op cit note 1 at 8 
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The amici curiae participation in the cases described could be viewed as successful 
and unsuccessful on many levels. It is clear from the above case discussions that 
the Constitutional Court was generally receptive to the gendered arguments brought 
by the parties and amici, and that the Court did not shy away from extending 
protection to women. 
 Baloyi contributed to an understanding of domestic violence in its broader 
social context and set a positive precedent for future litigation, stressing the 
importance of the consideration of the indirect impact of amicus curiae participation 
and its role as judicial sensitizer, which could possibly influence the way in which a 
matter is decided in future.  
The Carmichele judgment entrenched the importance of all courts to take 
account of the rights enshrined in the Constitution when interpreting the common law 
and, in this specific instance, the law of delict. Although the judgment was not solely 
gender-based, the arguments brought by the applicant and amici curiae set a solid 
precedent in reference to police behaviour and the response of the criminal justice 
system to victims of violence, specifically gender-based violence.  
Although the decisions in Masiya and Zuma were not the outcome intended 
by the amici curiae, their participation had important indirect implications in spurring 
on the enactment of the much advocated and desired Sexual Offences Bill.220 After 
the highly publicised Zuma trial in 2006, followed by Masiya in 2007, renewed 
attention was focused on the Sexual Offences Bill and shortly after Masiya the Bill 
was enacted. Here the amici curiae successfully used litigation as public platform to 
place the necessary pressure on Government to promulgate the promised 
legislation.  
The reasoning of the Court in Carmichele and Masiya is interesting, as it 
mostly generalised the nature of violence against women without explicitly 
recognising the social and gendered intricacies involved in gender-based violence, 
specifically sexual violence. What is evident from the current high levels of violence, 
and specifically sexual violence against women, is that explicit recognition of the 
power relations at work in South African society is required and warranted in a shift 
or at least in acknowledgement of inequalities.221 The Court’s reasoning in Masiya 
                                               
220 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Bill op cit note 123. 
221 Artz & Smythe ‘Introduction: Should we consent’ op cit note 10 at 15. 
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also encouraged the notion that women are perpetual victims in need of special 
protection which further entrenches their subordination and inequality in society.222  
These are points that should have possibly been elaborated on in the Masiya 
and Carmichele amici curiae briefs and should be taken into account for future amici 
curiae briefs, ensuring that the relevant evidence is presented to courts to note.  
The most important purpose of the amici curiae participation in these matters, 
is their engagement with the legal system. Artz and Smythe describe this in relation 
to law reform. I regard it to be equally applicable to litigation: 
 
‘Engaging in law reform, and in that process, making statements about the reality of 
women’s lives and their engagement with the law, gives conversations about the law 
some depth. It creates oppositional positions and even raises ambiguities about the 
law, which is more than non-engagement with the law and legal systems would do. The 
feminist project on the law is deeply challenging and imperfect, but the fact that 
women are negotiating a system – one that was historically exclusionary and 
systemically discriminating – can be considered an essential tread in our efforts to 
address sexual violence and the attainment of equality more generally.’223 
 
The amici curiae that participated in these matters contributed to the development of 
strong precedents that acknowledged the gendered nature of violent crime and set 
new standards for police behaviour towards victims of violent crimes.  
 
 
                                               
222 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 2 at 307. 





1 WOMEN AS PART OF CULTURAL COMMUNITIES: GENDER versus 
CULTURE?  
 
The place of customary law in our new constitutional dispensation had been the 
subject of much debate. During the negotiations for the Interim Constitution, one of 
the key debates was whether customary law, was going to be expressly recognised 
as part of South African law.1 Within this debate, a particularly complicated and 
controversial issue arose, as to whether the right to participate in one’s culture could 
be reconciled with the equality principle, a key feature of the new Constitution. The 
conflict was especially complex as customary law, like most legal systems, had a 
very strong patriarchal foundation.2  
The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) 
objected to the proposed equality provision, stating that in terms of their culture they 
did not support equality for women.3 CONTRALESA argued that customary law 
should not be subject to the Bill of Rights, a standpoint that was vehemently opposed 
by all women delegates at the negotiations and rural women’s organisations.4 These 
women argued that all women should be protected by the Bill of Rights, with the 
equality guarantee included, as its exclusion would be detrimental to the most 
oppressed and marginalised group - rural women.5  
The outcome recognised customary law as part of South African law subject 
to the Bill of Rights. Whilst the Interim Constitution contained a right to participate in 
                                               
1 Customary law means the customs and practices observed among the indigenous African people of 
South Africa which form part of the culture of those people.  
See sec 8 & 31 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (hereinafter the 
Interim Constitution); Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray ‘The contest between culture and gender 
equality under South Africa’s interim Constitution’ (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 409; 
Thandabantu Nhlapo ‘African customary law in the Interim Constitution’ in Sandra Liebenberg (ed) 
The Constitution of South Africa from a gender perspective (Community Law Centre UWC 1995) 157; 
Wieland Lehnert ‘The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human 
rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 241. 
2 T.W. Bennett ‘The equality clause and customary law’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 122 at 123; Elsje Bonthuys 
‘Accommodating gender, race, culture and religion outside legal subjectivity’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 41. 
3 Catherine Albertyn ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ (1994) Acta Juridica 39 
at 57. 
4 Kaganas & Murray op cit note 1 at 411; Albertyn ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South 
Africa’ op cit note 3 at 57. 
5 Albertyn ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ op cit note 3 at 59. 
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one’s own culture, it also guaranteed gender equality. Although women were 
successful in ensuring that customary law was subject to the equality guarantee, the 
exact nature of the relationship between culture and equality was left open to 
interpretation. The right to equality could possibly trump the right to culture, but it 
also allowed for an integrated approach where cultural rules and practices could be 
harmonised with the constitutional values, including equality.6  
The Final Constitution, much the same as the Interim Constitution, recognised 
customary law as part of South African law subject to the Constitution.7 The Bill of 
Rights provided for freedom of religion, belief and opinion, as well as the right to use 
one’s language and to participate in one’s cultural life, but no one exercising these 
rights could do so in a manner that was inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.8 The Final Constitution further provided for the right of cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities to practise and enjoy their relevant culture, again not in a 
manner that was inconsistent with any rights in the Bill of Rights.9 As with the Interim 
Constitution, the Final Constitution recognised the right to equality.10 
Law reform and litigation had an important role to play in addressing the 
potential conflict between customary law and the Bill of Rights. Customary law was 
codified in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (BLA) entrenching and extending 
the subordination of women under customary law.11 The official and written sources 
of customary law were “tainted by their association with colonialism and apartheid, 
and much of the law had been allowed to drift into stagnant backwater.”12 This was 
                                               
6 Catherine Albertyn & Likhapha Mbatha ‘Customary law reform in the new South Africa’ in S.J.R. 
Cummings, H van Dam & M Valk (eds) Gender, citizenship and governance: A global sourcebook 
(KIT Publishers 2004) 51 at 52. 
7 Sec 211 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution) 
provides: 
‘(1) The institution, status and the role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are 
recognised, subject to the Constitution. 
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any 
applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or 
those customs. 
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and 
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.’ 
8 Sec 15 and 30 of the Constitution. 
9 Sec 31 of the Constitution. 
10 Sec 9 of the Constitution. 
11 See for example sec 11(3)(b) of the BLA that relegated customary wives as minors for purposes of 
contractual capacity and standing. 
12 T.W Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ (2009) 57 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 3. 
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intensified when the apartheid government transferred legislative powers to the 
independent states, renouncing its responsibility in reforming customary law.13 The 
independent legislatures who took over were controlled by conservative chiefs who 
had little interest in disturbing their power structures which led to an encoded 
traditional and very much patriarchal version of customary law.14  
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) was one of 
the firsts steps taken to reform customary law. The main goal of the Act is to remedy 
gender and racial inequality entrenched in official customary law and the “perceived 
injustices of the unwritten patriarchal system of customary law” in relation to 
customary marriages.15 With not many other legislative initiatives reformists soon 
turned to the courts.16 However, to litigate on a customary matter meant that the 
actual content of custom had to be established. There was strong support that only 
the law as it was lived by its people should be heeded.17 This came to be known as 
“living” customary law as opposed to the codified and outdated sources available to 
courts, mainly through the BLA, known as “official” customary law. The problem with 
living customary law is that it is drawn from modern social practice and would be 
difficult to ascertain, thus in conflict with the courts’ need of legal certainty.18 
Therefore, when a woman brings a matter to court claiming that a customary/cultural 
rule infringes her right to equality, the courts will be tasked with establishing the 
specific rule and finding a suitable remedy between two potentially conflicting value 
systems.  
Equivalent to the divergent views in the recognition of customary law within an 
equality framework, feminists had diverged in the specific strategy to be followed in 
the litigation of these matters. Some feminists have chosen to focus on a rights-
based approach that relies on the rights to equality and dignity to prove that an 
                                               
13 Id; the independent states were known as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; 
14 Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ op cit note 12 at 
4. 
15 Jan Bekker & Gardiol van Niekerk ‘Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa: 
Harmonisation, or the creation of new marriage laws in South Africa’ (2009) 24 SAPL 206 at 207. 
16 Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ op cit note 12 at 
4; Bennett refers here to the planned reform of customary succession that, despite a South African 
Law Commission discussion paper, was not acted on; see the South African Law Reform Commission 
Customary Law of Succession Discussion Paper 93 Project 90 (2000) in this regard. 
17 Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ op cit note 12 at 
2. 
18 Ibid 9. 
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infringement has occurred and that supports an ensuing constitutionally prescribed 
remedy.19 Others have called for the application of rules of living customary law, 
provided it does not violate the Bill of Rights, and, where needed, its development.20 
Mbatha describes this custom-based process as, first, identifying the cultural value to 
be protected, then ascertaining the different ways in which community members 
protect the cultural value and, finally, looking into the constitutionality of these 
practices to craft a unique remedy dependent on the relevant custom.21 This 
underlying tension in approach is reflected in the litigation strategy of the amici 
curiae in the discussed cases and is indicative of the complex nature of litigating 
customary law matters within an equality framework. 
Although the right to culture and right to equality have sometimes been 
viewed as being in direct conflict with each other, Bronstein prefers to describe the 
tension as one of intra-cultural conflict: 
 
‘When a woman comes to court to argue about her status, she does not dislodge 
herself from her culture. She does not transcend her culture and find herself in the 
realm of Western values. Her identity is not suddenly transformed. Rather, an internal 
cultural dispute is brought to an alternative tribunal to be heard. The fight is no longer 
between culture and equality. Rather it is between two different interest groups battling 
to retain/change power relations within their very culture – a culture which is 
constantly evolving.’22 
 
An important departure point is therefore to acknowledge that rights to culture and 
equality are not oppositional but rather interrelated, a complexity that courts need to 
understand without feeling that it has to make a choice between different competitive 
rights.23 The particular customary rule, as lived, needs to be understood, as well as 
the social context of the relevant women. This requires knowledge “of the actual 
reality of people’s lives, their place within the community and the power, resources 
                                               
19 Sibongile Ndashe ‘Human rights, gender and culture - A deliberate confusion’ (2005) Agenda 36; 
Devina N. Perumal ‘Harmonising cultural and equality rights under customary law – some reflections 
on Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC)’ (2010) Agenda 101. 
20 Likhapha Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 259; Chuma 
Himonga ‘The advancement of African women’s rights in the first decade of democracy in South 
Africa: The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ (2005) Acta Juridica 82. 
21 Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20 at 284. 
22 Victoria Bronstein ‘Reconceptualising the customary law debate in South Africa’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 
388 at 403. 
23 Susan Moller Okin ‘Feminism and multiculturalism: Some tensions’ (1998) 108 Ethics 661 at 666. 
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and interests implicated by the dispute.”24 Courts should see claims based on the 
right to equality and culture as an opportunity to introduce constitutional norms to an 
area that has been deprived of these inputs for a long time.25 
 Within the current constructs of customary law and the need to take account 
of living customary law, amicus curiae participation is particularly relevant in the 
provision of an important avenue through which the actual reality of women’s lives’ 
and customs could be placed before a court. Albertyn states: 
 
‘Claims of culture, gender and diversity – controversial and contested as they are – 
emphasise the need for multiple voices and multiple sites of engagement. The context 
of the claim needs to be clearly understood, competing narratives of culture aired, the 
interpretation and application of values made public and debated.’26 
 
Different amici curiae are in a position to represent these multiple voices and to 
contextualise a claim. The case analysis that follows focuses on women exercising 
their constitutional rights within a customary framework and discusses the intricacies 
of the right to culture and equality, and the importance of amicus curiae participation 











                                               
24 Catherine Albertyn ‘‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’? Gender equality and cultural diversity 
in South Africa’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165 at 184; also see Aninka Claasens & Sindiso 
Mnisi ‘Rural women redefining land rights in the context of living customary law’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 
491 at 492. 
25 Lisa Fishbayn ‘Litigating the right to culture: Family law in the new South Africa’ (1999) 13 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 147 at 150. 
26 Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 196. 
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2 CASE DISCUSSIONS 
 
2.1 Women and the Customary Law of Inheritance: Bhe and Others v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha, and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights 
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
(Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) as amicus curiae).27 
 
2.1.1 Contextual and factual background 
The women to whom customary law applies are African and most often live in rural 
areas.28 African rural women are especially vulnerable to poverty and a particular 
concern has been how this vulnerability has been exacerbated through 
discriminatory customary practices concerning access to property and inheritance.29 
In terms of the customary law of succession, the devolution of an estate followed a 
male lineage (also known as primogeniture) and traditionally the heir was 
responsible for the control and administration of family property.30 The heir stepped 
into the shoes of the deceased and carried with him the responsibility of looking after 
the deceased’s family, especially a wife and children.31 
However, evidence showed that the traditional role of the heir was no longer 
adhered to, this left women and children in a particulary vulnerable position, as male 
family members laid claim to family property without discharging their duties as 
heirs.32 This often led to the eviction of the wife and children from the family home, 
as the husband’s family refused to acknowledge the marriage.33  
                                               
27 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African 
Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (hereinafter Bhe). 
28 Likhapha Mbatha, Najma Moosa & Elsje Bonthuys ‘Culture and religion’ in Elsje Bonthuys & 
Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 158 at 162. 
29 Brigitte Clark & Beth Goldblatt ‘Gender and family law’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 195 at 198. 
30 Mthembu v Letsela and Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) (hereinafter Mthembu v Letsela) para 8 
explains the rule of male primogeniture in that in a monogamous family, the eldest son of the family 
head is the heir. If the eldest son does not survive his father, then his (the eldest son’s) eldest male 
descendant is the heir. If there is no surviving male descendant in the line of the deceased’s eldest 
son, then an heir is sought in the line of the second, third and further sons. If the deceased is not 
survived by any male descendants, his father succeeds him. If his father also does not survive him, 
an heir is sought in the father’s male descendants related to him through the male line; also see 
Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20 at 260 for a discussion of the rule.  
31 Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20 at 260.  
32 Mbatha, Moosa & Bonthuys op cit note 28 at 190. 
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The codification of the traditional customary concept of male primogeniture in the 
BLA, and its regulations, prescribed that black estates should be regulated by black 
law and custom, as opposed to all other estates that were regulated by the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987 (hereinafter the Intestate Succession Act). By failing to 
reflect the impact of social and economic changes concerning inheritance and 
property ownership, codified customary law increased women’s vulnerability and it 
was evident that change was required.34 
In 1998, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) initiated the 
reform process and published an issue paper on the topic.35 However, before the 
consultation process had been completed, a Bill was tabled before Parliament that 
suggested the replacement of the customary law of succession with the Intestate 
Succession Act.36 Traditional leaders strongly objected to the proposed Bill and 
argued that it merely imported a western value system.37 The Bill was withdrawn and 
the topic returned to the SALRC, who proceeded with the publication of a discussion 
paper on the topic.38 Shortly before the discussion paper appeared in 2000, public 
interest litigation was initiated on the topic.39 
In Mthembu v Letsela the applicant challenged the validity of the customary 
law rule of primogeniture in that it prevented African women from inheriting 
intestate.40 The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) found the customary law of 
succession and the rule of male primogeniture to be valid as a result of the ensuing 
duty that the heir inherits. The judgment was disappointing and Bennett described 
the outcome as an application of a generic brand of customary law without asking 
which specific system of customary law was at issue and the case did not address 
the changing circumstances of communities and the reality on the ground.41 
                                                                                                                                                  
33 Id. 
34 Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20 at 264. 
35 South African Law Reform Commission Harmonisation of the common law and indigenous law 
(Draft issue paper on succession) Issue Paper 12 Project 108 (1998); T.W Bennett Customary law in 
South Africa (Juta 2004) 359. 
36 Bennett Customary law in South Africa op cit note 35 at 359. 
37 Himonga op cit note 20 at 98. 
38 South African Law Reform Commission Customary Law of Succession Discussion Paper 93 op cit 
note 16; Bennett Customary law in South Africa op cit note 35 at 359. 
39 Bennett Customary law in South Africa op cit note 35 at 359. 
40 Mthembu v Letsela op cit note 30 paras 1-7. 




Shortly after the Mthembu v Letsela decision, another matter concerning the 
customary law of succession was heard by the Constitutional Court. In Moseneke v 
The Master, the Court addressed questions that related to the administration of 
customary estates.42 In terms of the BLA, when a person died intestate his estate 
was administered by a magistrate.43 All other estates and black estates where a will 
was present, was administered by the Master of the High Court. Moseneke’s family 
believed that the provisions unfairly discriminated on the grounds of race and that all 
black estates should, as white estates were, be administered in terms of the 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965.44 Although the case did not concern the 
rights of women specifically, or gender discrimination per se, the Women’s Legal 
Centre (WLC), acting as amicus curiae, contended that in the case of intestate 
succession of Africans, race, gender and culture interacted in a way which 
discriminated directly and indirectly against African widows.45 The WLC supported 
the invalidation of the relevant sections of the BLA, as the procedure that was 
provided for in the Administration of Estates Act, was far more protective of the rights 
of African women.46 The submissions of the WLC did not focus on providing 
contextual evidence, but were strategic in confirming its support for the equal 
treatment of women in customary law thus laying the groundwork for future possible 
participations. 
The Court found that the section was unconstitutional and, subject to a period 
of two years, granted to Parliament to review the customary law of succession, found 
that African families could exercise a choice in having their estates administered by 
either the Master or a magistrate.47 
With a changing landscape in reference to the customary law of succession, 
Bhe, a consolidated matter, presented another chance to challenge the rule of male 
primogeniture concerning the customary law of succession. After the death of Bhe’s 
husband, a magistrate appointed the deceased’s father as administrator of the 
estate, as he was the only heir in terms of the application of the rule of 
                                               
42 Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC) (hereinafter Moseneke v 
The Master). 
43 Sec 23(7)(a) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; Moseneke v The Master op cit note 42 
para 4. 
44 Moseneke v The Master op cit note 42 para 7. 
45 Himonga op cit note 20 at 95; Moseneke v The Master op cit note 42 para 17. 
46 Moseneke v The Master op cit note 42 para 17. 
47 Ibid para 27. 
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primogeniture.48 The deceased’s father wanted to sell the property that Bhe and her 
daughters lived in to cover the funeral costs, in effect leaving them homeless.49 Bhe 
(represented by the WLC) challenged the relevant provisions of the BLA and 
regulations and acted on behalf of her two minor daughters whom she believed were 
the sole heirs to her husband’s estate.50 The High Court found that the provisions of 
the BLA and regulations were unconstitutional, and the matter was directed to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation. 
The Shibi matter also concerned a confirmation order. Shibi was not entitled 
to inherit from her brother’s estate in terms of an application of the principle of 
primogeniture and the only heirs were two cousins who, upon their appointment as 
administrators, squandered most of the inheritance.51 Shibi challenged the decision 
of the magistrate in appointing the cousins as administrators, upon which the High 
Court gave a similar finding as in Bhe by declaring Shibi the sole heir and awarding 
damages against the two cousins.52 
In the Constitutional Court the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) and WLC (who also acted for Bhe) were joined as a third party in 
promoting the protection and attainment of the right to equality acting in the public 
interest.53 They argued that section 23 of the BLA was in its entirety unconstitutional 
and was concerned about the amount of time government was taking in legislating 
on the topic, taking in consideration a drawn-out SALRC process.54 The CGE 
                                               
48 Bhe op cit note 27 paras 11–19. It should be noted that there was a factual dispute in the High 
Court concerning whether Bhe was married to the deceased. Bhe argued that lobolo was never paid 
and that a valid customary marriage was never entered into, whilst the deceased’s father argued that 
lobolo was indeed paid. According to Bhe, her children was also considered illegitimate, which led to 
a further discriminatory barrier, as extra-marital children were seen to belong to their mother’s family 
where they would qualify as heirs and, even then, only after all the legitimate children have been 
considered in line with the principle of primogeniture. The Cape High Court approached the matter on 
the premise that lobolo was paid and that a marriage existed, however the Constitutional Court did not 
make this premise. 
49 Bhe op cit note 27 para 17. 
50 Ibid para 9-10. 
51 Ibid para 21. 
52 Id. 
53 Notice of motion for a declaratory order SAHRC & WLC, founding affidavits deposed to by 
Narandran Jody Kollapen & Michelle O’ Sullivan, in the High Court of South Africa, Transvaal 
Provincial Division para 28. 
54 Ibid; see the South African Law Reform Commission Customary Law of Succession Discussion 
Paper 93 op cit note 16. 
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applied for admission as amicus curiae and argued that in terms and in fulfilment of 
their constitutional mandate,55 they should be allowed to participate as amicus.56 
The factual scenario of all three matters led the Court to two main questions: 
firstly, the constitutional validity of section 23 of the BLA, and secondly, the 
constitutional validity of the rule of male primogeniture in the context of the 
customary law of succession.57 
 From the outset, the matter was of great importance to feminist litigators, as it 
presented an opportunity to dissect the relationship between culture and equality and 
a positive outcome would have a significant impact on all women who are subject to 
the application of customary law.58 However, the case was also contested amongst 
feminist litigators, especially in terms of the applicable remedy, as the WLC 
supported a stringent rights-based approach and the CGE, as amicus curiae, an 
approach located in customary law and its development.  
 
2.1.2 The parties 
The parties provided the context within which the principle of male primogeniture had 
to be interpreted.  
Bhe set out the history of, and need for, the principle of primogeniture. She 
focused on modern urban families that no longer adhered to traditional practice with 
heirs, today, simply acquiring property.59 According to Bhe, despite the change in 
practice, courts still applied official customary law that ignored living custom, a 
position that needed to change.60 Bhe applied the discrimination test laid down in 
Harksen v Lane,61 and suggested that the rule differentiated along the lines of 
gender, sex, age, birth, social origin and race.62 She specifically referred to the 
                                               
55 Sec 181 and 187 of the Constitution 
56 Notice of motion application to be admitted as amicus curiae, founding affidavit deposed to by 
Joyce Piliso-Seroke, case number: CCT 49/03. 
57 Bhe op cit note 27 para 3.  
58 Catherine Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in 
South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 217 at 231. 
59 Written submissions of Bhe, as drafted by Wim Trengove (SC), Ron Paschke & Susannah Cowen, 
case number: CCT 49/03  para 34. 
60 Ibid para 43. 
61 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); see the tests as discussed in chapter 1 fn 68. 
62 Written submissions of Bhe op cit note 59 para 32. 
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vulnerable position of African women in society and how the current application of 
primogeniture had a negative impact on the women and children involved.63  
Shibi supported Bhe’s submissions and focused on discrimination based on 
age, as succession was not only determined by sex and gender, but the eldest was 
entitled to succeed to the exclusion of all others.64  
The SAHRC and WLC challenged the constitutionality of section 23 of the 
BLA on the grounds that all women, other than women married to a black person in 
terms of customary law, were entitled to inherit and to have direct control over the 
property of a deceased.65 According to them, this distinction blatantly discriminated 
on the grounds of race and gender.66  
 
2.1.3 The amicus curiae 
The CGE was admitted as amicus curiae to provide the Court with expert affidavits 
on the relevance of cultural practices on the African continent, with the focus being 
on South African intestate succession.67 However, because of the late filling of their 
submissions, no affidavits were actually provided and the CGE chose to focus on the 
relevant remedy.68  
The CGE argued that, if the orders in Bhe and Shibi were confirmed, black 
estates would be governed by the Intestate Succession Act, which could not 
effectively deal with all the issues of succession and inheritance under customary 
law, especially considering polygynous unions.69 The CGE suggested an alternate 
remedy in that the rule of primogeniture could be remedied: 
 
‘[b]y a proper application of the principles of Living Customary Law in respect of 
succession and inheritance on a case by case basis, thereby ensuring the 
development of customary law.’70 
                                               
63 Ibid paras 58-61. 
64 Written submissions of Shibi, as drafted by Vincent Maleka (SC) & Kameshni Pillay, case number: 
CCT 69/03 para 22-23. 
65 Notice of motion for a declaratory order SAHRC & WLC op cit note 53 para 28. 
66 Id. 
67 Notice of motion application to be admitted as amicus curiae, op cit note 56 para 8. 
68 Notice of motion application by the amicus curiae for condonation of non-compliance with 
directions, affidavit deposed to by Joyce Piliso- Seroke, case number: CCT 49/03 para 3. 
69 Written submissions of the amicus curiae, as drafted by P.M Mtshaulana & Karrisha Pillay, case 
number: CCT 49/03 para 13. 
70 Ibid para 13.2. 
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The CGE indicated that the proposed remedy would be an interim measure awaiting 
proper legislative change.71 In support of the proposed remedy, they provided a 
detailed analysis, supported by scholarly publications, on the distinction between 
what is known as “official” and “living” customary law.  
The CGE argued that the Court should enforce living customary law and that 
current social practice allowed for women and girl children to inherit, thus 
recognising individual ownership of property.72 In giving effect to sections 30, 31 and 
211(3) of the Constitution, living customary law had to be applied by the courts, but if 
a court, for whatever reason, still applied official customary law, they were obliged to 
develop this in light of section 39(2) of the Constitution to take account of the living 
version.73 The CGE’s arguments are aptly summarised in the following paragraph:  
 
‘It is our submission that the rule of primogeniture under official customary law is 
discriminatory and in contravention of the Constitution. However, we contend that an 
abandonment of the rule does not necessitate a complete overhaul of a system, that 
carries with it several other benefits for women living under Customary Law in South 
Africa and its substitution by a system that is so different and foreign to those that 
practice Customary law. As already stated, we submit, that the positive aspects of 
customary law for women and children may remain intact if the principles 
underpinning living customary law are in fact applied.’74 
 
Accordingly, the question of when customary law should be applied should be left to 
the discretion of the courts awaiting the finalisation of law reform.75  
 
2.1.4 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
The Court first confirmed the importance of customary law within the South African 
legal system and stressed that it should not be viewed as a separate and inferior 
system.76 The Court provided a short analysis of the constitutional rights implicated 
and concluded that section 23 of the BLA was “manifestly discriminatory and in 
breach of section 9(3) of our Constitution”, and that the breach could not be 
                                               
71 Ibid para 13.3. 
72 Ibid paras 19-47. 
73 Ibid para 71. 
74 Ibid para 95. 
75 Ibid para 99. 
76 Bhe op cit note 27 para 42. 
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justified.77 The Court moved on to establish the constitutionality of the principle of 
primogeniture and set out its history and relevance, much as the applicants had in 
their submissions.78  
The Court found that the rules of succession in customary law had not been 
given the space to adapt to the changing social conditions of a modern urban 
society, which supported the amicus’s contentions in this regard.79 The Court 
acknowledged the interplay between official and living customary law, but noted that 
the problem with living customary law was that the adoptions were “ad hoc and not 
uniform.”80 The Court found that the principle of male primogeniture discriminated 
against women: 
 
‘The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear violation 
of section 9(3) of the Constitution. It is a form of discrimination that entrenches past 
patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of 
patriarchy and male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under this 
constitutional order.’81 
 
The Court then turned to the question of an appropriate remedy, contested by the 
amicus curiae, and according to the Court the most difficult part of the case.82 The 
Court rejected the amicus’s proposed remedy and found against the development of 
the current rule in terms of practices of living law, as there was insufficient evidence 
and material available, to enable the Court to develop the rule properly.83 In addition, 
the Court found that direct action was required to safeguard the identified rights and 
acknowledged that the legislature was in the best position to do this and that its 
order was to be viewed as a temporary measure.84 The order provided that all 
estates previously governed by section 23 of the BLA were now governed by section 
                                               
77 Ibid paras 68-73. 
78 Ibid paras 75-80 in relation to the written submissions of Bhe op cit note 59 paras 31-38. 
79 Bhe op cit note 27 para 82. 
80 Ibid para 87. 
81 Ibid para 91. 
82 Ibid para 101. 
83 Ibid para 109. 
84 Ibid paras 113-115. The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related 
Matters Act 11 of 2009 has subsequently been enacted and modifies the customary law of succession 
as to provide for the devolution of property in terms of the law of intestate succession and further 
clarifies certain matters relating to the law of succession and the law of property in relation to persons 
subject to customary law. 
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1 of the Intestate Succession Act and made specific provision for spouses in 
polygynous unions.85 
Justice Ngcobo dissented from the majority in relation to the applicable 
remedy. His judgment clearly reflected support for the remedy proposed by the CGE, 
in that the rule of male primogeniture should be developed, in order to bring it in line 
with the Constitution.86 He focused on the development of the rule in other African 
jurisdictions that considered the position of women in the context of succession.87  
Accordingly, he found that the rule needed to be developed to bring it in line with the 
Constitution, by simply removing the reference to male so as to allow an eldest 
daughter to succeed as well.88 In line with the amicus curiae, he concluded that it 
should have been applied “in the concrete setting and social conditions presented by 
each particular case.”89 
 
2.1.5 Purpose and impact of the amicus curiae submissions 
The judgment in Bhe was welcomed by scholars and many were of the opinion that it 
was a strong affirmation of gender equality in a customary framework.90 
 
‘Again the positive end for women was a result of the application of substantive 
equality: historical and contextual analysis, the interrogation of the private sphere, a 
                                               
85 Bhe op cit note 27 para 136. The Court specifically with regards to polygynous unions stated:  
‘In the application of ss 1(1)(c)(i) and 1(4)(f) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 to the estate 
of a deceased person who is survived by more than one spouse: 
 (a) A child's share in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased, shall be calculated by dividing 
the monetary value of the estate by a number equal to the number of the children of the deceased 
who have either survived or predeceased such deceased person but are survived by their 
descendants, plus the number of spouses who have survived such deceased;    
(b) each surviving spouse shall inherit a child's share of the intestate estate or so much of the 
intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed from time to time by the Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development by notice in the  Gazette, whichever is the greater; and 
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-para (b) above, where the assets in the estate are not 
sufficient to provide each spouse with the amount fixed by the Minister, the estate shall be equally 
divided between the surviving spouses.’ 
86 Bhe op cit note 27 para 139. 
87 Ibid paras 192-208. He specifically focused on jurisprudence from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
and Ghana.  
88 Bhe op cit note 27 para 222. 
89 Ibid para 236. 
90 See Christa Rautenbach, Willemien du Plessis & Gerrit Pienaar ‘Is primogeniture extinct like the 
dodo, or is there any prospect of it rising from the ashes? Comments on the evolution of customary 
succession laws in South Africa’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 99; Narnia Bohler-Muller ‘The story of an African 
value’ (2005) 5 SAPR 266.  
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concern with impact and a willingness to confirm the application of constitutional 
norms in the private sphere as well as to find a remedy rather than defer to the 
parliamentary process. Most significantly, the judgment has both normative value in 
setting the terms of the relationship between custom and gender equality, and 
practical value in extending inheritance rights to all women married in customary 
law.’91 
 
Others argued that although Bhe protected women from gender-based 
discrimination, it failed to acknowledge the unique living nature of customary law and 
the necessity of its development, supporting the amicus’s arguments and minority 
judgment.92  
The CGE’s focus on remedy could be ascribed to the well-drafted and 
complete arguments presented by Bhe in combination with the arguments presented 
by the SAHRC and WLC. From the pleadings and submissions, one can see that the 
relevant parties worked closely together in constructing the arguments and the two 
applications complemented each other perfectly. This could be ascribed to the fact 
that the WLC acted for Bhe, and as applicant in the SAHRC case, and the relevant 
counsels worked closely together in the construction of the arguments to present a 
strong and well thought out case.  
Although there was little leeway to provide further contextual evidence, the 
amicus curiae in fact provided a different and important angle by focusing on the 
relevant remedy and the importance of recognising and giving effect to living custom, 
ensuring the development of customary law as an equal legal system. The amicus 
curiae rejected the approach generally followed by courts namely to merely replace 
customary law with legislative and common law prescripts in an attempt at its 
reformation.93 The CGE’s submissions had a clear influence on the Court’s 
reasoning as the Court acknowledged the importance of living custom, although it 
questioned how this was to be established, but it specifically provided for polygynous 
unions in its remedy.94 
The CGE’s approach, supported by feminists such as Himonga and Mbatha, 
could be described as an egalitarian approach to customary law and a way in which 
customary law could rightfully be seen to be a part of South African law without 
                                               
91 Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law’ op cit note 58 at 231. 
92 Himonga op cit note 20; Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20. 
93 Himonga op cit note 20 at 83. 
94 See fn 85 above. 
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equating it with general civil law. Justice Ncgobo in the minority judgment 
encapsulates this approach by stating: 
 
‘It seems to me therefore that the answer lies somewhere other than in the application 
of the Intestate Succession Act only. It lies in flexibility and willingness to examine the 
applicability of indigenous law in the concrete setting of social conditions presented 
by each particular case. It lies in accommodating different systems of law in order to 
ensure that the most vulnerable are treated fairly. The choice of law mechanism must 
be informed by the need to: (a) Respect the right of communities to observe cultures 
and customs which they hold dear; (b) preserve indigenous law subject to the 
Constitution; and (c) protects vulnerable members of the family. Indigenous law is part 
of our law. It must therefore be respected and accorded a place in our legal system. It 
must not be allowed to stagnate as in the past or disappear.’95 
 
The amicus’s arguments raised an important debate as to the purpose of the 
acknowledgement of living customary law if courts are not able/willing to apply it and 
as to the future of customary law within the South African legal framework.  
The Court’s wariness with regard to the content of living customary law also 
focuses renewed attention on the purpose and use of amicus curiae briefs, as an 
amicus is ideally placed to provide a court with evidence regarding a particular 
practice or culture and could in future play an important role in customary law 
disputes. The amicus’s focus on the remedy was unique here and indicated that it 
was not only concerned with influencing the Court’s arguments but specifically in the 
construction of a remedy and equitable outcome, that would best serve the interests 









                                               
95 Bhe op cit note 27 para 236. 
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2.2 A Woman as Chief: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (CGE and National 
Movement of Rural Women (NMRW) as amici curiae).96 
 
2.2.1 Contextual and factual background 
Traditional leadership was and is a particularly contested area of customary law. As 
discussed, traditional leaders were opposed to subjecting customary law to the 
Constitution, especially the equality provision, as they claimed they were defending a 
traditional way of life that did not regard the sexes as equals, and to do otherwise 
would degenerate custom, replacing it with western values.97 However, the real 
concern at the time appeared to be the possibility of women challenging the 
accession to chieftainship, as was clear from a newspaper interview with a chief: 
 
‘my fear is that my son can be successfully challenged for my throne by my daughter, 
because the Bill says that all forms of discrimination – and it is emphatic on gender – 
should not be permitted. So now my daughter, who is the first born, can take my son to 
court and I have no doubt that my son would come second.’98  
 
The Shilubana case concerned a woman claiming the chieftaincy of a community, a 
position traditionally only reserved for men in line with the principle of 
primogeniture.99 However, it was not simply a question of relying on the equality 
provision of the Constitution, as traditional leaders initially feared, but whether a 
community could develop its customs and traditions in order to appoint a woman as 
chief of their community.  
Shilubana had not been allowed to succeed her father as chief in the pre-
democratic era and the succession fell upon another male relative. The community, 
at a later stage, conferred the chieftainship on Shilubana and in their resolution 
noted that the appointment was made specifically to uphold the equality guarantee 
provided for in the Constitution.100 Nwamitwa, challenged the appointment of 
                                               
96 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) (hereinafter Shilubana). 
97 Albertyn ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ op cit note 3 at 57. 
98 Interview with Chief Nonkonyana Saturday Star (21 Augsut 1993) as quoted by Albertyn ‘Women 
and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ op cit note 3 at 58, fn 76. 
99 Shilubana op cit note 96 paras 1-2. 
100 Ibid para 4. 
114 
 
Shilubana as chief.  According to him, he was the rightful heir to the chieftainship in 
terms of customary law and the application of the principle of primogeniture.101  
The importance of the case, and arguments presented by all the parties, 
including the amici curiae, is the way in which it fosters our constitutional ideals of 
participation and recognition of divergent voices. Shilubana also confirmed the 
importance of recognising and giving effect to the living nature of customary law and 
the power of communities to amend their customs and traditions to reflect change.102  
 
2.2.2 The parties 
Given the contested and controversial nature of the case, the Court issued directives 
on the issues it wanted the parties to address and invited the Commission on 
Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, CONTRALESA, the CGE and the 
National House of Traditional Leaders to enter as amici curiae.103 The Court wanted 
the parties to consider: 
 
‘(a) Does the Royal family have the authority to develop the customs and traditions 
of the Valoyi community so as to outlaw gender discrimination in the 
succession to traditional leadership?  
(b) In the course of developing the customs and the traditions of a community, 
does the Royal Family have the authority to restore the position of traditional 
leadership to the house from which it was removed by reason of gender 
discrimination even if this discrimination occurred prior to the coming into 
operation of the Constitution?  
(c) Are the provisions of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act, 2003 applicable to these proceedings?  
(d) If the provisions of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 
2003 are applicable, is the dispute relating to the restoration of traditional 
leadership the kind of dispute that ought to be dealt with by the Commission as 
required by Section 21(1)(b) read with section 21(1)(b) of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003?.’ 104 
 
The discussion that follows, focuses only on the arguments regarding the 
relationship between gender and customary law.  
                                               
101 Ibid para 7. 
102 Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 168. 




Shilubana stressed the importance of taking into account the living nature of 
customary law that recognised and acknowledged continual changes within a 
community.105 She further argued that foreign nations, who had monarchies or 
traditional leaderships, had adapted their practices in relation to accession and 
allowed females to accede.106 Accordingly, she maintained that there was no reason 
why a traditional community could not make its own decision in relation to its 
practices, except where the rule or practice would be inconsistent with the 
Constitution, which in this particular situation it was not.107  
Nwamitwa argued that the discrimination that ensued from the principle of 
primogeniture was fair and that the royal family did not have the authority to declare 
Shilubana chief.108  
 
2.2.3 The amici curiae 
In responding to the directions issued by the Court, the CGE, the NMRW, and 
CONTRALESA applied for admission as amici curiae and were subsequently 
allowed to participate. 
 
The Commission for Gender Equality:  
In terms of its constitutional and legislative mandate and consistent with its focus on 
poor rural women, the CGE argued that it was ideally placed to assist the Court, as 
the matter raised important issues pertaining to the right to equality and customary 
law.109 The CGE supported Shilubana and the application of living customary law, 
especially considering the historical context in which women had been excluded from 
political and juridical positions due to patriarchal norms, and the fact that the 
community itself decided to develop its customs to bring it in line with the 
Constitution.110 The CGE maintained that in these instances courts should defer, as 
                                               
105 Written submissions of the applicant, as drafted by Semenya (SC), Dlwathi and Mayet, case 
number: CCT 3/07 para 6.10. 
106 Ibid para 8; Shilubana specifically referred to Norway, the Netherlands, Britain, Denmark, Sweden 
and Japan. 
107 Shilubana op cit note 96 para 12.9. 
108 Ibid para 31. 
109 See the discussion of the CGE in chapter 2 above; application for admission as amicus curiae of 
the CGE, affidavit deposed to by Notemba Joyce Piliso-Seroke, case number: CCT 03/07 para 10-11. 
110 Application for admission as amicus curiae of the CGE op cit note 109 para 16.3. 
116 
 
far as possible, to the customary authorities who themselves took the decision to 
develop their custom and practices to bring them in line with the Constitution.111  
 The CGE indicated that the matter did not need to be decided solely in terms 
of customary law and the recognition of a lived rule. As the practice of male 
primogeniture was also inherently discriminatory, the matter could be decided simply 
by declaring the practice unconstitutional in terms of section 9(3) of the 
Constitution.112  
 
The National Movement of Rural Women: 
 The NWRW also stressed the flexible nature of customary law, but provided a 
different perspective to the Court. It argued that the appointment of Shilubana as 
chief was the community practising its actual lived custom and not a development 
thereof, and that this practice had to be respected by the courts.113  
The NMRW provided several examples of the appointment of women as 
traditional leaders at times when it suited the needs and circumstances of a 
community.114 The appointment of Shilubana as chief was thus consistent with the 
inherent nature of living customary law and did not reflect a need for developing it.115  
The NMRW further argued that, if the Court found that a development of 
customary law did take place, it was done in terms of section 9(2) of the Constitution 
that shielded the decision from a challenge by Nwamitwa.116 
 
The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa:  
CONTRALESA supported the use of the principle of male primogeniture as fair 
discrimination. According to it, not only women were possibly discriminated against 
but also younger brothers, elder brothers born out of wedlock and in communities 
where a maternal line was followed.117 They rejected the submissions advanced by 
                                               
111 Written submissions of the CGE, as drafted by Kameshni Pillay, case number: CCT 03/07 para 9. 
112 Ibid paras 50-55. 
113 Written submissions of the NMRW, as drafted by Geoff Budlender & Richard Moultrie, case 
number: CCT 03/07 para 6. 
114 Ibid para 6.2.4; see the examples provided for in paras 25-38. 
115 Ibid para 6.2.5. 
116 Ibid para 59; Section 9(2) of the Constitution states: 
‘Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protector advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 
117 Written submissions of CONTRALESA, case number: CCT 03/07 para 41. 
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the other amici curiae and supported a decision that would uphold the norms and 
values of traditional communities, refusing an application of what they described as 
western norms and values to African people.118 
 
2.2.4 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
What is noticeable about the judgment is the extent to which the Court referred to the 
arguments presented by the amici curiae. The Court summarised the arguments 
made by each amicus before it proceeded with a discussion of the relevant 
issues.119 The Court then considered what the proper approach should be to 
determine a rule of customary law and found that it would be necessary to consider 
the traditions of the specific community, taking into account the living nature of 
customary law.120 The Court (similar to Bhe) stressed its difficulty in pinpointing living 
custom and noted that evidence in this regard was crucial.121 For the Court, a fine 
balance had to be sought between the acknowledgement of the flexible nature of 
customary law and the need for legal certainty, respect for vested rights and the 
protection of constitutional rights.122  
The Court again provided a lengthy discussion of the arguments presented by 
the NMRW,123 and stated that they were indeed “attractive and persuasive”, but as 
Shilubana had argued, that there was a development of customary law, it was 
necessary to address the development of the rule.124 Accordingly, the Court found 
that the community’s actions represented a development of customary law and that 
the contemporary practice of the community reflected a valid legal change which 






                                               
118 Ibid paras 11-12. 
119 Shilubana op cit note 96 paras 33-40. 
120 Ibid paras 44-45. 
121 Ibid para 46. 
122 Ibid para 47. 
123 Ibid paras 61-64. 
124 Ibid paras 65-66. 
125 Ibid para 86. 
118 
 
2.2.5 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
It is clear from the judgment and amount of references to the amici curiae’s 
arguments that their participation had a substantial influence on the Court’s 
reasoning.126 The Shilubana facts, and the possibility of allowing women to become 
chiefs, resounded back to the Interim Constitution negotiations and the Court was 
very aware of the competitive views and the need to involve all the interested parties 
to ensure an equitable outcome, hence the invitation to participate as amici curiae. 
The Court presented a detailed summary of the amici’s arguments and throughout 
the judgment made reference to these arguments, showing particular interest in the 
arguments presented by the NMRW.127 This attention to the amici’s arguments adds 
legitimacy and authority to the Court’s judgment as it allows for the voices of those 
affected by its judgment to be heard, and in this instance, especially the voice of 
rural women. 
Shilubana focused on equality as a value and how this value could and did 
influence a community’s norms and practices rather than a claim based on unfair 
discrimination.128 The Court’s approach thus diffused possible tension between 
traditional leaders and women, as it was not a question whether the right to equality 
trumped the right to cultural practice, but rather whether a community is allowed to 
develop a customary rule to bring it in line with the Constitution.   
This approach was supported by the amici curiae, especially the NMRW who 
referred to the application of actual lived custom and whose approach resonated with 
feminists who have called for an application of rules of living customary law and the 
operation of these rules within a constitutional framework.129  
Suggesting a more rights-based approach, the CGE attempted to shift the 
focus of the Court to gender discrimination.130 Perumal describes the Court’s failure 
                                               
126 For a discussion of the judgment and different viewpoints see Nomthandazo Ntlama ‘“Equality” 
misplaced in the development of the customary law of succession: Lessons from Shilubana v 
Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC)’ (2009) 20 Stell LR 333; Obeng Mireku ‘Customary law and the 
promotion of gender equality: An appraisal of the Shilubana decision’ (2010) 10 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 515. 
127 Shilubana op cit note 96 paras 17-18, 33-40, 51, 61-66 and 87; for a discussion of the relevance 
and importance of the NMRW arguments see Drucilla Cornell ‘The significance of the living customary 
law for an understanding of law: Does custom allow for a woman to be Hosi?’ (2009) 2 Constitutional 
Court Review 395.  
128 Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 183. 
129 Himonga op cit note 20; Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20. 
130 Written submissions of the CGE op cit note 111 paras 48-55. 
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to engage directly with gender discrimination as a missed opportunity to ease the 
tension between cultural and gender equality rights and the loss of an opportunity to 
strengthen already set precedent that could have sent a clear message that: 
 
‘rules and practices that unfairly discriminate against women by relegating them to 
positions of subservience, dependence and lack of choice, should/ will not survive 
constitutional scrutiny.’131 
 
Although a valid argument, and an argument followed by the Court in Bhe, one 
should view Shilubana within historical context and the balance that is necessary to 
give effect to the right to equality and, in the same breath, allow for the operation of 
customary law. When litigating in matters where a rule of customary law and the right 
to equality is at issue, one needs to respect the existence of customary law and the 
women who function within these systems and acknowledge that it is not always 
viable, for example, to question chieftainship as an inherent patriarchal structure, but 
rather to focus on achievable gains such as infusing current practices with 
constitutional values.132  The Court was also more open to these arguments as they 
extensively referred to the arguments presented by the NMRW, as opposed to those 
of the CGE. The judgment had a positive impact in that it found that a woman could 
be the chief of her community and indirectly affirmed the importance of gender 
equality within a customary framework.  
Although the arguments of the amici curiae played an important role in the 
Court’s deliberation process, it decided to abide by the parties’, and specifically 
Shilubana’s arguments, choosing safe ground, rather than the NMRW arguments 
that would have far reaching implications with regard to the understanding of the 
nature of customary law and the use of section 9(2) of the Constitution. The amici 
curiae in Shilubana were able to represent a multiplicity of voices and are testament 
that amici curiae participation: 
 
‘[c]an assert rights for vulnerable and marginalised members of a community in a 
manner that affirms both gender equality and cultural diversity, permitting the 
development and incorporation of constitutional and communal values.’133 
                                               
131 Perumal op cit note 19 at 108. 
132 Interview Susannah Cowen, Legal Counsel Shilubana (29 November 2012). 
133 Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 178. 
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2.3 A Constitutional Challenge to the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act: 
Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa (WLC as amicus curiae).134 
 
2.3.1 Contextual and factual background 
The most significant and systematic reform of customary law after the advent of 
democracy was the enactment of the RCMA.135 The Act was the first comprehensive 
piece of legislation to address gender and racial inequality concerning customary 
marriages.136  
Since the implementation of the Act, one of the areas of concern was the 
different proprietary consequences of marriages provided for reliant on when a 
customary marriage came into existence.137 All customary marriages concluded after 
the commencement of the Act (15 November 2000) would be a marriage in 
community of property and loss.138 The proprietary regimes of all marriages 
concluded before the commencement of the Act would be governed by customary 
law.139 
Gumede argued that these provisions discriminated unfairly against her on 
the grounds of race and gender.140 Gumede was married in terms of customary law, 
well before the RCMA.  When she sought a divorce from her husband she found that 
she was not entitled to any of the property that accrued during the marriage, as the 
customary law, specifically the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu law 16 of 1985 and 
the Natal Code of Zulu law, determined that a husband, as head of a family, would 
be the sole owner of all family property.141 
 
2.3.2 The parties 
Gumede recognised that the main purpose of the RCMA was to protect women 
against discriminatory practices, hence the provision that allowed customary 
marriages, concluded after the RCMA, to be in community of property. However, for 
                                               
134 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (hereinafter Gumede). 
135 Mbatha, Moosa & Bonthuys op cit note 28 at 161. 
136 Bekker & Van Niekerk op cit note 15 at 207. 
137 Likhapha Mbatha ‘Reflection on the rights created by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act’ 
(2005) Agenda 42 at 43. 
138 Sec 7(2) of the RCMA; Gumede op cit note 134 para 10. 
139 Sec 7(1) of the RCMA. 
140 Gumede op cit note 134 para 1. 
141 Natal Code of Zulu Law published in Proc R151 of 1987, Government Gazette No 10966; Gumede 
op cit note 134 para 11. 
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marriages concluded before the Act, discrimination could still be possible in terms of 
the applicable rules of customary law, thus rendering the protection afforded by the 
Act under-inclusive.142 She relied on the precedent set in Bhe that embraced the 
living nature of customary law and acknowledged that women could hold property, 
but stressed that the Natal codes, as official customary law, were incompatible with 
the Constitution, as they excluded women from benefiting from the matrimonial 
property scheme of the RCMA, the latter which applied to all marriages after its 
implementation.143 
Government, on the other hand, rejected her arguments and argued that the 
RCMA allowed for the application of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (hereinafter the 
Divorce Act), which sufficiently catered for women in Gumede’s situation as it 
permitted a divorce court to order the transfer of property to the other spouse if it was 
just and equitable to do so.144 It claimed that the matter differed from Bhe as the 
legislature had attempted to resolve the conflicts between the Bill of Rights and 
customary law through the RCMA, whereas in Bhe no legislative steps were 
taken.145 Accordingly, government argued that the protection granted by the RCMA 
was sufficient and that the Constitution obliged courts to apply customary law when it 
was applicable.146 
 In response Gumede argued that she would bear an unfair onus in having to 
persuade the divorce court that she was entitled to the marital property. She pointed 
to the fact that most customary wives did not have the resources to approach a court 






                                               
142 Written submissions of the applicant, as drafted by Geoff Budlender, case number: CCT 50/08 
para 4.  
143 Ibid paras 32-40. 
144 Sec 8(4)(a) of the RCMA provides that a court granting a decree for the dissolution of a customary 
marriage has the powers contemplated in sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Divorce Act and section 24(1) of 
the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984; written submissions of the respondent, as drafted by V Soni 
(SC), case number: CCT 50/08 para 4. 
145 Written submissions of the respondent op cit note 144 para 81. 
146 Gumede op cit note 134 para 12. 
147 Written submissions of the applicant op cit note 142 paras 61-63. 
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2.3.3 The amicus curiae 
The WLC applied to be admitted as amicus curiae since it had for several years dealt 
with the impact of customary law on the lives of women and children. It stressed its 
participation in Bhe, and maintained that in light of this history it was well placed to 
make submissions that would assist the Court in its deliberation process.148  
For the WLC, it was important for the Court to understand the disadvantaged 
position of the women to whom the RCMA applied, as it was of the opinion that 
Gumede did not sufficiently highlight this vulnerability, since she focused mainly on 
the ensuing unfair discrimination. The WLC focused on the group of women to whom 
the RCMA applied (mostly African women living in rural areas) and stressed that 
these women were marginalised and vulnerable and had been “historically and 
systematically subjected to discrimination on various and intersecting grounds.”149 
 The WLC referred to several international and African regional human rights 
instruments, and indicated that the discrimination allowed by the RCMA was 
unfair.150 Its main contention is summarised in the following statement: 
 
‘To say to women in pre-Act marriages, these being black, mainly rural women who will 
tend to be older, that all other people (whether married under civil law or new 
customary marriages) deserve the protection of the Constitution and the right to 
equality, but they do not, fundamentally violate their dignity.’151 
 
The WLC argued that the Court had to be mindful of the changing circumstances of 
migrant labour and urbanisation that had led to the disintegration of the extended 
family and subsequent extended support systems. These circumstances left women 
vulnerable to eviction and homelessness upon divorce.152 This vulnerability was 
                                               
148 Notice of motion to be admitted as amicus curiae, founding affidavit deposed to by Noluthando 
Ntlokwana, case number: CCT: 50/08 paras 9-18.  
149 Written submissions of the amicus curiae, as drafted by Susannah Cowen & Nobahle Mangcu-
Lockwood, case number: CCT 50/08 para10. 
150 Ibid paras 21-35. Specifically they relied on sec 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (1981); sec 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); sec 16 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979); the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) and the 
SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (2008). 




much worse for older women who were further disadvantaged by apartheid due to 
restrictions on their education and freedom of movement.153  
Similar to the amicus curiae in Bhe, the WLC focused on the remedy it 
thought the Court should provide in order to protect as many women as possible. Its 
argument was that a workable remedy should consider the women who found 
themselves in polygynous unions: 
 
‘We were hoping the court would go further than it needed to and extend the remedy to 
women in polygynous marriages, or comment on their position obiter, which sets the 
scene for further law reform or litigation. This is because many women in South Africa 
are not in monogamous marriages. The law needs to develop in such a way as to 
ensure the equal treatment of women in polygynous marriages, and cases where there 
is both a civil and customary marriage, where there is a domestic partnership and a 
marriage (either customary or civil). In this regards, an expression that women are 
entitled to statutory remedies that are just and equitable would benefit many 
women.’154 
 
The remedy suggested by the WLC required property acquired by the parties to be 
held in community of property until a second marriage was concluded. Property 
acquired after a second or subsequent marriage, was to be divided in proportion to 
the respective contributions (both monetary and non-monetary) of the spouses to the 
respective marriages, in a manner that was deemed just and equitable by a court, 
taking into account the factors referred to in section 7(7) of the RCMA.155 
 
                                               
153 Id. 
154 Interview Jennifer Williams, WLC (14 March 2013). 
155 Written submissions of the amicus curiae op cit note 149 para 54; sec 7(7) of the RCMA states: 
‘When considering the application in terms of subsection 6- 
(a) the court must- 
(i) in the case of a marriage which is in community of property or which is subject to the accrual 
system- 
(aa) terminate the matrimonial property system which is applicable to the marriage; and 
(bb) effect a division of the matrimonial property; 
(ii) ensure an equitable distribution of the property; and 
(iii) take into account all the relevant circumstances of the family groups which would be affected if the 
application is granted; 
(b) the court may- 
(i) allow further amendments to the terms of the contract; 
(ii) grant the order subject to any condition it may deem just; or 
(iii) refuse the application if in its opinion the interests of any of the parties involved would not be 
sufficiently safeguarded by means of the proposed contract. 
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2.3.4 Decision by the Constitutional Court 
The Court approached the matter in terms of section 9 of the Constitution, as the 
parties did not call for the development of custom and as the RCMA was enacted to 
bring customary law in line with the Constitution.156 The Court probably might have 
thought that preceding cases such as Bhe and Shilubana have dealt with the need to 
acknowledge the living nature of customary law, and that there was no need to 
repeat the relevant findings of those decisions. Therefore, the only question before 
the Court was whether the differentiation in terms of the RCMA resulted in unfair 
discrimination.  
The Court found that the relevant provisions discriminated on the grounds of 
gender, as they discriminated between a husband and wife, as only wives were 
subjected to the unequal proprietary distribution, and, between different classes of 
women, as only “old” marriages were subjected to the proprietary consequences in 
terms of the codes.157   
The Court hinted at the arguments of the WLC and the relevant context 
stating “that the marital property system renders women extremely vulnerable by not 
only denuding them of their dignity but also rendering them poor and dependent.”158 
The Court rejected the argument that section 8(4) of the RCMA provided sufficient 
protection, as it would not always be cost effective to approach a court and the 
provision did not address the discrimination a party suffered during the course of a 
marriage.159 Accordingly, the Court found the relevant provisions of the RCMA 
invalid as it discriminated on the grounds of gender.160 The Court ordered that all 
customary marriages would be marriages in community of property and limited its 
retrospectivity to not affect marriages that had already been terminated.  
The Court acknowledged the usefulness of the WLC’s submissions, with 
regards to the relevant international and regional instruments, and the vulnerability 
and position of the class of women affected by the RCMA. However, it found that its 
arguments in relation to pre-act polygynous unions should not form part of its 
decision and that, at most, the judgment could draw the attention of the legislature to 
                                               
156 Gumede op cit note 134 para 1 and 30. 
157 Ibid para 34. 
158 Ibid para 36. 
159 Ibid paras 41-45. 
160 Ibid para 49. 
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cure the possible lacuna.161 The proprietary consequences of polygynous unions 
would be regulated by customary law until Parliament intervened.162 
 
2.3.5 Purpose and impact of the amicus curiae submissions 
Litigating in matters that pertain to custom and gender equality became much easier 
after the decisions in Bhe and Shilubana. Both decisions established the importance 
of, and adherence to, the principle of equality within a customary and cultural 
framework and paved the way for considering the importance and relevance of living 
customary law. With clear precedent, Gumede was able to directly challenge the 
official rules of customary law as unconstitutional, focusing mainly on the relevant 
discrimination, with the WLC who decided to enter as amicus curiae to assist the 
Court in focusing on the specific group of women. The WLC also decided to focus on 
a particularly vulnerable group within the general grouping, this being women in pre-
act polygynous marriages.  
The Court implemented an equality analysis and briefly acknowledged the 
vulnerability of women within customary marriages subjected to the Natal codes and 
the subsequent distinction in terms of the RCMA.163 The Court specifically referred to 
the arguments presented by the WLC in three separate instances. First at the start of 
the judgment confirming their admission and their support for Gumede, secondly in a 
short summarising of their arguments, and thirdly, after the order which stated its 
reasons for not adopting the proposed remedy of the WLC in relation to pre-act 
polygynous marriages.164  
It could be argued that the WLC expected a positive response by the Court 
after its decision in Bhe, especially as Bhe in fact provided a remedy for women in 
polygynous marriages. The Court’s response to the WLC’s suggested relief was a 
disappointment, as it was willing in Bhe to extend the protection of the Intestate 
Succession Act to women in polygynous unions, a remedy argued for by the amicus 
curiae in that matter, but rather formalistically, in Gumede, left the matter for 
Parliament to consider. 
                                               
161 Ibid para 55. 
162 Id. 
163 Ibid para 36. 
164 Ibid see paras 5, 14, 55 and 56 respectively. 
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The Court might have been over-cautious in this regard not wanting to rock the boat 
by engaging in arguments with regard to polygyny as the constitutionality and 
acceptability of the custom have increasingly become an issue of debate in society. 
When one reads the judgment it becomes clear that the contextual evidence 
presented by the WLC, which was absent in Gumede’s pleadings with its focus on 
discrimination, assisted the Court in acknowledging the vulnerability of women in 
customary marriages. The Court focused on the patriarchal nature of the relevant 
Natal codes and the need for those entrenched values to change within a 
constitutional framework.165 However, it is regrettable that the Court did not adopt 
the remedy as proposed by the WLC. The contention could be that the Court did not 
want to, on its own accord, change a democratically implemented piece of legislation 
which was highly regarded deeming this Parliament’s responsibility: 
 
‘The Recognition Act was assented to and took effect well within our new 
constitutional dispensation. It represents a belated but welcome and ambitious 
legislative effort to remedy the historical humiliation and exclusion meted out to 
spouses in marriages which were entered into in accordance with the law and culture 
of the indigenous African people of this country. Past courts and legislation accorded 
marriages under indigenous law no more than a scant recognition under the lowly 
rubric of customary 'unions'.166 
 
This is where Gumede differs from Bhe, as Bhe dealt with colonial apartheid 
legislation which the Court did not hesitate to declare unconstitutional. Gumede set 
an important precedent concerning the equal treatment of wives in customary 
marriages, a precedent that was especially followed in the Court’s next judgment 






                                               
165 Ibid para 17. 
166 Ibid para 16 (footnotes omitted). 
167 See the MM v MN and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) (hereinafter MM v MN) judgment para 77 
discussed below where the Court referred to the Gumede judgment in stressing the equal status and 
capacity of spouses. 
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2.4 Competing Narratives of Equality - Polygyny and Consent: MM v MN and 
Another (WLC; CGE and NMRW as amici curiae). 
 
2.4.1 Contextual and factual background 
When the RCMA was drafted, a contentious issue was the recognition of polygynous 
marriages, since it has been viewed as a patriarchal institution which provided men 
with access “to the sexual and reproductive and other services of several women, 
while wives in polygynous marriages have to share the material and emotional 
benefits provided by a single man.”168 Research indicated that many women were 
against its legal recognition, with their main concerns relating to economic and 
tenure security when a husband entered into another marriage.169 However, non-
recognition was not really an option, as many women were in polygynous marriages 
and continued to enter into them for a range of reasons.170 
Feminists and organisations that worked in the area did not want the practice 
to be declared discriminatory and unconstitutional, but wanted to work towards 
incremental change and rights protection in order to find a balance between the 
respect of the rights to culture and to equality: 
 
‘If we reject some institutions and label others as valid and acceptable, we fall into the 
trap of assuming that institutions essentially and intrinsically determine the justness of 
the practices within them. Just as we must recognise that western monogamous 
marriage does not guarantee equality, we cannot assume that polygamy inevitably 
leads to oppression.’171 
 
A compromise was reached with the drafting of the RCMA as it extended protection 
to women and children that found themselves in these unions.172 The compromise 
was the serial division of estates that required a husband, who wanted to enter into a 
                                               
168 Mbatha, Moosa & Bonthuys op cit note 28 at 178; also see Bronstein op cit note 22 at 408; Felicity 
Kaganas & Christina Murray ‘Law, women and the family: The question of polygyny in a new South 
Africa’ (1991) Acta Juridica 116; Penelope E. Andrews ‘Who’s afraid of polygamy? Exploring the 
boundaries of family, equality and custom in South Africa’ (2009) 11 Utah Law Review 351. 
169 Albertyn & Mbatha ‘Customary law in the new South Africa’ op cit note 6 at 52. 
170 Mbatha, Moosa & Bonthuys op cit note 28 at 178. 
171 Christina Murray ‘Is polygamy wrong?’ (1994) 10 Agenda 37 at 39. 
172 Albertyn & Mbatha ‘Customary law in the new South Africa’ op cit note 6 at 54. 
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further customary marriage, to make an application to a court to approve a written 
contract that regulated the future matrimonial property systems of the marriages.173  
However, there were still many uncertainties, as the RCMA did not provide for 
the equal treatment of wives in polygynous marriages.174 This was especially 
relevant with regard to consent, as the Act only required consent of the parties to the 
marriage and it was uncertain if consent of existing wives were required for the 
conclusion of a subsequent marriage.175 The MM v MN matter came to focus on this 
specific issue, whether the consent of a first wife was necessary for the conclusion of 
a subsequent customary marriage and whether compliance with section 7(6) of the 
RCMA was a requirement for the validity of a subsequent customary marriage. The 
case raised interesting questions with regard to the equal treatment of wives versus 
equal treatment between husband and wife.   
  Mayelane, the first wife, was married to her husband in 1984 in terms of 
customary law. Upon her husband’s death in February 2009, Mayelane approached 
the Department of Home Affairs to register her marriage for the administration of her 
husband’s estate. She was informed that another wife, Ngwenyama, who allegedly 
entered into a customary marriage with her husband in 2008, had also applied for 
the registration of a marriage with her husband.176 Both the wives disputed the 
validity of the other’s marriage.  
Mayelane applied to the High Court for an order to declare her customary 
marriage valid and Ngwenyama’s null and void, on the basis that she did not consent 
to the second marriage, as required in Xitsonga custom.177 The High Court granted 
both orders and determined the matter by interpreting and applying section 7(6) of 
                                               
173 Sec 7(6) of the RCMA specifically states:  
‘A husband in a customary marriage who wishes to enter into a further customary marriage with 
another woman after the commencement of this Act must make an application to the court to approve 
a written contract which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriages.’ 
174 Mbatha, Moosa & Bonthuys op cit note 28 at 179. 
175 Ibid; Sec 3 of the RCMA sets the requirements for a valid customary marriage and states: 
‘(1) For a customary marriage entered into after the commencement of this Act to be valid – 
(a) The prospective spouses- 
(ii) must be above the age of 18 years; and  
(ii) must both consent to be married to each other under customary law; and 
(b) the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary 
law.’ 
176 Facts as provided in the SCA judgment MN v MM and Another 2012 (4) SA 527 (SCA) paras 3-4. 
177 MM v MN op cit note 167 para 4. 
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the RCMA and not considering the consent issue.178 The High Court interpreted the 
section to be peremptory, in that, if a husband failed to obtain court approval of a 
document that would regulate the proprietary consequences of the marriages then a 
subsequent marriage would be void.179 Ngwenyama appealed the decision.  
The SCA found that section 7(6) did not regulate the validity of a customary 
marriage but only its proprietary consequences.180 The SCA confirmed the order of 
the High Court but also overturned the invalidity in relation to Ngwenyama’s 
marriage. Mayelana appealed the latter part of the SCA decision to the Constitutional 
Court. 
For the Constitutional Court, unlike the High Court and SCA, who only judged 
the matter according to an interpretation of section 7(6), the consent issue was 
crucial in adjudicating the matter and it issued directives requesting the parties to 
consider: 
 
‘(i) whether it was necessary for the applicant to lodge a cross-appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in view of the fact that she was the successful party in the High Court 
proceedings.  
(ii) If no cross-appeal was necessary:  
(a) whether the contrary finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal raises an issue that 
confers jurisdiction on this Court to determine the application for leave to appeal and, 
if leave is granted, the appeal;  
(b) whether it is a requirement for the validity of a second or subsequent customary 
marriage that the consent of the wife of the first customary marriage had to be 
obtained; and, if so;  
(c) whether the High Court should have found that the necessary consent was 
obtained.’181  
 
It was only after all the parties filed their submissions, and the Court had benefit off 
all the arguments, that it again issued a set of directives that hinted towards the fact 
that it planned to ground its decision in the particular custom. The second set of 
directives requested: 
 
                                               
178 Ibid para 5. 
179 Ibid para 6. 
180 Id. 
181 Directions of the Constitutional Court, dated 1 August 2012, case number: CCT 57/12. 
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‘1. The parties and the amici are invited to file statements by way of affidavit or 
affirmation on the issues described in paragraph 2 below. The statements must be 
lodged by 22 March 2013. 
2. The above statements must address the following questions:  
(i) under Tsonga customary law, is the consent of a first wife a requirement for the 
validity of a subsequent customary marriage entered into by that first wife’s husband; 
(ii) if so – 
(a) What are the requirements, if any, regarding the manner and form of the consent; 
and  
(b) What are the consequences, if any, of the failure to procure the first wife’s consent 
or of any defects in relation to the manner or form of the consent? 
3. The above sworn statements must have due regard to and adequately reflect 
authoritative sources of customary law, which sources may include writers on 
customary law, case law, testimony from traditional leaders and other expert 
evidence.’182 
 
2.4.2 The amici curiae 
The WLC and the CGE, together with the NMRW, applied to be admitted as amici 
curiae in the Constitutional Court. The WLC participated as amicus curiae in the SCA 
and argued that it could make a valuable contribution to the Constitutional Court 
specifically considering its litigation and amici curiae participation history in 
customary matters.183  
The CGE and NMRW, in a combined brief, maintained their interest in the 
matter as being that the promotion of the right to gender equality is fundamental to 
the CGE’s constitutional mandate and that the NMRW, as an advocacy organisation 
for women’s independent land, housing, inheritance and property rights, is directly in 
touch with women in rural communities who live in terms of customary law.184  
 
The Women’s Legal Centre:  
The WLC focused on establishing equality between the different wives with regard to 
their lived realities and vulnerability as a group.185 The WLC supported the SCA’s 
                                               
182 Directions of the Constitutional Court, dated 25 February 2013, case number: CCT 57/12. 
183 Written submissions of the WLC, as drafted by Susannah Cowen & Nomzamo Mji, case number: 
CCT 57/12. 
184 Notice of motion to be admitted as amici curiae of the CGE and NMRW, affidavit deposed to by 
Mfanozelwe Shozi, case number: CCT 57/12 paras 15-16. 
185 Notice of motion to be admitted as amicus curiae of the WLC, affidavit deposed to by Jennifer Lynn 
Williams, case number: CCT 57/12 para 4. 
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decision and was critical of the Constitutional Court’s decision to focus on 
consent.186 Before the Court issued its second set of directives, the WLC argued in 
its submissions, that the issue of consent was an issue of custom, and that there 
was not sufficient information before the Court to establish or develop the applicable 
customary rules.187  
The WLC further argued that it was not just the existence of a consent 
requirement that had to be established under customary law, but also the “contours 
of a consent requirement”.188 This would mean that the Court would have to view 
consent within the context that women do not have an equal bargaining position in 
relationships, as well as a range of other questions such as, what does consent 
mean; express consent or would tacit consent suffice?; what must the consent relate 
to?; is consent to polygyny enough or must it relate to a particular individual and her 
family?; should consent be given at the time of the subsequent marriage or could it 
be procured earlier?189 The WLC argued that even if the Constitutional Court were to 
remit the matter back to the High Court to establish custom, it would not yield great 
certainty for women and would be a very slow process in securing rights protection 
for all the women concerned.190 
For the WLC, one of the most important questions was what the 
consequences of a subsequent marriage would be if it was concluded without the 
necessary consent. Would the marriage be void from the start or would it be a 
ground for nullification of the marriage, and then, what patrimonial consequences 
would follow?191  
  The WLC attempted to construct a remedy that would best protect all the 
parties in the relevant circumstances. They argued that the appropriate route would 
be to treat marriages without consent as voidable rather than void.192 A second 
marriage would thus be voidable once knowledge of this marriage comes to light, 
and it would be voidable from the date of a court’s order.193 They conceded that it 
might violate the rights of women in second marriages, but that at least it would not 
                                               
186 Ibid para 34. 
187 Written submissions of the WLC op cit note 183 para 35. 
188 Id. 
189 Ibid para 35.1. 
190 Ibid para 38. 
191 Ibid para 35.2. 




be invalid from the start.194 Furthermore, that if (as it was in this case) the knowledge 
of a subsequent marriage only came to light when a husband died, the second 
marriage would continue to be valid, but that it did not mean that the first wife was 
without recourse as the Master would have a discretion and the right to refer a 
relevant dispute to a magistrate or traditional leader.195 
 After the Court issued its second set of directives and it was clear that it 
planned to ground its decision within the particular custom, the WLC filed an expert 
affidavit by an elder and advisor to traditional leaders.196 Mr Mayimele stated that a 
first wife may be informed of a subsequent decision but that the husband makes the 
decision to marry again.197 
  
The Commission for Gender Equality and the National Movement of 
Rural Women:  
The CGE and NMRW believed that the questions that had to be answered revolved 
around the establishment of specific rules of living custom and allowing these to be 
applied, and if necessary, developed, to bring them in line with the Constitution. They 
argued that customary law should only be developed once a court had a clear 
understanding of the content of the custom it intended to develop and that the matter 
should therefore be remitted to the High Court to re-consider the relevant custom.198  
In response to the Court’s second directives, the CGE and NMRW filled a 
range of affidavits, in which they directly consulted with members of the Xitsonga 
community. These affidavits described the law and practices that relate to polygyny 
in that culture.199 In contrast to the evidence provided by the WLC, all the affidavits 
confirmed that consent was a requirement in the conclusion of subsequent marriage 
in Xitsonga custom.200 
                                               
194 Ibid para 52. 
195 Ibid para 54. In this regard they referred to section 5 of the Reform of Customary Law of 
Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
196 Affidavit of Hlanganani Hamilton Mayimele filed on behalf of the WLC, case number: CCT 57/12. 
197 MM v MN op cit note 167 para 56. 
198 Written submissions of the CGE & NMRW, as drafted by Tembeka Ngcukaitobi & Michael Bishop, 
case number: CCT 57/12 para 10.2. 
199 The affidavits included affidavits by Mbhazima Surprise Bungeni; Mamaila Rikhotso; Mkhatshane 
Daniel Shiranda and Khazamula Isaac Nkanyani. They also commissioned an expert, Dr Mabalana 
Mhlaba to provide his opinion on the issues raised by the Court; see the filling sheet of the CGE & 
NMRW in response to the Court’s directions dated 25 February 2013, case number: CCT 57/12. 
200 See the Court’s summary of the affidavit evidence in MM v MN op cit note 167 paras 55-59. 
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2.4.3 Decision of the Constitutional Court 
With the Court’s directives, it was clear that the case dealt with the manner in which 
the content of customary law should be established and if found necessary, 
developed, to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights.201 The decision in MM v 
MN is an important follow-up on the Bhe and Shilubana decisions, where the Court, 
although it acknowledged the importance of the living nature of customary law, 
expressed its concern in establishing its content.202  
 The Court confirmed the SCA’s decision that the RCMA did not prescribe any 
consent requirements for a valid second or subsequent customary marriage, and 
followed the NMRW’s arguments that it was necessary to determine the content of 
custom in this case, which justified its call for further evidence in this regard.203  
The Court greatly relied on the affidavits filed by the amici curiae, especially 
those of the CGE and NMRW, in establishing whether Xitsonga custom prescribed 
consent.204 As most of the affidavits indeed required consent of the first wife, the 
Court accepted the evidence with regard to the different opinions, as nuance and 
accommodation, rather than contradiction.205  
The Court then proceeded to consider the relevant evidence within the 
constitutional framework of equality and dignity.206 Unlike the WLC, who focused on 
equality between the different wives and their equal treatment, the Court focused on 
equality between husband and wife: 
 
‘Are the first wife’s rights to equality and human dignity compatible with allowing her 
husband to marry another woman without her consent? We think not. The potential for 
infringement of the dignity and equality rights of wives in polygynous marriages is 
undoubtedly present. First, it must be acknowledged that “even in idyllic pre-colonial 
communities, group interests were framed in favour of men and often to the grave 
disadvantage of women and children.” While we must accord customary law the 
                                               
201 The majority judgment was delivered by Froneman J, Khampepe J and Skweyiya J with Moseneke 
DCJ, Cameron J and Yacoob J concurring; MM v MN op cit note 167 para 1. 
202 Bhe op cit note 27 para 87; Shilubana op cit note 96 para 36. 
203 MM v MN op cit note 167 para 45; notice if motion to be admitted as amici curiae of the CGE & 
NMRW op cit note 184 para 35.12. 
204 MM v MN op cit note 167 para 18. The Court specifically stated: 
‘The amici provided invaluable submissions throughout the proceedings before this Court. In 
particular, the amici’s submissions in response to this Court’s request for further information regarding 
Xitsonga customary law have been crucial to the outcome of this case.’ 
205 MM v MN op cit note 167 paras 54-61. 
206 Ibid paras 62-69. 
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respect it deserves, we cannot shy away from our obligation to ensure that it develops 
in accordance with the normative framework of the Constitution. Second, where 
subsequent customary marriages are entered into without the consent of the first wife, 
she is unable to consider or protect her own position. She cannot take an informed 
decision on her personal life, her sexual or reproductive health, or on the possibly 
adverse proprietary consequences of a subsequent customary marriage. Any notion of 
the first wife’s equality with her husband would be completely undermined if he were 
able to introduce a new marriage partner to their domestic life without her consent.’207 
 
Despite finding that Xitsonga custom in fact required consent, the Court found that 
the particular custom nevertheless should be developed in light of the principles of 
equality and dignity in order to unequivocally require consent.208 Ngwenyama’s 
marriage was found to be null and void, and to protect parties in existing customary 
marriages, the requirement was to be prospective and made known to the public 
through the Houses of Traditional Leaders and the Minister of Home Affairs.209  
Zondo J and Jafta J (with Mogoeng J and Nkabinde J concurring) in separate 
minority judgments criticised the majority, specifically in relation to the issuing of the 
second set of directives and the call for further evidence.210 
 
 2.4.4 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
MM v MN, in no uncertain terms, confirmed the importance of customary law within 
our constitutional framework. For the first time, the Court established the living 
content of custom, which it specifically refrained from doing in Bhe and Shilubana, 
and developed the same to ensure its constitutional compliance. The MM v MN 
                                               
207 Ibid paras 71-72 (footnotes omitted). 
208 Ibid para 75. 
209 Ibid para 89. 
210 Zondo J, argued that the Court should not have called for additional evidence and that the matter 
could have been dealt with on the records from the High Court and SCA. He found that the Court, as 
appellate court, was not in a position to deal with contradictory evidence as clearly presented in the 
affidavits. For Zondo J, the evidence tendered by Mayelane and the affidavit from her uncle pertaining 
to Xitsonga custom was sufficient in establishing that consent was a requirement and that 
Ngwenyama failed to prove that she entered into a customary marriage with the deceased. According 
to him there was no valid marriage between Ngwenyama and the deceased, irrespective of whether 
one would take into account the additional affidavits; see MM v MN op cit note 167 paras 90-131. 
Jafta J asserted that development was not needed as this was never argued by any of the parties and 
fell outside the scope of the case. For Jafta J, there were no compelling reasons, especially when not 
argued by the parties, why the Constitutional Court should sit as a court of first and last instance 
considering the development of customary law. In agreeing with Zondo J, Jafta J found that 
Ngwenyama failed to prove that a customary marriage existed between her and the deceased and 
that Xitsonga custom required consent which rendered development unnecessary; see MM v MN op 
cit note 167 paras 132-157. 
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judgment can be seen as a victory to those who advocated a custom-based 
approach as opposed to the rights-based approached in litigating customary matters. 
The case was a difficult matter to adjudicate, because it seemingly pitted two 
women, each equally vulnerable and disadvantaged, against each other. It was this 
vulnerability that the WLC wanted to focus on, since for them, this class of women 
should be accorded the proper protection and respect of their rights as contemplated 
by the Constitution.211  
For the NMRW, equality had to be ascertained in context of the relevant 
custom and if necessary developed, to comply with constitutional norms. The Court 
criticised the WLC’s arguments in relation to the establishment of the “contours” of 
consent, which had its basis in the law of contract, stressing that the focus had to be 
customary law.212 It adopted the NMRW’s approach in establishing the relevant living 
custom and developing it to bring it in line with the Constitution.  
However, when considering the development of Xitsonga custom it focused 
on the equality between husband and wife and not the equal treatment of the 
relevant wives. This approach has been criticised, as it has left the second wife 
powerless, and unable to live her life with dignity and respect.213 Although the WLC’s 
approach was rights-based in relation to the law of contract, it still had valuable 
arguments in relation to balancing the rights of both wives, which according to them, 
was a constitutional imperative.214  
The MM v MN decision might have been averted if the Court adopted the 
remedy as suggested by the WLC in Gumede namely that, awaiting law reform on 
the topic, the property of parties in a customary marriage be held in community of 
property and upon the conclusion of another marriage all property acquired after the 
subsequent marriage be divided in proportion to the respective contributions (both 
monetary and non-monetary) of the spouses to the respective marriages. This 
                                               
211 Notice of motion to be admitted as amicus curiae of the WLC op cit note 185 para 12. 
212 MM v MN op cit note 167 para 49 where the Court stated: 
‘courts must understand concepts such as “consent” to further customary marriages within  the 
framework of customary law, and must be careful not to impose common-law or other understandings 
of that concept. Courts must also not assume that such a notion as “consent” will have a universal 
meaning across all sources of law.’ 
213 Pierre De Vos ‘Between a rock and a hard place for wives in polygynous marriages’ available at: 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-for-wifes-in-polygynous-
marriages/ (last accessed 24 June 2013). 
214 Notice of motion to be admitted as amicus curiae of the WLC op cit note 185 para 28. 
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remedy might have provided Mayelane with the security she wanted and could have 
averted the legal challenge. 
The Court, in issuing its second set of directives, prevented the remittance of 
the matter back to the High Court and also established a unique role for the amici 
curiae in providing relevant evidence pertaining to lived custom. The amici curiae, 
specifically the CGE and NMRW, filed most of the affidavit evidence, which 
confirmed the amici’s role of being of assistance to the Court and established a 
future role for amici curiae participation in customary matters.  
It is interesting to note that the arguments that pertained to the importance of 
living customary law and its development were first argued by the CGE as amicus 
curiae in Bhe, which became the minority opinion in that judgment, and which had 
now become the majority opinion of the Court in MM v MN. This clearly confirms the 
role of amicus curiae participation as judicial sensitizer and although it might not 
influence a majority decision, it might influence a minority finding which could 






















3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
‘Cultures are inherited ideas, beliefs and values. They provide a shared basis for social 
behaviour and are transmitted and reinforced over time. But cultures are man-made, 
and they serve the interests of particular groups. They also change continually. And 
they can be challenged.’215 
 
The cases that have been discussed have unequivocally confirmed the place of 
living customary law in the South African legal system and specifically women’s 
rights to belong to a cultural community, as long as the relevant cultural norms 
adhere to the Constitution and its ensuing rights. 
The Constitutional Court in the above decisions grappled with key issues of 
custom and culture in relation to the right to equality and non-discrimination. In Bhe 
and Shilubana, the litigation was very much focused on establishing the role of 
customary law within the South African legal framework, and the importance of 
acknowledging the living nature of this body of law as opposed to its official codified 
status. The judgments acknowledged the dynamic nature of society and the need for 
the legal system to take account of the true, living, adaptable nature of customary 
law.216 Very important, is the way in which the judgments affirmed women’s rights to 
equality under customary law and the community’s rights to develop their custom to 
take account of this. 
From the start it is clear that there were two schools of thought on how courts 
should approach matters concerning the operation of customary law within a 
constitutional framework. These schools are directly related to feminist debate on the 
topic. 
The first school (supported by the CGE and Justice Ncgobo in Bhe; the 
NMRW in Shilubana and the CGE and NMRW in MM v MN) is that courts, when 
confronted with a matter pertaining to customary law, should establish what the 
actual living custom is, enquire as to whether that custom complies with 
constitutional norms and if it does, not to develop the particular custom. Although the 
emphasis is on custom, it is custom operating within a constitutional framework. 
Here, there would not be a blanket decision that is applicable to everyone, but only 
                                               
215 Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ op cit note 20 at 273. 
216 Bhe op cit note 27 para 86. 
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those that practice a specific custom, allowing customary law to develop alongside 
the Constitution.  
The second school of thought (supported by the majority and the WLC in Bhe, 
the CGE in Shilubana as well as the WLC in MM v MN) points to the evidentiary 
difficulty in establishing living custom and that the Court should, considering the 
vulnerability of the parties, provide immediate relief and establish legal certainty 
pertaining to specific rights claims. This position acknowledges the importance of 
living custom, although it is not applied.  
The amici curiae that litigated in the matters could also be classified as falling 
within these two schools. The WLC, acting as applicant or amicus curiae, supported 
a rights-based approach and remedy that would protect as many women as possible 
who live under customary law. This could be ascribed to its own outcome based 
approach to litigation to ensure that as many women as possible benefit from a 
single decision.217  
The NMRW supported a custom-based approach, as the organisation 
represented women who lived under customary law and who felt strongly about the 
protection and development of their culture. The CGE, complying with its 
constitutional mandate, was more or less neutral following a custom-based approach 
in Bhe and MM v MN, where they supported the NMRW, and a rights-based 
approach in Shilubana. Prior to the MM v MN matter and the Constitutional Court’s 
unequivocal support for the custom-based approach, these diverging schools led the 
amici curiae to adopt a specific litigation strategy. This strategy focused on the 
relevant remedy that it thought the Court should grant that would, in acknowledging 
the living nature of customary law, provide relief to as many women possible.  
The remedy advocated by the CGE in Bhe, and adopted to an extent by the 
Court, afforded protection to women in polygynous unions and extended real rights 
protection to a vulnerable group of women in customary law. In Gumede and MM v 
MN, the WLC proposed specific remedies in an attempt to assist the Court in giving 
a judgment that would be sensitive to the nature of customary law, but that would 
also extend constitutional protection to an identified vulnerable group.  
Although divergent, the general consensus between the different approaches 
has been the acknowledgment that, although it is possible to approach these matters 
                                               




solely within an equality and discrimination framework, there is a constitutional 
mandate to locate these arguments within customary law and to respect the 
communities who practice these cultures, an acknowledgment that is important to 
enable the Court to reach an equitable outcome.  
In litigating these matters, the amici curiae have especially applied feminist 
method. They illustrated how the substance of law, specifically customary law, has 
been used to suppress the perspectives of women and that the system needed to 
change.218 They employed “feminist practical reasoning” in seeking to identify 
perspectives that have not been represented by the dominant culture in the 
acknowledgement of the importance of living custom, recognising the possibilities of 
new situations and the importance of not limiting women’s experience to prescribed 
(western) categories.219  
A further point of interest is the extent to which the parties and the amici 
curiae relied on the equality test as laid down in Harksen v Lane.220 In employing a 
feminist litigation strategy, the WLC as applicant in Bhe, and as amicus curiae in 
Gumede, has been able to address the rigidity of the test and through their 
participation incorporate context and disadvantage, to ensure that the Court, when 
itself applies the test, does take account of these factors.221 This clearly indicates the 
relevance and importance of litigating from a feminist viewpoint, and establishes the 
relevance of amicus curiae participation in this regard, to ensure that the application 
of seemingly neutral law and precedent takes account of the position of women and 
ensures that the courts are aware of this, thus allowing for a more substantive 
approach. As feminist litigators we should work on the expansion of seemingly set 
law to ensure a transformative approach to equality that will actually remedy 
disadvantage.222 
                                               
218 See the feminist methods discussed in chapter 2 based on a scholarly article by Katharine T. 
Bartlett ‘Feminist legal methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829 at 836. 
219 Bartlett op cit note 218 at 858. 
220 See the test as discussed in Chapter 1 fn 68. 
221 The test has been criticized for its rigidity, see for example Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt ‘Facing 
the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of 
equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 262.  
Albertyn, has warned that the complex and multiple forms of discrimination found in South Africa 
requires a flexible equality test “so that courts can respond to different forms of disadvantage, stigma 
and vulnerability, to differing claims of recognition and redistribution and to competing claims over 
power, status and resources.” See Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 
186 in this regard. 
222 Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 24 at 185. 
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In future the amici curiae, that participate in customary matters, should focus on 
supporting and acquiring research into living custom as this is where future amici 
curiae briefs could play an important role in placing the necessary evidence of living 






1 WOMEN’S VULNERABILITY, CHOICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
South African society is characterised by poverty and inequality, with the poorest 
households being headed by women, often in rural areas.1 This poverty and 
women’s subordinate economic position create and reinforce a lack of bargaining 
power that is reflected in the choices women make and the relationships they enter 
into.2  
This chapter identifies sex work,3 and domestic life partnerships (between 
heterosexual couples), as areas where women’s vulnerability is particularly pertinent. 
Existing discriminatory rules and legal exclusion are justified by the fabrication that 
women “choose” to be subject to their detrimental circumstances.4 Feminists have 
long argued that the law and courts rely on a liberal interpretation of choice in 
excluding women from legal protection. Bonthuys describes this liberal approach to 
choice as: 
 
‘People who make choices are viewed as isolated individuals who act as rational 
agents to maximize their own interests in the public sphere. This means that whatever 
they choose must be good for them and that they should therefore suffer the 
consequences of their choices. The circumstances that structure choices open to them 
and the social, economic and cultural conditions that influence their choices are 
regarded as “private” and therefore legally irrelevant.’5 
 
Rather than acknowledging the constrained circumstances in which women have to 
make choices, the law places the responsibility of negative consequences of choice 
                                               
1 Catherine Albertyn & Elsje Bonthuys ‘Introduction’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 1 at 7. 
2 Brigitte Clark & Beth Goldblatt ‘Gender and family law’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 195 at 199. 
3  The term sex work and prostitution (the term chosen by the courts) is used interchangeably to refer 
to the exchange of sexual services for money. 
4 Elsje Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments: The example of the 
South African Constitutional Court’ (2008) 20 CJWL 1 at 23. 
5 Ibid 24 (footnotes omitted). 
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on the woman herself.6  South African feminists and organisations have relied on the 
underpinnings of socialist feminism to challenge the liberal understanding of choice 
in focusing on the social and economic context and relationships which influence and 
structure individual behaviour and choice.7  
When the cases of S v Jordan,8 (decriminalisation of prostitution) and Volks 
NO v Robinson,9 (extension of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouse Act 27 of 1990 
to include domestic life partnerships) came before the Constitutional Court, feminists 
and organisations were acutely aware of the need to focus the Court’s attention on 
the nature of women’s vulnerability, and the need to recognise women’s agency and 
choice in these areas, in addressing inequality and disadvantage.  
The discussion that follows focuses on these two decisions and the amici 
curiae who intervened to represent the categories of vulnerable women. As 
background, a brief outline on the different feminist responses to sex work and 
















                                               
6 Id; Catherine Albertyn ‘Equality’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and 
Justice (2007, Juta) 82 at 104. 
7 Karin Van Marle & Elsje Bonthuys ‘Feminist theories and concepts’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine 
Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and justice (Juta 2007) 15 at 32. 
8 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) (hereinafter Jordan). 
9 Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (hereinafter Volks). 
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2 CASE DISCUSSIONS 
 
2.1 Decriminalising Prostitution: S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education 
and Advocacy Taskforce (SWEAT) and the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) 
as amici curiae). 
 
2.1.1 Feminist interpretations of sex work 
An on-going debate within scholarly and legal frameworks has been whether to 
decriminalise sex work as most countries, including South Africa, criminalise the 
selling of sex. Questions have been asked whether legal protection could empower 
women and decrease the vulnerability associated with this work, since it is accepted 
that women engaged in sex work are vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and 
stigmatisation by clients, police, pimps and society in general.10 
Feminists have held divergent views about the sex industry, specifically the 
decriminalisation of sex work. Liberal feminists have argued that sex work should be 
viewed as a legitimate form of work and that women have a right to choose to 
engage in sex work, as they do in any other work, therefore affording them the same 
rights as any other workers.11 This falls within the general liberal feminist acceptance 
“of the ideal of autonomous individuals who are free to make choices that benefit 
themselves” within an equality framework.12 Liberal feminists demand the 
decriminalisation of prostitution and argue that if criminal sanctions were removed, it 
would be more likely to be accepted as a legitimate form of work. This could address 
vulnerabilities such as police brutality and harassment, as well as the placement of 
sex workers within the protective ambit of labour law.13 Therefore, the focus for 
liberal feminists is the acknowledgment of choice, the reduction of harm and the 
development of minimum working standards.  
Radical feminists argue that women are never free to make sexual choices 
and that “prostitution (sex work as a term is rejected) is an extreme form of 
                                               
10 Catherine Albertyn, Lillian Artz, Helene Combrinck, Shereen Mills & Lorraine Wolhuter ‘Women’s 
freedom and security of the person’ in Elsje Bonthuys & Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and 
justice (Juta 2007) 295 at 355. 
11 Id; South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 
Project 107 (2002) 56. 
12 Van Marle & Bonthuys op cit note 7 at 32. 
13 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 op cit 
note 11 at 58. 
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exploitation and subordination of women by men.”14 Radical feminism rejects the 
claim that sex work is a valid employment opportunity as it devalues women and is 
the ultimate form of male domination over women. It thus opposes legal regulation to 
grant women greater rights to do sex work, but rather favours rights entitlements to 
protect women and reduce their subordination.15 For radical feminists: 
 
‘Prostitution isn’t like anything else. Rather everything else is like prostitution it is the 
model for women’s condition, for gender stratification and its logical extension sex 
discrimination. Prostitution is founded on enforced sexual abuse under a system of 
male supremacy that itself is built along a continuum of coercion-fear, force, racism 
and poverty. For every real difference between women, prostitution exists to erase our 
diversity, distinction and accomplishment while reducing us to meat to be bought, 
sold, traded, used, discarded, degraded, ridiculed, humiliated, maimed, tortured, and 
all too often murdered for sex.’16 
 
Radical feminists reject the liberal idea of choice arguing that women are directly or 
indirectly coerced into prostitution.17 Socialist and critical feminists have also 
questioned the liberal reliance on choice, as for them it “disregards the social 
contexts and relationships which influence and structure individual behaviour.”18 
However, socialist and critical feminists also criticise the radical approach: 
 
‘Although ‘abolitionist’ and ‘pro-sex worker’ feminists clearly hold divergent moral and 
political understandings of prostitution, it seems to me that the view of power implicit 
in both lines of analysis is equally unidimensional. The former offers a zero-sum view 
of power as ‘commodity’ possessed by the client (and/or third party controller of 
prostitution) and exercised over prostitutes, the latter treats the legal apparatuses of 
the state as the central source of a repressive power that subjugates prostitutes. 
                                               
14 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 10 at 355; the radical feminist perspective is 
specifically advocated for by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. See for example Catharine 
MacKinnon ‘Prostitution and civil rights’ (1993) 1 Mich J of Gender & L 13; Andrea Dworkin 
‘Prostitution and male supremacy’ (1993) 1 Mich J of Gender & L 1. 
15 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 op cit 
note 11 at 60. 
16 Sarah Wynter ‘Whisper: Women hurt in systems of prostitution engaged in revolt’ in Frederique 
Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander (eds) Sex work: Writings by women in the sex industry (1987) as cited 
in Nicole Bingham ‘Nevada sex trade: A gamble for the workers’ (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 69 at 81. 
17 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 10 at 356. 
18 Van Marle & Bonthuys op cit note 7 at 32. 
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However, the power relations involved in prostitution are far more complicated than 
either of these positions suggest.’19  
 
For socialist and critical feminists “prostitution as a social practice is embedded in a 
particular set of social relations which produce a series of variable and interlocking 
constraints upon action”.20 Both locate prostitution within this particular set of socio-
economic conditions which questions the reliance on individual choice and calls for 
an understanding of choice within the socio-economic circumstances that women 
find themselves in.21  
The South African approach to sex work has mostly been influenced by 
socialist and critical feminism and sex work has been linked to wider social and 
economic relations, considering our high levels of poverty and inequality, rather than 
focusing on individual choice.22 However, a liberal approach is also supported as 
decriminalisation is seen as an option to address the vulnerability of sex workers by 
providing a “safer” work environment.  
In the late nineties, the South African government realised that their approach 
to sex work needed to change.23 On provincial level, in 1996, the Gauteng Ministry of 
Safety and Security drafted a policy document that provided the provincial cabinet 
with statistics on how resources were utilised in policing sex work.24 The argument 
was that resources could be better spent in other areas and that policing sex work 
should not be a priority.25 On a national level, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development’s 1999 Gender Policy Statement mentioned the 
decriminalisation of sex work as an international obligation in terms of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW).26 At the same time, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) 
                                               
19 Julia O’ Connell Davidson ‘Prostitution, power and freedom’ in Jeffrey Weeks, Janet Holland & 
Matthew Waites (eds) Sexualities and society (Blackwell Publishing Inc 2003) 204 at 205. 
20 Ibid 206. 
21 Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 10 at 356. 
22 Ibid 358. 
23 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 op cit 
note 11 at 36. 
24 Janet M. Wojcicki ‘The movement to decriminalize sex work in the Gauteng Province, South Africa, 
1994-2002’ (2003) 46 African Studies Review 83 at 87.    
25 Ibid. 
26 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development’s Gender Policy Statement (1999) 
drafted under the leadership of Deputy-Minister M.E Tshabala-Msiamang, available at: 
http//:www.justice.gov.za/policy/gender/genderPOL.htm  (last accessed 31 January 2013) 15-16. 
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was tasked with its own investigation in reforming the area of law that started as an 
investigation on sexual offences by and against children, but expanded into a project 
concerning sexual offences against adults, including a project on adult prostitution.27 
The civil society organisation, the Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force 
(SWEAT), strongly in favour of the decriminalisation of sex work, actively lobbied the 
SALRC.28 These initiatives, combined with the SALRC process, created a positive 
framework for legislative change concerning sex work.  
When the Jordan case was brought forward in early 2002, it came as a 
surprise to those working in the area, as they were satisfied that their engagement 
with the executive would lead to decriminalisation and there were no plans to litigate 
on the issue.29 According to Albertyn, organisations working in the area did not 
believe that this was the ideal case and set of facts to decide the issue of 
decriminalisation, as Jordan’s circumstances were not representative of the sex work 
trade in general, specifically the circumstances of poor outdoor sex workers.30  
However, as the case was already before the Constitutional Court, there was 
no choice but to participate as amicus curiae to attempt to provide the Court with the 
contextual evidence, clearly lacking in Jordan’s arguments, and to ensure that all 
relevant voices were placed before the Court.31 In a disappointing judgment the 
Court found against decriminalisation. It conceded that decriminalisation was not 
constitutionally required despite the Court’s progressive equality jurisprudence. The 
Jordan judgment suggested that there were limits to litigation to effect meaningful 






                                               
27 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 op cit 
note 11 at 27-.28. 
28 Ibid; Albertyn, Artz, Combrinck, Mills & Wolhuter op cit note 10 at 356. 
29 Interview Catherine Albertyn, CALS (29 January 2013). 
30 Ibid; the case was brought by a brothel owner and a prostitute that was working in the brothel. The 
same sentiments were shared by the Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) see Ruth B. Cowan ‘The 
Women’s Legal Centre during its first five years’ (2005) Acta Juridica 273 at 287. 
31 Interview Catherine Albertyn, op cit note 29. 
32 Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray ‘Ten years of transformation: How has gender equality in South 
Africa fared?’ (2002) 14 CJWL 255 at 284. 
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2.1.2 Factual background 
Ellen Jordan, a brothel owner together with two of her employees, was arrested for 
contravening the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (hereinafter the Sexual Offences 
Act).33 Jordan was charged with the keeping of a brothel; Brooderyk, the 
receptionist, for assisting in the management of a brothel and Jacobs, the sex 
worker, for committing an act of indecency for reward with a policeman (parties 
hereinafter collectively referred to as Jordan). Jordan argued that the relevant 
sections of the Sexual Offences Act were unconstitutional and requested the 
decriminalisation of prostitution and brothel-keeping.  
The High Court concluded that the section criminalising prostitution was 
unconstitutional but held that the sections in relation to brothel-keeping were not. 
The declaration of invalidity against the sex work provision was sent to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation and Jordan appealed the High Court’s refusal to 
set aside the brothel provisions.34 My specific focus is on the constitutionality of the 
sex work provision as it was the main point of contention. 
 
2.1.3 The parties 
Jordan based her challenge on the rights to privacy, equality and freedom of trade.35 
The most important arguments were made in relation to the right to equality, as 
Jordan argued that all sex workers were unfairly discriminated against on the basis 
of gender, given that only the acts of the sex workers (mostly women) were 
                                               
33 Sec 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act states : 
‘Any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse, or commits an act of indecency, with any other 
person for reward, shall be guilty of an offence. Sec 2 of the act states that any person who keeps a 
brothel shall be guilty of an offence and sec 3 provides that certain persons would be deemed to keep 
a brothel including ‘(b) any person who manages or assists in the management of any brothel; (c) any 
person who knowingly receives the whole or any share of any moneys taken in a brothel.’  
34 Jordan op cit note 8 para 36. From the outset it should be noted that there was contending views 
whether the matter was to be heard in terms of the Interim or Final Constitution. The Interim 
Constitution was in force when the events that gave rise to the proceeding occurred. However, the 
High Court decided the matter in terms of the Final Constitution. Jordan in her argument relied on the 
provisions of the Final Constitution, although the Constitutional Court and some of the parties argued 
that the matter should be dealt with in terms of the Interim Constitution, as it was in force when the 
events occurred and that the provisions relied upon, specifically the equality provision, was not 
materially different from the equality provision in the Interim Constitution; see Jordan op cit note 8 
paras 2-4. 
35 See sec 14, 9 and 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the 




criminalised as opposed to those of the client (mostly men).36 In terms of the right to 
equality before the law,37 she asserted that sex workers were victimised since the 
stigma associated with sex work made it difficult for sex workers to lay charges of, 
for example, assault and rape.38  
 The State’s case emphasised the harm caused by prostitution. Arguments in 
relation to the decriminalisation of prostitution have often categorised prostitution as 
a harmless form of immorality that should not be punished, whilst others have 
argued that prostitution is inherently harmful and should be controlled.39 According to 
the State, the range of social ills inherent to prostitution meant that it was reasonable 
for it to combat these ills by prohibition rather than regulation.40 For the State, the 
choice to criminalise prostitution was a constitutionally permissible choice, although it 
conceded that it might not have been the only or most perfect choice (this argument 
was adopted by the majority of the Court). In defending its choice to prohibit, the 
State argued: 
 
‘The first is that the combat of the social ills of prostitution, is a legitimate and 
important state objective. It is permissible for the state to employ its legislative power 
to that end. The second is that there is no perfect cure for the social ills of prostitution. 
They may be addressed in different ways but all of them are imperfect. The state is in 
other words limited to a range of imperfect policy options. It is accordingly not helpful 
merely to point to imperfections in the means that parliament has chosen to combat 
the ills of prostitution.’41 
 
The State countered Jordan’s equality arguments by arguing that the prohibition was 
gender-neutral and that the offence could be committed by any person (both female 
                                               
36 Written submissions of the applicant, as drafted by C.R Jansen & N Janse van Nieuwenhuizen, 
case number: CCT 31/01 paras 29-32. 
37 Section 9(1) of the Constitution states: 
‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’ 
38 Written submissions of the applicant op cit note 36 para 45. 
39 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult prostitution: Issue paper 19 op cit 
note 11 at 64. 
40 Written submissions of the State, as drafted by Wim Trengove (SC) & Alfred Cockrell, case number: 
CCT 31/01 para 5; also see paras 6-25 for the social ills referred to including: the encouragement of 
violent physical abuse; encouragement of trafficking in women and children; spreading sexually 
transmitted diseases; drug abuse and the encouragement of other crimes such as bribery, corruption, 
drug trafficking, assault, public nuisance, robbery and even murder. 
41 Written submissions of the State op cit note 40 para 7. 
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and male prostitutes).42 The State supported a broad interpretation of the section 
which would criminalise both the prostitute and her customer and argued that, even if 
the Court did not follow a broad interpretation, a client could still be held guilty as an 
accomplice and could incur the same penalty.43  
In support of their contentions, the State relied on radical feminist arguments 
illustrating that prostitution degraded women and commodified their sexuality.44 
Although there is a link between viewing prostitution as a form of harm and radical 
feminism, the State misconstrued these arguments, including them merely as tactical 
persuasion to indicate that even feminists were against prostitution.45 The State 
(possibly also a strategic choice) relied on substantial affidavit evidence in support of 
their arguments which led to an equal number of answering and replying affidavits by 






                                               
42 Ibid paras 46-49. 
43 Id. 
44 Ibid paras 8-12.  
45 Jordan refuted the State’s reliance on radical feminist arguments responding in a supplementary 
affidavit that outlined the current feminist theories surrounding prostitution; see applicant’s 
supplementary affidavit, deposed to by Lillian Artz case number: CCT 31/01. 
46 The States supplementary and replying affidavits included affidavits by Frans Johannes Kloppers a 
member of the South African Police Service (SAPS) concerning trafficking of women and children; 
affidavit by Andre de Vries, the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Witwatersrand Local Division; 
affidavit by Penuall Mpapa Maduna, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development; affidavit 
by Pieter Karel Smit, a state advocate attached to the Asset Forfeiture Unit concerning trafficking of 
women and children; affidavit by Daniel Johannes Bester concerning public nuisance; affidavit by 
Anne Stewart Keyworth concerning public nuisance; affidavit by Harhklha Kyriszh concerning public 
nuisance; affidavit by Maria Sophia Elizabeth Van Zyl concerning public nuisance; affidavit by 
Albertus Van Eeden concerning HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases; affidavit by Pieter 
Willem Kruger, a police officer, in relation to brothel-keeping in residential areas; George Fredrick 
Hardaker, employee of the National Prosecuting Authority, as a response to the amici curiae affidavits 
of Crous and Gemeralis in relation to brothel-keeping; answering affidavits by Andries Petrus De 
Vries, Director of Public Prosecution for Witwatersrand Local Division in response to the amici curiae 
affidavits of Crous and Gemeralis. 
Even the Court commented on the amount of affidavits filed and stated: 
‘Although the affidavits were replete with denials and counter-denials, the differences in position 
adopted by the experts and other deponents related not so much to empirical facts as to how to 
characterize the activities concerned and what conclusions should be drawn from them. Little of the 
argument accordingly turned on disputed questions of fact.’; see Jordan op cit note 8 para 37. 
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2.1.4 The amici curiae  
The main amici curiae briefs were brought by the CGE and SWEAT.47 The SWEAT 
brief was a collaborative brief between SWEAT, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS) and the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU; hereinafter referred to 
collectively as the SWEAT brief) with each of the organisations bringing its own 
expertise to the table. SWEAT represented the voices of sex workers as an 
advocacy organisation, that works towards the empowerment of sex workers; CALS 
brought its legal expertise in furthering women’s equality ideals and the RHRU, its 
expertise in sex workers’ health concerns and their access to health care services.48  
Both the amici curiae aimed to expand on the equality arguments brought by 
Jordan and wanted to introduce progressive arguments regarding sex workers and 
their rights. Specifically they wanted to argue: 
 
‘that the criminalization of sex work violated women’s rights to freedom and security of 
the person – that women exercised choices to engage in sex work under constrained 
circumstances and that the criminalization of sex work violated this right and rendered 
women vulnerable to multiple consequent rights violations.’49  
 
According to Albertyn, the amici took a strategic decision that the CGE would focus 
on the equality arguments, whilst SWEAT would focus on the rights arguments.50  
The structure of the discussion that follows focuses on the equality and rights 
arguments of the amici curiae and the Court’s interpretation and response to both in 
relation to the judgment. The Court was strongly divided in its decision which leads 
to an interesting deduction that the minority judgment was intended to be the 
majority judgment.51 The minority judgment sets out the relevant facts and 
methodically addresses the different right entitlements whilst the majority judgment 
                                               
47 It should be noted that there were other amici curiae, including Pieter Crous and Michael 
Gemeliaris, who represented the interests of brothel owners and Andrew Lionel Phillips, also a brothel 
owner, who only participated on the contention whether the Final or Interim Constitution should apply. 
48 Written submissions of SWEAT, as drafted by G.J Marcus (SC) & S.J Cowen, case number: CCT 
31/01 paras 1.5 -1.9. 
49 Catherine Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law: Feminism, law and the courts in 
South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 217 at 228. 
50 Interview with Cathi Albertyn op cit note 29; the RHRU would supplement these briefs by providing 
specific contextual evidence pertaining to sex workers’ health.  
51 The majority judgment was delivered by Ngcobo J with Chaskalson CJ, Kriegler J, Madala J, Du 
Plessis AJ and Skweyiya AJ concurring; the minority judgment was delivered by O’Regan J & Sachs J 
with Langa DCJ, Ackerman J and Goldstone J concurring. 
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merely counters these arguments. The structure of the majority judgment is 
confusing to the reader, without the benefit of the minority judgment, as the majority 
merely replies to the minorities’ reasoning. I discuss the judgment starting with the 
minorities’ findings, followed by the majority’s interpretation in relation to the amici 
curiae arguments, which in my opinion leads to a better understanding of the 
judgment. 
 
The Commission for Gender Equality and the equality arguments: 
The purpose of the CGE’s brief was to expand on the equality arguments brought by 
Jordan and to advance a strong claim that the sex work provision breached the right 
to equality and resulted in unfair discrimination. The CGE provided the Court with 
background information and contextualised the relevant issues at the outset, before 
it engaged the actual equality analysis.52 An important argument was the fact that 
the vast majority of prostitutes were women and the vast majority of clients were 
men.53 The CGE linked prostitution with the experience of being a woman and 
stated: 
 
‘What does, however, emerge as a thread common to almost all depictions of 
prostitution is the recognition (albeit sometimes tacit) that prostitution is inextricably 
linked to the experience of being a woman. This is because prostitution cannot be 
severed from the reality of women’s experiences of inequality which experience is 
manifested in the most extreme cases in abuse and subordination and in less extreme 
cases in the limited options or choices available to women. Ultimately, however it is 
told, the story of prostitution is fundamentally a story about women and their position 
in society.’54 
 
It criticised the State’s approach in linking prostitution with harm and the professed 
purpose of the legislation to protect prostitutes and stated that the actual purpose of 
the criminal sanction was the enforcement of the moral views of a specific section of 
society.55  
The CGE’s main arguments revolved around section 9(1) and 9(3) of the 
Constitution. Following the test in Harksen v Lane, it argued that the sex work 
                                               
52 Written submissions of the CGE, as drafted by Shanee Stein, case number CCT: 31/01 para 5. 
53 Ibid paras 5.1-5.2. 
54 Ibid para 5.4. 
55 Ibid para 10. 
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provision differentiated between prostitutes with no legitimate government purpose 
or rational connection, despite the social ills as propagated by the State.56 Each of 
the social ills was discussed, refuting the State’s contentions in respect of them.57 
The CGE submitted that it was permissible for the State to legislate morality but only 
where such morality accorded with the values entrenched in the Constitution and not 
to enforce the private moral views of a certain section of society.58 According to the 
CGE, the Act, and the sex work provision in particular, drew a distinction between 
“chaste” women that needed to be protected and “unchaste women” that needed to 
be punished.59 It was this enforcement of morality that had no legitimate government 
purpose as required by section 9(1): 
 
‘It is apparent, therefore, that the morality which is sought to be upheld by the 
criminalisation of the sale by a prostitute of sexual services is the private morality of a 
section of the community premised on a conservative construction of good and bad. It 
is further based on a paternalistic outlook in which “good” women require protection 
and other “bad” women and “bad” men (such as homosexuals) who challenge notions 
of decency require punishment. This private morality is antithetical to the 
constitutional promise of equality and dignity.’60 
 
The CGE further argued that the provision unfairly discriminated on the grounds of 
gender, in terms of section 9(3), as it disproportionately affected women.61 The 
discrimination was seen to be manifestly unfair as it was based on stereotypical 
preconceptions about women who sell sexual services, which the State portrayed as 
                                               
56 Specifically in relation to sec 9(1) the Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 test requires the following 
questions to be asked: 
(a) Does the law or conduct differentiate between people or categories of people? 
(b) If so, it should be established whether there is a rational connection between the differentiation 
and a legitimate government purpose. It should be kept in mind that even if there is a rational 
connection that it might still amount to discrimination.  
The complete test is discussed in chapter 1 fn 68; written submissions on behalf of the CGE op cit 
note 52 para 4. 
57 Written submissions of the CGE op cit note 52 paras 32-63. 
58 Ibid para 65; the CGE to this extent relied greatly on the debates that served before Parliament 
when they debated the Sexual Offences Act. They also referred to the history of the Act, which was 
first termed the Immorality Act 5 of 1927, which contained provisions against interracial sexual 
relations, homosexuality and sex work. 
59 Written submissions of the CGE op cit note 52 para 69.2. 
60 Ibid para 69.3. 
61 Ibid para 92. 
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the social ills it wanted to protect society from.62 Accordingly the discrimination in 
terms of section 9(3) could not be justified under the limitation clause.63  
 
The Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and the rights 
entitlement arguments: 
The purpose of the SWEAT brief was to focus on the sex workers and bring the 
relevant contextual evidence to the Court’s attention. SWEAT wanted to outline the 
nature of the indoor and outdoor sex industry and the impact that the criminalisation 
of sex work had on adult commercial sex workers.64  
At the core of the brief, SWEAT wanted to illustrate that prostitutes were 
entitled to certain constitutional rights and that the Act curtailed these rights. SWEAT 
primarily relied on the right to freedom and security of the person and stated that the 
right encompassed autonomy from interference in determining for oneself what to do 
with one’s own body. Although the right to freedom and security of the person was 
more restrictively defined in the Interim Constitution than its counterpart the Final 
Constitution,65 SWEAT argued that section 11 of the Interim Constitution still allowed 
for an interpretation that endorsed personal autonomy in accordance with the Court’s 
previous interpretation of the right.66 
In addition, SWEAT contended that the Act violated sex workers’ right to 
dignity, their right to free economic activity, their right to privacy and supported the 
CGE’s submissions that the section discriminated unfairly.67  
                                               
62 Ibid para 94. 
63 Id. 
64 Notice of motion to be admitted as amici curiae, SWEAT brief, affidavit deposed to by Jayne Arnott, 
case number: CCT 31/01 para 18. 
65 See sec 12 of The Constitution discussed in chapter 3 fn 2 above and sec 11 of the Interim 
Constitution discussed in chapter 3 fn 54 above.  
66 Written submissions of SWEAT op cit note 48 para 5; counsel referred to the Court’s interpretation 
of section 11 of the Interim Constitution in Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 184 
where the Court stated: 
‘This does not mean that we must necessarily confine the application of s 11(1) to the protection of 
physical integrity. Freedom involves much more than that, and we should not hesitate to say so if the 
occasion demands it. But, because of the detailed provisions of chap 3, such occasions are likely to 
be rare. If despite the detailed provisions of chap 3 a freedom of a fundamental nature which calls for 
protection is identified, and if it cannot find adequate protection under any of the other provisions in 
chap 3, there may be a reason to look to s 11(1) to protect such a right. But to secure such protection, 
the otherwise unprotected freedom should at least be fundamental and of a character appropriate to 
the strict scrutiny to which all limitations of s 11 are subjected.’ 
67 Sections 10, 26, 13 and 8 of the Interim Constitution respectively; see the written submissions of 
SWEAT op cit note 48. 
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For SWEAT, the legal enforcement of morality (the actual purpose of the Act if 
viewed historically) was unjust, as the State should not be allowed in the current 
constitutional dispensation to impose a moral code concerning sexuality through 
criminal sanction.68 SWEAT maintained that the harm caused by the criminal 
sanction could not be constitutionally justified. 
 SWEAT further focused on several categories of vulnerability entrenched by 
the relevant criminal sanction including: vulnerability to violence, unsafe, unfair and 
poor working conditions, the stigmatisation of sex workers, their access to health, 
social, police, legal and financial services, prohibitions adverse impact on safe sex 
practices and the ability to find other employment.69 SWEAT advocated that 
prohibition was not the only viable option and that even without any legislation 
regulating the industry there existed a strong legal framework, including labour laws, 
business laws, liquor laws, solicitation laws and nuisance laws that could assist in 
regulating the industry and addressing the State’s fears.70  
SWEAT argued that the relevant sections should be struck down with 
immediate effect and that there were sufficient legislative provisions to protect sex 
workers and to regulate the industry, pending the outcome of the law reform process, 
which had been undertaken by the SALRC. 
 
2.1.5 The Court’s response to and interpretation of the CGE’s equality 
arguments 
 
The minority judgment 
The minority judgment, penned by O’Regan J & Sachs J (with Langa DCJ, 
Ackerman J and Goldstone J concurring), gives the impression of being the planned 
majority judgment, with the equality arguments being the common ground around 
which the judgment would revolve. 
 The minority first considered section 9(1), namely whether the sex work 
provision differentiated between prostitutes and their clients and whether the 
differentiation had a legitimate government purpose.71 It found that it was not 
                                               
68 Written submissions of SWEAT op cit note 48 paras 6.13-6.14. 
69 Ibid paras 6.57-6.85. 
70 Ibid para 14.7.1. 
71 Jordan op cit note 8 para 57. 
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irrational for the legislature to punish the conduct of only one group but not the other. 
It then considered section 9(3) and found that the differentiation did amount to 
discrimination as the Act differentiated on a ground which had the potential to impair 
human dignity or to affect people adversely in a comparably serious manner.72  
Here the minority relied on the CGE’S arguments to conclude that the 
discrimination was indirect gender discrimination, that is, that prostitutes (who were 
mostly women) were disproportionately affected by the Act as opposed to their 
clients (mostly men).73 The minority rejected the State’s arguments that the section 
was gender-neutral and that clients were equally liable in terms of the common law 
and legislation, specifically the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (it is here that the 
majority opted out of the minority’s reasoning).74 The minority proceeded to identify 
the gender stereotypes that give rise to the discrimination: 
 
‘In the present case, the stigma is prejudicial to women and runs along the fault lines 
of archetypal presuppositions about male and female behaviour, thereby fostering 
gender inequality. To the extent therefore that prostitutes are directly criminally liable 
in terms of s 20(1)(aA) while customers, if liable at all, are only indirectly criminally 
liable as accomplices or co-conspirators, the harmful social prejudices against women 
are reflected and reinforced. Although the difference may on its face appear to be a 
difference of form, it is in our view a difference of substance that stems from and 
perpetuates gender stereotypes in a manner which causes discrimination. The 
inference is that the primary cause of the problem is not the man who creates the 
demand but the woman who responds to it: she is fallen, he is at best virile, at worst 
weak. Such discrimination, therefore, has the potential to impair the fundamental 
human dignity and personhood of women.’75 
                                               
72 Ibid paras 57-60. 
73 Ibid para 63. 
74 Ibid para 61; In terms of sec 18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (hereinafter the Riotous 
Assemblies Act):  
(1) Any person who attempts to commit any offence against a statute or a statutory regulation shall be 
guilty of an offence and, if no punishment is expressly provided thereby for such an attempt, be liable 
on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence would 
be liable. 
(2) Any person who- 
(a) conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit; or 
(b) incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person to commit any offence, whether at 
common law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence would be 
liable. 
75 Jordan op cit note 8 para 65. 
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In determining whether the indirect discrimination was unfair, the minority, to an 
extent, detracted from its above positive averment of discrimination by relying on a 
liberal interpretation of choice and stated: 
 
‘There can be no doubt that they are a marginalised group to whom significant social 
stigma is attached. Their status as social outcasts cannot be blamed on the law or 
society entirely. By engaging in commercial sex work, prostitutes knowingly accept the 
risk of lowering their standing in the eyes of the community. In using their bodies as 
commodities in the marketplace, they undermine their status and become 
vulnerable.’76 
 
However, they acknowledge that many prostitutes become involved in prostitution 
because they have few alternatives.77 Ultimately it found that the provision 
discriminated unfairly which decision it based on the arguments put forward by the 
CGE.78  
 
  The majority judgment 
The majority judgment by Ngcobo J (with Chaskalson CJ, Kriegler J, Madala J, Du 
Plessis AJ and Skweyiya AJ concurring), simply countered the minority’s arguments 
alluding to the conclusion that the majority judgment was initially intended to be the 
minority judgment.  
The majority, in establishing discrimination, simplistically adopted the State’s 
arguments that perceived the section to be gender-neutral, as it penalised both male 
and female prostitutes.79 It argued that the criminality of the conduct was equal as 
both parties incurred liability, the prostitute in terms of the Sexual Offences Act, and 
the client at common law and in terms of Riotous Assemblies Act.80 In relation to the 
unfairness of the discrimination the majority stated: 
                                               
76 Ibid para 66. 
77 Ibid paras 67- 68. 
78 The minority specifically stated: 
‘In determining whether the discrimination is unfair, we pay particular regard to the affidavits and 
argument of the Gender Commission. It is their constitutional mandate to protect, develop, promote 
respect for and attain gender equality. This Court, of course, is not bound by the Commission’s views 
but it should acknowledge its special constitutional role and expertise. In the circumstances, its 
evidence and argument that s 20(1)(aA) is unfairly discriminatory on grounds of gender reinforces our 
conclusion.’; see Jordan op cit note 8 para 70 (footnotes omitted). 
79 Jordan op cit note 8 paras 9-10; written submissions of the State op cit note 40 paras 46-49. 
80 Jordan op cit note 8 para 14; also see fn 74 above. 
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‘And if there is any discrimination, such discrimination can hardly be said to be unfair. 
The Act pursues an important and legitimate constitutional purpose, namely to outlaw 
commercial sex. The only significant difference in the proscribed behaviour is that the 
prostitute sells sex and the patron buys it. Gender is not a differentiating factor. 
Indeed, one of the effective ways of curbing prostitution is to strike at its supply.’81  
 
For the majority, the stigma attached to prostitution was not a legal issue and could 
be attributed to the prostitute through her own conduct and not her gender.82 The 
majority did not pay any attention to the CGE’s equality arguments except in so far 
as it refuted the minority’s analysis that relied on them.  
 
2.1.6 The Court’s response to and interpretation of SWEAT’s rights 
arguments 
 
  The minority judgment 
The minority did not engage SWEAT’s arguments and built on its earlier statement 
that prostitutes were, to an extent, to blame for their own vulnerability as a result of 
the choice they exercise in becoming involved in prostitution.83  
In relation to SWEAT’s main arguments concerning the right to freedom and 
security of the person, it found that the invasion of the right was as a result of the 
prostitute’s own conduct and not as a result from an intrusion on the right by the 
State.84 This alludes to the minority’s own liberal approach in the understanding 
women’s choice that was picked up by the majority and which formed the basis of 
their decision. The minority adopted the same reasoning in relation to SWEAT’s 
other rights arguments. With reference to the right to dignity it stated: 
 
‘To the extent that the dignity of prostitutes is diminished, the diminution arises from 
the character of prostitution itself. The very nature of prostitution is the 
commodification of one’s body. Even though we accept that prostitutes may have few 
alternatives to prostitution, the dignity of prostitutes is diminished not by s 20(1)(aA) 
but by their engaging in commercial sex work.’85 
 
                                               
81 Ibid para 15 (footnotes omitted). 
82 Ibid para 16. 
83 See reference to the quote in fn 76 above. 
84 Jordan op cit note 8 para 75. 
85 Ibid para 74. 
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Although it found that the sex work provision infringed the right to privacy, it did so in 
a constrained manner: 
 
‘By making her sexual services available for hire to strangers in the marketplace, the 
sex worker empties the sex act of much of its private and intimate character. She is not 
nurturing relationships or taking life-affirming decisions about birth, marriage or 
family; she is making money. Although counsel for the appellants was undoubtedly 
correct in pointing out that this does not strip her right to be treated with dignity as a 
human being and to have respect shown for her as a person, it does place her far away 
from the inner sanctum of protected privacy rights. We accordingly conclude that her 
expectations of privacy are relatively attenuated. Although the commercial value of her 
trade does not eliminate her claims to privacy, it does reduce them in great degree.’86  
 
 The majority judgment 
The majority also did not take account of any of SWEAT’s arguments. It’s reasoning 
in terms of the rights claims were formalist and focused on the unlawful nature of the 
conduct with no reference to the lived realities of prostitutes. 
It chose to implement traditional legal method, that relies on relevant and 
persuasive evidence, to determine facts (which for the majority was the State’s 
arguments); a reliance on legal precedent (in this case the common law and Riotous 
Assemblies Act) to provide a framework for analysis that lead them to the decision 
that the restriction was constitutionally permissible.87 The majority rejected the 
confirmation of invalidity and was deferential in stating that the legislature had to 
consider whether the interests of society would be better served by decriminalising 
prostitution.88  
It is clear that the majority was not ready to accept the feminist arguments 
introduced by the amici curiae that challenged its traditional method of reasoning. It 
merely considered the constitutionality of the legislation which it argued passed 
constitutional scrutiny.89  
 
 
                                               
86 Ibid para 83. 
87 Mary Jane Mossman ‘Feminism and legal method: The difference it makes’ (1987) 3 Wisconsin 
Women’s Law Journal 147 at 153: see chapter 2 for a discussion of traditional legal method.  
88 Jordan op cit note 8 para 30 and 33. 
89 Mary Jane Mossman ‘Feminism and the law: Challenges and choices’ (1998)10 CJWL 1 at 5. 
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2.1.7 Purpose and impact of the amici curiae submissions 
 
Seeing as the applicant’s brief in Jordan was ill-conceived, the case called for 
feminist intervention and the application of feminist method to ensure that the 
relevant contextual evidence was placed before the Court and the voices of sex 
workers were adequately represented. 
The CGE’s discrimination arguments were the arguments on which 
consensus was dependant, as the greatest part of the Court’s analysis is devoted to 
it eliciting a great degree of debate and consideration from the Court. The minority’s 
interpretation possibly received initial majority support, but was rejected with the 
majority opting for simplistic interpretative reasoning, finding that it is constitutionally 
permissive to legally prohibit prostitution. However, despite attaching great value to 
the CGE’s brief, it is interesting how both the majority and minority judgments did not 
attach any value to the SWEAT submissions.  
The SWEAT brief focused on the sex workers themselves and their 
experience as opposed to the CGE’s brief, that focused on the gendered 
discrimination underlying sex work, that affected all women. Both the minority and 
majority judgments attempted to neutralise difficult rights assertions made by 
prostitutes by framing the case as a general women’s issue. It might be that the 
CGE’s equality arguments were seen as the safest and most familiar, as opposed to 
having to consider difficult rights assertions by a distinct group.  
Sheehy states that judges will often validate the more conservative or 
simplified feminist arguments to reach consensus and to conform with traditional 
legal paradigms and established hierarchies.90 However, this represents the 
importance of the feminist project in law to challenge formalist reasoning and 
established hierarchies: 
 
‘The power of law to define boundaries so as to exclude “irrelevant” facts about 
women’s lives represents a formidable challenge. Yet, the power of feminism to 
critique a construction of law that has safely situated itself outside social life is also a 
choice, albeit, not an easy one. Both of these challenges – the challenge to 
acknowledge complexity in assessing the impact of cases and the challenge to 
recognize relationships between law and social arrangements – represent feminism’s 
                                               
90 Elizabeth A. Sheehy ‘Feminist argumentation before the Supreme Court in R. v Seaboyer; R. v. 
Gayme: The sound of one hand clapping’ (1991) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 450 at 462. 
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challenges to law. They demonstrate both the law’s power and the power of feminism 
to resist it. However, the effort to take up these challenges and to resist the power of 
traditional legal method, depends on a third choice, which is whether or not to persist 
in seeking justice within law.’91 
 
Feminists had to intervene in Jordan to ensure that sex workers’ voices were 
represented and to introduce progressive arguments regarding their rights 
entitlements. Although the amici curiae intervention was not successful in persuading 
the Court to adopt its arguments, the indirect impact of the participation ensured that 
these arguments were before the Court, thereby eliciting debate and discussion 
regarding women’s subordination. The judgment was disappointing and widely 
criticised considering the extensive amici curiae briefs and, since many organisations 
had for a long time lobbied and worked towards the decriminalisation of 
prostitution.92  
The case dealt a blow to the positive framework that was established by 
organisations with the executive in reforming the sex industry, as the issue of 
decriminalisation seems to have fallen off the legislative agenda since the judgment. 
The CGE has only recently again publicly announced its support for the 
decriminalisation of sex work through legislative efforts.93 To date, the response from 
Parliament has also not been positive, as the Sexual Offences Act has been 
                                               
91 Mossman ‘Feminism and the law’ op cit note 89 at 14. 
92 See Jagwanth & Murray op cit note 32 at 284; Ronald Louw ‘The Constitutional Court upholds the 
criminalisation of sex work’ (2003) Agenda 104; Nicole Fritz ‘Crossing Jordan: Constitutional space for 
(un) civil sex?’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 230; Usha Jivan ‘‘Let’s talk about sex, baby’ – but not in the 
Constitutional Court: Some comments on the gendered nature of legal reasoning in the Jordan case’ 
(2004) 17 SACJ 368; Michelle O’ Sullivan and Christina Murray ‘Brooms sweeping oceans? Women’s 
rights in South Africa’s first decade of democracy’ (2005) Acta Juridica 1 at 26; Elsje Bonthuys 
‘Women’s sexuality in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 392; 
Chesa Boudin & Marlise Richter ‘Adult, consensual sex work in South Africa – The cautionary 
message of criminal law and sexual morality’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 179. 
According to Wessel Le Roux ‘Sex work, the right to occupational freedom and the constitutional 
politics of recognition’ (2003)120 SALJ 452 at 463 the issue could possibly be litigated on again as it 
was decided under the Interim Constitution and should it be argued in terms of the Final Constitution, 
the outcome might be different, although this might be stretching the usefulness of court action in 
changing social and political discourse. 
93 Commission for gender Equality ‘Commission for Gender Equality: Position on sex work’ (2013) 
available at: 
http://www.cge.org.za/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=223&Itemid= (last 
accessed 28 August 2013).  
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amended to explicitly criminalise the clients of sex workers,94 and no feedback is 
























                                               
94 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 6 of 2012 amended sec 
11 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences Act) 32 of 2007 which now states: 
‘A person (“A”) who unlawfully and intentionally engages the services of a person 18 years or older 
(“B”), for financial or other reward, favour or compensation to B or to a third person (“C”) – 
(a) For the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with B, irrespective of whether the sexual act is 
committed or not: or 
(b) By committing a sexual act with B, is guilty of engaging the sexual services of a person 18 years 
or older.’ 
The imposition of penalties in respect of this section is left to the discretion of the courts. 




2.2 Extending Legislation to Include Domestic Life Partnerships: Volks NO v 
Robinson (Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) as amicus curiae). 
 
2.2.1 Feminist interpretations of domestic partnerships 
The inadequacy of the legal framework in protecting a particularly vulnerable group 
of women is also illustrated through the issue of cohabitation. Domestic partnerships 
between women and men are widespread and, although there are different reasons 
why women enter into these relationships, in the South African context an 
overwhelming reason is financial need and dependency.96 Here, women’s 
vulnerability stems from the fact that when a partner leaves or dies there is no legal 
entitlement to maintenance or any share of the property despite their contributions.97 
Feminist responses to the legal recognition of these partnerships have also 
differed.98 Liberal feminists view legal recognition as reinforcing the harmful 
stereotype of female dependence, which is counterproductive in an era where many 
women are establishing social and economic independence.99 Many liberals 
subscribe to the ideal of individualism and respect for individual choice that is 
premised on: 
 
‘[f]irst, the dignity of the individual; secondly autonomy, or self-direction; thirdly, 
privacy, or a sphere of thoughts and action that should be free from public 
interference; and, fourthly, self-development.’100 
 
They are therefore against the legal regulation of domestic partnerships and argue 
that choosing whether or not to enter in such a relationship is an exercise of one’s 
own choice and freedom to contract, which will be unduly restricted if regulated  -- 
therefore a form of State paternalism.101 
                                               
96 Beth Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships – A necessary step in the development of South 
African family law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 610. Also unique to South Africa’s context is the extent to which 
migrant labour has led many African men to marry women in rural areas, and to form domestic 
partnerships in the urban areas where they work. 
97 Clark & Goldblatt op cit note 2 at 208. 
98 Ibid 209. 
99 Id. 
100 Ruth L. Deech ‘The case against legal recognition of cohabitation’ (1980) 29 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 480 
(footnotes omitted). 
101 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 616. 
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Socialist feminists maintain that a liberal viewpoint is dependent on the specific 
society as well as the social and economic position that particular women find 
themselves in, and that legal regulation could play a role in improving the lives of 
poor women.102 In the South African context, feminist scholars have been in favour 
of legal recognition, especially equitable redress when a relationship comes to an 
end, as women’s choice in entering such a relationship is mostly influenced by 
economic need and social powerlessness in negotiating the terms of a 
relationship.103 For South African feminists, there also need to be an 
acknowledgement and recognition that marriage is not the only relationship form nor 
the only relationship entitled to legal protection. They have argued that relationships 
and families should not be categorised by specific legal definitions but by the 
function that they fulfil, entitling them to legal protection. Minow, states: 
 
‘that it is not important here whether a group of people fit the formal legal definition of 
a family (created by marriage or adoption). Instead, what is important is whether the 
group of people function as a family: do they share affection and resources, think of 
one another as family members, and present themselves as such to neighbours and 
others?’104 
 
In the context of domestic partnerships, Goldblatt described the importance of 
understanding the functionality of a family relationship as: 
 
‘The purpose of family law is to protect vulnerable members of families and to ensure 
fairness between the parties in family disputes. Women and children are vulnerable 
groups in our society and often become poorer when families break down. The lack of 
legal protection afforded to domestic partnerships increases the vulnerability of these 
groups living within such arrangements. A domestic partnership is but one amongst 
many different types of family and should be included within the definition of family for 
the purposes of family law. Our constitution requires the law to give effect to the rights 
to dignity and equality of the members of all forms of families, particularly when such 
members are vulnerable within their relationships.’105  
 
                                               
102 Clark & Goldblatt op cit note 2 at 209-210. 
103 Id. 
104 Martha Minow ‘Redefining families: Who’s in and who’s out?’ (1991) 62 Colorado Law Review 269 
at 270. 
105 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 610-611. 
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In South Africa, law reform in this area was considered and the SALRC produced a 
report that called for a system of registration of domestic partnerships alongside the 
recognition of de facto partnerships which led to draft legislation on the topic.106 
Whilst the SALRC process was under way, the Volks case came before the 
Constitutional Court.  
Unlike Jordan, the WLC was actively looking for a case to litigate in order to 
secure rights for women in domestic partnerships as part of their identified 
substantive priorities for the organisation.107 When the WLC was requested to advise 
Robinson about her claim for maintenance from a deceased estate, they saw an 
opportunity to advance the arguments they wanted to bring in extending rights 
protection to all women in domestic partnerships.108  
The facts of the case were not ideal, as it was brought by a woman who was 
relatively privileged and not representative of the majority of poor women who enter 
into these relationships. CALS saw an opportunity to supplement the WLC’s 
arguments to bring the relevant contextual evidence to Court and to ensure that the 
reality of poor women in these relationships was brought before the Court.109 
 Again the Court employed traditional legal method, refusing to extend rights 
protection to women in domestic partnerships, deferring to Parliament to grant 
protection.110 
 
2.2.2 Factual background 
Robinson was in a stable long term relationship with Shandling who, upon his death, 
left some money to her in his will. However, Robinson felt that she would not be able 
to sustain herself with the amount as she was supported by the deceased financially. 
She proceeded to institute a claim of maintenance against the deceased estate in 
terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (hereinfter the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act). She argued that the relevant Act should not 
                                               
106 South African Law Reform Commission Domestic Partnerships Discussion Paper 104 Project 118 
(2003); Beth Goldblatt ‘Different routes to relationship recognition: A comparative discussion of South 
Africa and Australia’ (2008) Paper Delivered at the Law and Society Association Australia and New 
Zealand (LSAANZ) Conference 10-12 September, University of Sydney 6. 
107 Cowan op cit note 30 at 285. 
108 Ibid; Volks op cit note 9 paras 8-10. 
109 Interview Beth Goldblatt, CALS (14 December 2012). 
110 Albertyn ‘Defending and securing rights through law’ op cit note 49 at 230.  
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only apply to married couples, but also to the survivor of a permanent heterosexual 
life partnership where the couple lived as husband and wife.111  
Volks, the executor of the deceased’s estate, rejected Robinson’s claim on 
the basis that she was not a spouse in terms of the Act.112 Robinson challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act, in that, it discriminated against her on the ground of 
marital status and infringed her right to dignity.113 The High Court confirmed 
Robinson’s contentions which Volks appealed alongside confirmation by the 
Constitutional Court.  
The WLC, similar to the Bhe matter, not only represented Robinson but joined 
the proceedings as a party, acting in their own interest, on behalf of all partners in 
permanent life partnerships and in the public interest.114 This strategy had the aim 
that notice be taken of the public interest nature of the case, bringing to the Court’s 
attention that a decision will have implications far wider than the relevant parties.  
CALS entered as amicus curiae to supplement the WLC’S arguments to 
ensure that all women who find themselves in these relationships were represented 
and to bring the relevant contextual evidence to Court. 
 
2.2.3 The parties 
For the executor of the deceased’s estate, Volks, the most important arguments 
revolved around Shandling’s rights to freedom of testation and freedom of contract, 
specifically his choice not to enter into a marriage contract with Robinson.115 Volks 
argued that there was no maintenance duty between co-habitants whilst they were 
alive and that there was no convincing reason to provide such after death. If, for 
whatever policy reasons, the reciprocal duty to maintain should be extended, Volk’s 
argued that it was an issue for the legislature and not the courts.116 (Volks later, at 
the beginning of the trial, conceded that the Act discriminated unfairly against women 
in domestic partnerships). 
                                               
111 Volks op cit note 9 paras 3-7. 
112 Ibid para 9; sec 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act defines survivor as the surviving 
spouse in a marriage dissolved by death. Marriage is therefore a prerequisite to claim maintenance in 
terms of the Act. 
113 Volks op cit note 9 para 12. 
114 Ibid para 11 and 22. 
115 Id. 
116 Ibid para 16. 
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For the WLC, it was important to view domestic partnerships within the South African 
context and the fact that, although cohabiting had similar dependencies to marriage, 
few of the protective and supportive measures available to married couples were 
available to cohabiting couples.117 The WLC relied, to a great extent, on an 
academic article by Beth Goldblatt (also the basis of the amicus’s arguments) which 
explored cohabitation from a South African perspective as well as the discussion 
paper by the SALRC on domestic partnerships.118  
The WLC rejected Volk’s choice arguments and emphasised that the choice 
exercised by individuals in these relationships are often unfair, unequal and 
constrained and had to be viewed within the context of gender inequality and 
patriarchy, where free and equal choice to set the terms of a relationship, were often 
lacking.119 The WLC referred to several pieces of legislation that included domestic 
partnerships in their ambit and the inclusive trend of extending legal protection to 
people in same-sex relationships.120  
The WLC also contended that the Act discriminated on the grounds of marital 
status and that the emphasis on marriage as a sacred institution was constitutionally 
offensive, as it privileged marriage in a way which did not show equal concern and 
respect for other forms of relationships and partnerships.121 The impact of the 
discrimination on women in domestic partnerships would increase their vulnerability 
                                               
117 Written submissions of the respondents, as drafted by G.J Marcus (SC) & M O’ Sullivan, case 
number: CCT 12/04 para 4. 
118 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 610; South African Law Reform 
Commission Domestic Partnerships Discussion Paper 104 op cit note 106. 
119 Written submissions of the respondents op cit note 117 para 4.10. 
120 Ibid para 4.12; the WLC specifically referred to the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (sec 58); 
the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (sec 21(3)); the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 (sec 24(2)); the 
Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956; the Compensation for Occupational Diseases Act 61 of 1997; the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (sec 27(2)(c)); the Independent Media Commissions 
Act 148 of 1993 (sec 6(1)(f)); the Housing Act 107 of 1997 (sec 8(e)(iii)(aa).  
Further in para 6.3.6 they referred to the cases of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) regarding the issuing of immigration permits under sec 
25(5) of The Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 to the permanent life partners of same-sex couples; 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (4) SA 266 (CC) which case addressed 
the unfair exclusion of same-sex couples from the provisions of the Judges’ Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989; Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development 
2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) which case declared certain provisions of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
unconstitutional for limiting joint adoption to married people to the exclusion of same-sex couples; J v 
Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) which case considered the 
exclusion to include same-sex partners as parents of children conceived by way of artificial 
insemination in the Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987. 
121 Written submissions of the respondents op cit note 117 paras 7-8. 
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and compound the social and economic disadvantage that occurs at the end of a 
relationship.122 The WLC requested the Court to declare the relevant provision of the 
Act unconstitutional and to provide ancillary relief in reading into the challenged 
provisions wording that would cure the constitutional defect and provide Robinson 
with meaningful relief.123 
 
2.2.4 The amicus curiae 
CALS joined as amicus curiae to provide the Court with the context of poor women in 
domestic partnerships since Robinson was a relatively privileged white woman and it 
was important to them that the Court considered the position of all South African 
women who found themselves in these relationships.124 CALS wanted to focus on 
the nature of South African domestic partnerships, in light of the migrant labour 
structure that forced many men to move to urban areas in search of work, mostly the 
mines, where they formed long term domestic partnerships with “urban women” 
whilst being married to a wife in a rural area.125 In assessing whether the Act 
discriminated, the Court had to take cognisance of all women’s lived reality.126 
CALS wanted to provide information to the Court, based on its own research, 
on the changing notion of family in South Africa; gender inequality and its 
relationship to the family; the patterns of cohabitation in South Africa and the 
features of a cohabitant relationship which point to it being a permanent life 
partnership.127 The CALS report explored and rejected Volk’s so called choice 
arguments and argued, as the WLC did, that men and women approached intimate 
relationships from different social positions and with different measures of bargaining 
power, and that gender inequality and patriarchy resulted in women lacking the 
                                               
122 Ibid para 7.17. 
123 Ibid para 9.5. 
124 Interview Beth Goldblatt op cit note 109. 
125 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 613. 
126 Written submissions of the amicus curiae, as drafted by Kameshni Pillay, case number: CCT: 
12/04 para 56. 
127 Application to be admitted as amicus curiae, affidavit deposed to by Beth Ann Goldblatt, case 
number: CCT 12/04 para 11; the research report was based on a qualitative study and involved sixty 
eight interviews in eight sites across four provinces. The report was to be viewed as primary research 
as a result of limited research in the area and was aimed at understanding why people cohabit, how 
they arrange their relationships and what their views were on law reform. The research report was 
also published as an academic article referred to in fn 96 above. 
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choice to freely and equally set the terms of these relationships.128 It was this 
inequality with regards to choice that entitled women to protection within these 
relationships. The report also drew a direct correlation between unequal power in 
relationships and the socio-economic circumstances of women in general.129  
CALS supported the WLC’s submissions that the Act discriminated on the 
ground of marital status but argued, as was evident from its research, that the 
discrimination had a gender and race dimension, since the group worst affected by 
the exclusion were black women.130 
 CALS wanted to focus on the functions that families performed in determining 
whether a relationship created responsibilities and expectations for the parties 
involved.131 In constructing a remedy, CALS suggested that the Court should not 
defer, as the legislative process had already taken several years and was not near 
completion, and supported the remedy as constructed by the WLC.132  
 
 2.2.5 CALS’s research report  
The research report upon which CALS based its arguments, was disputed in 
supplementary arguments filed by the parties.133 Volks submitted that the evidence 
in the amicus’s report was not incontrovertible or uncontroversial as required by the 
rules of the Court.134 Volks stated that the report was commendable but proceeded 
from a particular premise focusing only on women’s perspective.135  
CALS, in response, argued that none of the parties ever disputed the 
evidence and, whilst never contending that the evidence was incontrovertible, 
contended that the evidence was common cause and that the Court could in any 
event take judicial notice of the contents of the research report.136  
                                               
128 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 616. 
129 Written submissions of the amicus curiae op cit note 126 para 27. 
130 Ibid para 61. 
131 Goldblatt ‘Regulating domestic partnerships’ op cit note 96 at 616. 
132 Written Submissions of the amicus curiae op cit note 126 para 67. 
133 The parties were allowed to file supplementary arguments after oral argument had been heard due 
to the complexity of the matter. 
134 Appellant’s replying note, as drafted by Anton Katz & Paul Farlam, case number: CCT 12/04 para 
22; see rule 31 of the Constitutional Court in chapter 2 above fn 100. 
135 Appellant’s replying note op cit note 134 para 22.1. 
136 Written submissions of the amicus curiae in response to appellant’s replying note, as drafted by 
Kameshni Pillay, case number: CCT 12/04 paras 21-22. 
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At the beginning of its judgment, the Court referred to the arguments presented by 
the amicus curiae, specifically the report they tendered as evidence.137 The Court, 
adopting the argument advocated for by Volks in his replying note, rejected the 
admission of the report as evidence and stated that it was apparent that the 
conclusions and solutions offered were not incontrovertible or uncontroversial.138 
The Court referred to the report as non-representative and stated that it could not be 
regarded as scientific or capable of easy verification and found that it would broaden 
the case beyond the issues before it.139  
 
2.2.6 Decision of the Constitutional Court 
 
Majority and concurring judgments: 140 
At the beginning of the proceedings Volks conceded that the Act discriminated 
unfairly, however, the majority found it necessary to fully consider the question of 
constitutionality despite the abandonment of the appeal in this regard.141 
The Court agreed with the WLC that the differentiation based on marital status 
amounted to discrimination, but questioned whether this discrimination was unfair. 
The Court recognised the important role that marriage played in South African 
society and found that a distinction between married and unmarried persons was 
legally permissible.142 The Court accepted Volks’s chosen arguments and described 
the parties to the relationship as free agents who chose not to marry, thus accepting 
the consequences: 
 
‘Her relationship with Mr Shandling is one in which each was free to continue or not, 
and from which each was free to withdraw at will, without obligation and without legal 
or other formalities.’143 
 
                                               
137 Volks op cit note 9 para 31. 
138 Ibid para 33. 
139 Ibid paras 34-35. 
140 Skweyiya J delivered the majority judgment with six justices concurring Chaskalson CJ, Langa 
DCJ, Moseneke, Ngcobo, Van der Westhuizen and Yacoob; a seperate concurring judgment was 
delivered by Ngcobo J; dissenting judgments were delivered by Justices Mokgoro and O’Regan and 
Justice Sachs with his own dissenting judgment. 
141 Volks op cit note 9 paras 26-27. 
142 Ibid paras 51-54. 
143 Ibid para 55. 
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For the Court, the Constitution did not require the imposition of an obligation on the 
estate of a deceased person in circumstances where the law attached no such 
obligation during his lifetime and where there was no intention on the part of the 
deceased to undertake such an obligation.144  
The Court recognised the vulnerability and economic dependence of women 
in these relationships, but stated that it was not due to the under-inclusiveness of the 
Act.145 For the Court, women’s vulnerability is part of a broader societal reality, that 
should be corrected by empowering women through social policies, initiated by the 
legislature.146 The Court did not confirm the order made by the High Court and 
upheld Volks’s appeal.147 
 Ngcobo J’s concurring judgment was based on the arguments relating to 
choice. He also admitted that the Act differentiated between married and unmarried 
couples, but for him, the discrimination was not unfair, as there was no legal 
impediment for heterosexual couples to get married.148 The law merely provided for 
a legal regime that regulated the rights and obligations for those who decided to get 
married.149 For Justice Ngcobo, to marry or not to marry, is simply a matter of choice 
and an acceptance of the consequences of that choice.150 
 
Minority judgments: 
Justices Mokgoro and O’Regan in their minority judgment focused on the 
functionality of the relationship, as advocated for by CALS, and stated if a 
relationship was socially and functionally similar to marriage and treated differently, 
discrimination was present.151 For them, a surviving partner in a domestic 
relationship would be particularly vulnerable and therefore the limitation imposed by 
the Act would discriminate unfairly.152  
                                               
144 Ibid para 58. 
145 Ibid paras 63-65. 
146 Ibid para 66. 
147 Ibid paras 61-62 and 70. 
148 Ibid paras 76-80. 
149 Ibid para 92. 
150 Ibid para 94. 
151 Ibid para 108. 
152 Ibid paras 128-132. 
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Justice Sachs in his minority judgment followed a wider contextual approach, mostly 
in support of the amicus’s contentions. He rejected the method of reasoning followed 
by the majority and stated: 
 
‘I do not accept that it is appropriate to examine the entitlements of the surviving 
cohabitant in the context of what the common law would provide during the lifetime of 
the parties. To do so is to employ a process of definitional reasoning which 
presupposes and eliminates the very issue which needs to be determined, namely, 
whether for the limited socially remedial purposes intended to be served by the Act, 
unmarried survivors could have legally cognisable interest which founds a 
constitutional right to equal benefit of the law.’153 
 
For Sachs, failure to provide legal protection results in a failure to afford these 
individuals with equal concern and respect. He examined the philosophical context of 
freedom of choice and equality and the importance of considering socio-legal context 
during the interpretive enquiry.154 He situated the interpretation within the ambit of 
family law and supported the functional approach suggested by the amicus curiae, 
and followed by O’Regan and Mokgoro, that marriage should be defined according 
to the function that it serves and that non-traditional relationships such as domestic 
partnerships could fulfil the functions traditionally attributed to marriage.155  
Taking into consideration the “key ingredients” of the Act namely familial 
relationship, intimacy and need, he reached the conclusion that it would not only be 
socially harsh to exclude domestic partners from the ambit of the Act, but also legally 
unfair.156 He paid particular attention to the vulnerability of women within these 
relationships and the often limited choices they are faced with and stated that this 
context needed to be considered when interpreting the Act.157 He consequently 
                                               
153 Ibid para 151. 
154 Ibid para 154-166. 
155 Ibid para 172. 
156 Ibid para 220. 
157 Ibid para 225 where he specifically stated: 
‘The reality in which the Act must be interpreted is that many recently bereaved, elderly, and poor 
women find themselves with no assets or savings other than their clothing and cooking utensils, little 
chance of employment and only the prospect of a State old-age pension to keep them from penury. 
Thus, while it is necessary to emphasise the importance of people taking responsibility for their lives, 
and to acknowledge the extraordinary self-reliance shown by many women in the face of extreme 
hardship, the law cannot ignore the fact that lack of resources has left many women with harsh 
options only. Their choice has been between destitution, prostitution and loneliness, on the one hand, 
and continuing cohabitation with a person who was unwilling or unable to marry them on the other. 
172 
 
found the provision to discriminate unfairly which discrimination could not be 
justified.158 
 
2.2.7 Purpose and impact of the amicus curiae submissions 
The Volks judgment, as much as the judgment in Jordan, have been criticised for its 
legal formalism and reflection of popular prejudice.159 The Volks case was not 
concerned with gender discrimination but was argued on the basis of discrimination 
on the grounds of dignity and marital status.160 It is uncertain why Robinson and the 
WLC restricted their discrimination claims, but the lapse could be ascribed to 
reliance on positive legislative recognition and positive litigation outcomes in 
extending legal protection to same-sex relationships.161  
In hindsight participation by women and feminists’ organisations as amicus 
curiae in the same-sex relationship cases might have led feminist litigators to 
carefully consider the tension and difference in the arguments that the two groups 
were making. Although both women and same-sex couples were arguing for the 
legal protection of their relationships,  same-sex couples were specifically excluded 
from legal protection, especially in entering into marriage, whilst women in 
heterosexual relationships had a choice to marry or not. Earlier amici intervention in 
the same-sex cases could have alerted feminists to the complexity and difference in 
these relationships and the different direction of arguments that the two groups were 
following. This might have led to a different approach by the WLC in Volks in not 
necessarily overtly relying on the same-sex precedent, with these cases being 
viewed within their own context and within their own constraints.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Any consideration of the fairness or otherwise of excluding from maintenance claims people who 
chose the latter path, must take account of this.’ 
158 Volks op cit note 9 para 239. 
159 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 4 at 34: also see 
the following criticisms of the judgment: Anita Cooke ‘Choice, heterosexual life partnerships, death 
and poverty’ (2005) 122 SALJ 542; Lawrence Schafer ‘Marriage and marriage-like relationships: 
Constructing a new hierarchy of life partnerships’ (2006) 123 SALJ 626; Helen Kruuse ‘‘Here’s to you, 
Mrs Robinson’: Peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the treatment of domestic partnerships’ 
(2009) 25 SAJHR 380; B.S Smith & J.A Robinson ‘An embarrassment of riches or a profusion of 
confusion? An evaluation of the continued existence of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 in the light of 
prospective domestic partnerships legislation in South Africa’ (2010) 13 PELJ 30; Karin van Marle 
‘The ‘archaic structures of our desire’’ (2010) 25 SAPL 195. 
160 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 4 at 13. 
161 See fn 120 above. 
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It is uncertain whether a gender claim by the WLC would have influenced the 
judgment in any way, but the possibility exists that it could have, in light of strong 
minority opinions and the possibility that a gender claim could have rallied support 
for the minority findings.  
CALS’s main purpose was to extend the Court’s focus to all women, 
specifically poor black women cohabitants within the confines of the factual scenario 
and arguments presented by the parties.162 CALS’s participation can be described 
as a classical public interest brief, as the main purpose of the brief was to make sure 
that the Court understood the point of view of those who would be affected by its 
decision and to ensure that those affected feel that their voice had been heard.163 
The Court’s rejection of the empirical study of CALS was disappointing, as the 
Court, despite questioning the report, could have taken judicial notice of the 
contextual evidence provided.164 The minority supported CALS’s findings, 
specifically O’Regan and Mokgoro J, in focusing on the functionality of the 
relationship, and Sachs J, who throughout his judgment referred to the vulnerability 
of women in domestic partnerships, with specific emphasis on their socio-economic 
vulnerability. Sachs J used the amicus’s evidence by relying on Goldblatt’s academic 
article that was based on CALS’s initial research.165  
Criticising the Court’s rejection of the amicus’s evidence, Lind states that, 
although the impact of gender-based inequality in cohabitation relationships may not 
be universal, it was so overwhelming “and so obvious to anyone with the most 
rudimentary, unrefined skills of observation, that it seems almost ludicrous to 
demand evidence of [it].”166 It might be that the Court was persuaded by Volk’s 
arguments and, coupled with the factual scenario presented to it, it was seen as an 
easy way to revert back to the familiar and narrow confines of matrimonial law and 
traditional legal method. Lind states that: 
 
                                               
162 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 4 at 13; written 
submissions on behalf of the amicus curiae op cit note 126 para13. 
163 Philip Bryden ‘Public interest intervention in the courts’ (1987) 66 The Canadian Bar Review 490 at 
513. 
164 Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments’ op cit note 4 at 20. 
165 Id. 




‘It is regrettable that they chose to regard the law as so obvious and so obviously 
constitutional when there are so many reasons to see it, instead, as remarkably 
opaque and desperately in need of clarification and elucidation.’167 
 
The Court showed some understanding of the systemic inequalities that underpin 
women’s choices and dependence, but distorted this contextual analysis by 
implementing traditional legal method that rely on certain traditional concepts of 
marriage and choice.168 The Court also acted within the confines of what was argued 
and chose to follow Volks’s well-structured brief that suited its own moral 
conservatism best.  
The contradictory majority and minority judgments and the extent to which the 
amicus curiae brief was considered (and not considered) illustrates that the brief had 
a definite impact, as it provoked a great deal of debate within the Court.169 This also 
points to the fact that in considering context, the Court is strongly influenced by 
individual judicial attitudes and that an amicus curiae brief could/should be structured 
to speak to receptive attitudes and to educate others.170 Therefore, it is important in 
structuring an amicus curiae brief to take account of the composition of a court and 
the mind-set of individual judges in order to target those that you might think would 
be the most receptive to your arguments. Ennis stresses the importance of focusing 
on individual judicial opinion in drafting a successful amicus curiae brief: 
 
‘Amicus briefs, like all briefs, should not be written to be read by an abstract entity 
known as “a court”. They should be written to appeal to and persuade individual 
judges, with individual predispositions and widely varying judicial philosophies. 
Particularly at the Supreme Court level, it is important for amici (and for parties) to try 
to predict which Justices are likely to be the “swing votes” on particular issues. It is a 
waste of time for an amicus to preach to the already converted, or to urge individual 
Justices to adopt positions they have squarely rejected in earlier decisions. Once the 
“swing vote” Justices have been identified, the amicus should be drafted to catch their 
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attention, to anticipate and respond to their likely concerns, and to urge positions that 
are likely to attract their votes.’171 
 
Therefore, in considering litigation strategy, it is important for prospective amici 
curiae to familiarise themselves with the judicial preference of the individual justices 
and as Ennis suggests to stress prior opinions of identified judges and employ 


























                                               
171 Bruce J. Ennis ‘Effective amicus briefs’ (1984) 33 Catholic University Law Review 603 at 608. 
172 Ibid 609. 
176 
 
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Jordan and Volks judgments were disappointing, especially considering the 
detailed amici curiae briefs and contextual evidence provided. Of particular concern 
was the libetarian view the Court followed in its consideration of choice that placed 
the consequence of a choice on the person who chose, irrespective of their 
constrained circumstances.173 The Court also fell into the trap of stereotypical 
reasoning, where only women who are seen as proper victims, are entitled to 
constitutional protection, whilst women, who are seen to be responsible for their own 
vulnerability, are denied this protection.174 Albertyn frames the Court’s restrictive 
approach in terms of current societal discourse, a discourse that society and by 
implication, legal structures, are not ready to accept: 
 
‘Perhaps, together with society as a whole, the Court recognises women as particular 
kinds of victims – of violence, of the burdens of motherhood, of stereotypes of 
capacity and role – but not as agents making ‘uncomfortable’ choices in often 
constrained social and economic circumstances that take them outside of accepted 
understandings of gender roles.’175 
 
The amici curiae briefs did little to affect the reasoning of the Court and it might be 
an indication that amicus briefs are more accepted when they “speak to general 
issues of disadvantage that resonate with the Court”, but where evidence is brought 
outside the “safety zone” of the Court, they are less successful.176 Despite the 
Court’s liberal track record of granting extensive rights to same-sex couples,177 the 
Court has illustrated its own conservative constraints, even in the same-sex cases, 
pertaining to what it believes to be an acceptable relationship - marriage. Albertyn in 
describing the Court’s interpretation of the Volks case states: 
 
‘In Robinson, the Court was concerned about the choice ‘not to marry’ of the claimant 
and (particularly) her partner, while in the sexual orientation cases the Court is 
concerned with overwhelming legal prohibitions on the choice to marry. It grants rights 
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to same-sex couples to eliminate the consequences of the state’s legal prohibition to 
those relationships that are otherwise ‘the same as’ marriage. In both instances, the 
result is a society in which social inclusion is based on sameness, rather than 
difference, and which limits the choice unless exercised within (re)stated boundaries 
of acceptable relationships.’178 
 
Although the judgments in Volks and Jordan could be seen as a step back from the 
Court’s established equality jurisprudence, the strong dissenting opinions indicate 
that the majority’s conservative approach was not shared by all. In both judgments, 
the dissenting opinions recognised feminist method and followed a more substantive 
and contextual approach and in many instances supported the evidence provided by 
the amici curiae.  
Bonthuys points to the fact that the dissents in both Jordan and Volks were 
given by judges who have always been sensitive to a feminist analysis, with the 
majority being socially conservative, and that concurrence is reliant on downplaying 
feminist arguments.179 An amicus’s contribution in focusing on feminist arguments is 
important, as it provides ammunition for feminist judges and sensitises those who 
are not familiar with feminist reasoning. The minority judgments clearly reflected the 
amici’s reasoning and ensured that the precedent set would reflect these arguments, 
placing them in the public domain.  
Feminist method was particularly evident in the Jordan and Volks amici curiae 
briefs. The amici, in focusing on two particularly vulnerable categories of women, 
were able to bring to the Court’s attention, how the substance of law and/or lack of 
legal protection, are used to suppress the perspectives of women. In providing 
detailed and context specific briefs, the amici curiae attempted to indicate to the 
Court how the current constructs of law contributed to women’s vulnerability and how 
change or recognition could address this vulnerability. 
Although the impact and relevance of the contextual evidence provided is very 
much dependant on judicial attitudes, the chosen strategies of the litigating parties 
had a role to play in the decisions reached.180 In Jordan the applicants did not seem 
to have consulted with the various women’s organisations working in the area, which 
led to a misplaced application, with watered down constitutional arguments and no 
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contextual evidence, whilst there was considerable work being done in the area. 
Most of the constitutional arguments and contextual evidence were brought by the 
amici curiae, represented by organisations working in the area, who in lengthy briefs 
attempted to argue the case from the applicant’s viewpoint. This is not the purpose 
of an amicus curiae brief and created unnecessarily bulky briefs which could have 
been more focused and crisp, focusing mostly on the realities of these women and 
how this could influence the law. 
Volks indicated the importance of bringing a case with the “correct” client, that 
is representative of a broad category of women, taking into account that “the relative 
privilege of certain claimants could limit the transformative potential of litigation by 
making it easier for courts to ignore the impact of their judgments on the most 
disadvantaged of women.”181 In hindsight, the WLC in Volks was perhaps too reliant 
on positive established precedent concerning same-sex couples and legislative 
reform in the area and should have considered bringing the discrimination claim both 
on the grounds of marital status and gender.  
  In both Jordan and Volks, the Court employed traditional legal method in its 
reasoning and followed a deferential tone with the legislature seen as the ideal forum 
where these issues should be addressed. In both instances the SALRC was in the 
process of discussing and deliberating the issues.182 The Court was possibly of the 
opinion that, seeing as legislative debate was imminent, that it was probably best to 
let the process run its course, rather than imposing a view or placing unnecessary 
strain on an already complicated process. The Court perhaps believed that its relief 
would not be suitable to issues so intrinsically embedded in social beliefs and that 
the legislature would be better suited to formulate social policy that could have the 
desired impact.  
 However, the Jordan judgment seems to have slowed the legislative process 
removing a sense of urgency and allowing conservative factions to regain 
momentum in order to advocate against the process of decriminalisation.183 There is 
still no final report from the SALRC on decriminalisation and, apparently, as a result 
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of the Jordan judgment, criminal sanctions have been increased.184 There are still 
on-going efforts in getting government to consider decriminalisation and the CGE 
have recently decided to actively engage government to promote legislative reform 
and to sensitise the public to address their conservative attitudes towards sex 
work.185 
Similarly, with domestic partnerships, there has been no law reform despite a 
draft Domestic Partnership Bill published in 2008.186 There is currently no indication 
as to when the Bill will be passed and it seems to have slipped from the 
Parliamentary agenda, despite strong lobbying from the non-governmental sector.187 
A positive decision in Volks, although not solving all the questions regarding legal 
protection for domestic partnerships, would have provided some protection to those 
desperately in need and could have been the incentive for the legislature to 
implement planned legislation. In the meantime, partners in a domestic relationship, 
upon its dissolution, must rely on the ill-suited law of contracts or undue enrichment 
to attempt equitable distribution or simply accept that there is no recourse.188 
Despite the delayed legislative process and restrictive judgments, feminist 
litigators have not given up on litigation as a means to gain some protection for sex 
workers and women in domestic partnerships and are approaching the courts in an 
attempt to soften the harsh exclusionary effects of Jordan and Volks.  
In Kylie v CCMA, a sex worker felt that she was unfairly dismissed and 
approached the courts for redress.189 The Labour Appeal Court found that although it 
could not sanction sex work, the fact that prostitution was illegal did not derogate the 
prostitute’s constitutional rights and in this specific instance her right to fair labour 
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practices.190 The judgment softened the decision of Jordan to an extent and the 
arguments presented would not have been possible without the dicta in Jordan’s 
minority judgment and SWEAT’s arguments that specifically advocated for 
constitutional rights entitlements.  
In relation to domestic partnerships in Ponelat v Schrepfer a woman relied on 
the common law acknowledgement of a universal partnership, to claim a portion of 
her life partner’s estate when their relationship ended.191 In a progressive judgment, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, in establishing whether a universal partnership 
existed, took account of the woman’s contributions (financially and domestically) and 
found that such a partnership indeed existed and that she was entitled to a portion of 
her partner’s estate.  
The Kylie and Ponelat decisions are indicative that litigation is still an option in 
addressing vulnerability. Although it is not the ideal to fight for individual protection, it 
is possible, and positive judgments such as these strengthen and build on the 
arguments brought by the amici curiae in Jordan and Volks, in that courts should 
take account of women’s vulnerability and that legal protection could address this 
vulnerability.    
Although the decisions in Jordan and Volks could be described as regressive, 
they actually provided an opportunity for women’s organisations to confront the Court 
with evidence concerning women’s lived realities, and although those realities were 
not acknowledged by the Court, it created an important platform for these arguments 
to be debated.  Important lessons were also learned regarding strategic co-operation 
and judicial boundaries.192
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1 THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF AMICI CURIAE PARTICIPATION  
 
This study has focused on how women’s organisations and feminist litigators have 
used amicus curiae participation as a means of advancing feminist and gender 
equality goals in law. I explored key gender decisions of the Constitutional Court to 
establish whether the amici curiae that have participated in these matters were able 
to influence the judicial decisions in any way, and if amici curiae participation is a 
viable litigation strategy to communicate a feminist and gendered viewpoint to affect 
the outcome of a case. 
The three feminist methods identified in Chapter 2, namely the “women 
question”, “feminist practical reasoning” and “consciousness-raising” provided a 
starting point in identifying and developing a feminist litigation strategy.1 These 
methods enabled me to establish whether the amici curiae that participated in 
gender equality cases were able to address the gendered impact of law and, through 
their presentation of contextual evidence, ensure that the Court is aware of this 
impact and women’s lived realities.   
Of particular interest was the way in which the amici curiae used the method 
of “feminist practical reasoning”, specifically contextual evidence, to further their 
goals. Through the contextual evidence provided, the amici were able to build and, in 
certain instances, contest established jurisprudence, provide or contest an 
interpretation of a right and suggest a specific remedial option.  
Despite important legal gains and lessons, amici curiae participation and their 
ability to influence the law and judicial process has to be viewed, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, within the constraints of the legal system and its ability to effect change: 
 
‘[t]he law of equality is also the law of inequality. The law marks a liminal point. It 
declares what constitutes unequal treatment as a matter of law. At the same time it 
also states what is not unequal treatment, or put slightly differently, what forms and 
claims of inequality the law will not recognize as presenting real or remediable 
problems of inequality. The law sees only some forms of inequality and not others 
because that is how law is made. First, law is simply imperfect. It cannot prevent all 
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unfair or unjust inequalities even if it wanted to. Second, and most important, law is a 
compromise of contending forces and interests in society that is articulated in terms of 
doctrines and principles. Legal doctrines that enforce ideas of equality enforce the 
nature of that compromise and restate it in principled terms. Thus, what law enforces 
is not equality, but equality in the eyes of the law. Law does not stand outside the 
forms of social hierarchy and social stratification that exists in any society. To some 
extent, law also supports them and legitimates them. That does not mean that law 
cannot do enormous good in reforming discredited social practices. The point, rather 
is that even (and especially) when law participates in social change, law is complicit in 
the new forms of social stratification that replace older, discredited forms. As law 
recognizes and outlaws some forms of inequality, it fails to recognize or legitimize 
others.’2  
 
To me, the purpose of amici curiae participation, as part of a feminist litigation 
strategy, is the importance of challenging the law irrespective of whether the 
subsequent decision reflects the amici’s arguments or not. The importance of 
litigating from a feminist viewpoint is described as follows: 
 
‘If the feminist project is seen not only as the immediate dismantling of sexist social 
structures but also as raising gender issues, gradually influencing legal and popular 
discourses about gender, and mobilizing women to claim their constitutional rights, 
then success should be measured otherwise than by a count of cases won and lost.’3 
 
Amici curiae participation is but one litigation strategy that is located within the bigger 
picture of feminist litigation and activism, but it should be acknowledged as one of 
the potential tools to expose and argue for the legal redress of women’s 
subordination.4 The evidence seems to suggest that the amici curiae that 
participated in the Constitutional Court were able to harness the “rule shifting” 
capacity of law in influencing legal decisions that  created new rights and remedies 
for victims; altered the conduct of government; expressed new moral ideals and 
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standards and affected cultural attitudes and patterns.5 Although it is difficult to 
assess the “culture shifting” capacity of law,6 in harnessing the law’s “rule shifting” 
capacity, feminists have been able to influence the law to reflect women’s lived 
realities and voice. In many instances, this has, made a significant difference to 
women’s lives, for example, the Bhe case enabled women married in terms of 
customary law to inherit intestate.7 The discussion below draws together the purpose 
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2 AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
DECISIONS 
 
In chapter two I established the overall purpose, direct and indirect impact of amicus 
curiae participation. In accordance with this framework, I will reflect on the purpose 
and impact of the amici curiae that participated in the Constitutional Court’s gender 
matters. The findings will also be tabled in accordance with this structure at the end 
of this chapter (see annexure B). 
 
2.1 Violence Against Women, Women’s Voice and the Efficacy of the Criminal 
Justice System 
When an analysis of violence against women is undertaken, it should rest within a 
broader feminist analysis that examines the societal norms, values and institutions 
that perpetuate violent behaviour towards women.8 Although this study did not focus 
on locating violence against women within this broader theoretical framework, it has 
attempted to illustrate that litigation could be key in challenging patriarchal 
constructs, specifically with the use of amicus curiae briefs. 
 Although law and the criminal justice system uphold masculinist 
interpretations of justice, women and organisations working in this area, have 
engaged the system to place the real life experiences of South African women 
before the courts in order to expose the system’s inherent discriminatory nature, its 
structural inadequacies and limited scope and application.9 The importance of 
engaging law in an attempt to address gender inequalities pertaining to violence has 
been described as: 
 
‘Engaging in law reform, and in that process, making statements about the reality of 
women’s lives and their engagement with the law, gives conversations about the law 
some depth. It creates oppositional positions and even raises ambiguities about the 
law, which is more than non-engagement with the law and legal systems would do. The 
feminist project on the law is deeply challenging and imperfect, but the fact that 
women are negotiating a system – one that was historically exclusionary and 
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systematically discriminating – can be considered an essential tread in our efforts to 
address sexual violence and the attainment of equality more generally.’10 
 
The four case studies focused on defending protective legislative gains; developing 
the common law to entrench the State’s liability for protecting women against 
violence; extending the definition of rape and an attempt to balance the constitutional 
rights of complainants of sexual offences against the fair trial rights of accused 
persons.11 The amici curiae that participated had a common strategy of focusing the 
court’s attention on the gendered nature of violence and the need to take this into 
account when adjudicating these matters. It is necessary to reflect whether these 
briefs established a common strategy; whether they were able to better represent the 
complexities of women’s lives; whether they had impacted on the specific decision 
and if there was any indirect effects. 
 The Baloyi case defended the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993, 
which provided for the immediate arrest of a person that breached the terms of a 
protection order. The amici curiae briefs by the Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE) and Minister of Justice interpreted the legislation and briefly referred to the 
need for special measures to protect women against violence. The briefs can be 
criticised for not providing sufficient contextual evidence in establishing the gendered 
nature of violence. This could be as a result of inexperience as it was one of the 
early amici briefs before the Constitutional Court. The interpretive nature of the briefs 
could also have been strategic, as the briefs were aimed at protecting progressive 
legislation and a narrow interpretive stance could have been perceived to be the best 
strategy to ensure a positive result. The Court took account of the amici’s arguments 
and expanded on them considerably to establish positive precedent concerning the 
gendered nature of violence against women and contributed to an understanding of 
domestic violence in its broader social context. 
The amicus curiae brief in Carmichele focused on developing a principle in 
the law of delict confirming the State’s responsibility to protect women against 
violence. The Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) focused on supplementing 
                                               
10 Ibid 20. 
11 S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) (hereinafter Baloyi); Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (hereinafter Carmichele); Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (hereinafter Masiya) and S v Zuma 2006 (2) 




Carmichele’s arguments to bring contextual evidence concerning gender-based 
violence. Although women’s rights arguments were not the focal point of the Court’s 
judgment, it did refer to the amicus’s arguments and confirmed the importance of 
protecting women against violence. CALS’s participation provided an important 
platform to emphasise the need for gendered arguments to be taken into account 
when developing the common law.   
As with Baloyi, the importance of the amicus curiae participation in 
Carmichele lies in the positive precedent it set for courts to respond to the 
experiences of women in similar matters. The importance of “follow-up” amici curiae 
participation was also illustrated in the decisions that followed Carmichele. 
Subsequent decisions, that dealt with the State’s delictual liability in protecting 
women from violence, show that amici curiae participation is crucial in alerting courts 
to established positive precedent and in ensuring that it is followed and 
strengthened. The subsequent High Court and SCA decisions in Carmichele was 
disappointing, as they lacked the gendered arguments present in the Constitutional 
Court judgment and indicated how important amici curiae participation could be in 
framing a case from a gendered viewpoint.  
The Masiya case concerned the development of the definition of rape to 
include anal penetration. CALS and the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre 
(TLAC) entered as amici curiae to voice their dissatisfaction with the lengthy law 
reform process and to develop the definition trough litigation in order to provide 
extended protection to victims of sexual violence. The amici curiae stressed the 
gendered nature of the definition and the need to understand rape as a violent act to 
exert power. Although the Court took account of the amici’s arguments, the brief was 
misconstrued and the arguments used to justify a more restrictive finding. The 
judgment was disappointing but Masiya provided women’s organisations with an 
opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the legislative process and forced the 
Minister to account to the Court about what the status of the Sexual Offences Bill 
was.  
The amicus curiae participation in Zuma was important in establishing the role 
of amicus curiae participation in criminal trials. The case was indicative that caution 
should be exercised in criminal trials not to draft a brief that is too closely related to a 
specific party, but that the brief should be impartial and its only purpose should be to 
assist the court in adjudicating the matter. The Zuma case also pointed to the 
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inherent risks of getting involved in a high profile matter and the possibility of the 
media misconstruing the intentions of organisations in an attempt to polarise issues 
for public consumption.12   
From the case analysis, it is clear that women and organisations have used 
the court system to challenge the social and legal understanding of women’s 
experience with violence, in an attempt to ensure that these experiences are 
embodied within the law and criminal justice system.13 The above organisations, in 
support of women complainants, have intervened as amici curiae to place specific 
information pertaining to the gendered nature of violent crime before the Court and 
were able to focus on the relevant women and their experiences. For the 
organisations involved, this understanding and experience is key to affording the 
necessary protection and in contributing to an understanding of the social and 
masculine constructs that fuel violent behaviour towards women. 
Activists have acknowledged the contradictory nature of their engagement 
with law as the criminal justice system is seen as a site of oppression as well as a 
site “for protection, liberation and justice.”14 This contestation has been accepted and 
the focus has been using the court and amici curiae’s participation as a “site of 
resistance and struggle in shaping and re-defining women’s gendered experiences 
and the right to be free from violence.”15 To this extent, amicus curiae participation in 
violence matters has definitely had an influence on the extention of protection to 
women, on setting positive precedent for future development and creating a platform 
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2.2 Women as Part of Cultural Communities: Gender versus Culture 
With the Constitution recognising customary law, debates arose as to the application 
of the equality principle within custom, as many practices were seen as 
discriminatory.16 Litigation played an important role in addressing this potential 
conflict and gave rise to its own complexities, since the official and codified sources 
of customary law were not representative of actual practice. The aims of women and 
activists were “to contest and re-define cultural norms and practices, and in the 
process, to redress the gendered balance of power represented by the present 
system of customary law.”17 But, there were diverging views in how this was to be 
achieved. Some advocated for a rights-based approach, with the rights of equality 
and dignity being central in challenging discriminatory practices, whilst others argued 
that actual living custom had to be established and applied, and if necessary 
developed, to bring in line with constitutional norms of equality.  
The Bhe case questioned the application of the rule of male primogeniture in 
the context of customary law of succession and presented an ideal opportunity to 
dissect the relationship between culture and equality.18 The Women’s Legal Centre 
(WLC), representing Bhe and as applicant, followed a rights-based approach and 
from the outset had a specific strategy to provide the Court with the relevant 
gendered arguments based on the right to equality. The CGE, as amicus curiae, 
supported a custom-based approach and argued that the rule of male primogeniture 
had to be developed on a case-by-case basis, if necessary, in terms of the specific 
custom. They also focused on a particularly vulnerable group, women in polygynous 
marriages, and the negative effect that a civil remedy in terms of the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987 would have on these marriages. The Court supported the 
rights-based approach of the WLC, although it also acknowledged the importance of 
taking account of living customary law, but it was furthermore concerned with how 
living custom was to be proved. The minority judgment adopted and supported the 
arguments of the CGE.  
The Shilubana judgment questioned whether a community could develop its 
customs and traditions to bring them in line with the Constitution, in allowing a 
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woman to become chief of a community.19 In Shilubana, the CGE, in contradiction 
with its strategy in Bhe, focused on the fact that the practice discriminated in terms of 
the Constitution. The National Movement of Rural Women (NMRW), on the other 
hand, supported the application of living customary law which has already allowed 
for women chieftainship. It did not see a need to develop the custom as the lived 
custom was already constitutionally compliant. In its decision, the Court made 
numerous references to the amici’s arguments, especially the arguments of the 
NMRW, and found, as argued by Shilubana, that the particular custom had 
developed, thereby confirming her appointment as chief.  
The Gumede case concerned the constitutional validity of certain provisions of 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA).20 The WLC, as 
amicus curiae, wanted to focus the Court’s attention on the vulnerability of the 
specific group of women to whom the RCMA applied and on the fact that the 
application of the Act was discriminatory. It focused on a particular vulnerable group, 
women in polygynous marriages, and advocated for a remedy that would extend 
protection to women in these marriages. The strategy employed was both context 
specific and rights-based. The WLC’s contextual evidence led to an awareness of 
the vulnerability of these women, but the Court rejected its arguments in relation to 
the proposed remedy and focus on women in polygynous unions. Gumede is a good 
example of the Court not paying much attention to an amicus curiae brief or 
regarding it as unnecessary in light of its own positive precedent (established in Bhe 
and Shilubana), and of a case which has an equitable outcome but not necessary 
the equitable outcome advocated for by the amicus curiae.  
The MM v MN judgment shows the Court’s clear support for the custom-
based approach and was a victory for those supporting it.21 MM v MN dealt with the 
question whether consent was a requirement for a second or subsequent customary 
marriage. The WLC, as amicus curiae, focused on establishing equality between the 
different wives, having regard for their lived realities and vulnerability as a group. It 
followed a rights-based approach, and was concerned with the contractual 
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20 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC) (hereinafter Gumede). 




requirements of consent. The CGE and NMRW, as amici curiae, focused on the 
specific custom and whether, in terms of Xitsonga culture, consent was required.  
In calling for further evidence pertaining to Xitsonga custom, the Court clearly 
indicated its support for a custom-based approach. In reviewing the additional 
evidence, most of which was submitted by the CGE and NMRW, it found that 
Xitsonga custom prescribed consent but that the custom should be developed in light 
of the principles of equality and dignity, referring to the necessity of equality between 
husband and wife. It found that consent of the first wife is an express requirement of 
Xitsonga custom for the conclusion of a subsequent customary marriage. The case 
confirmed the importance and role of amici in providing evidence as proof of the 
content of customary law. 
What is noteworthy of the amici participating in the abovementioned matters, 
especially by those who support a custom-based approach, is the way in which they 
reflect an anti-essentialist approach to law. They have attempted to indicate that as 
women are subject to customary law, their experiences are unique and different from 
women not subject to its practice and that the Court has to take account of these 
differences and their specific experience. The different strategies employed by the 
amici curiae are also indicative of the existence of different feminist strategies in 
litigating, and despite distinctive legal outcomes, both have the communal goal of 
attaining equality for women.  
The amici curiae participation in customary matters has enabled a multiplicity 
of voices, specifically female voices, in establishing the role of customary law within 
a constitutional framework.22 For future matters, and building on the custom-based 
approach that is clearly supported by the Court, amici curiae have a definite role to 
play in placing evidence of lived custom before the Court, ensuring the development 







                                               
22 Catherine Albertyn ‘‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’? Gender equality and cultural diversity 
in South Africa (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165 at 206. 
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2.3 Women’s Vulnerability, Choice and the Constitutional Court 
Prostitution and co-habitation are two areas of women’s vulnerability that I felt 
needed specific mention, as there was considerable work done by organisations in 
these areas to address this vulnerability. When the cases of Jordan and Volks came 
before the Constitutional Court, organisations were well placed to participate as 
amici curiae in order to place the relevant contextual evidence before the Court.23 In 
both instances, the Constitutional Court refused to extend protection and employed a 
formalist, a-contextual method of reasoning, deferring to Parliament to grant 
protection. The amici’s participation was dissected to determine why such 
conservative decisions were given in light of detailed and sophisticated amici curiae 
briefs. 
The amici curiae participation by the Sex Workers Education and Advocacy 
Taskforce (SWEAT),24 and the CGE in Jordan was reactionary, as they were not 
actively looking for a case and were not expecting to litigate on decriminalisation 
while engaged in lobbying government to promulgate legislation. Considering the 
factual scenario and applicant’s simplistic brief, SWEAT and the CGE felt obliged to 
participate as amici curiae to represent the voices of all sex workers and to place the 
relevant contextual evidence and rights-based arguments before the Court, which 
were clearly lacking in the applicant’s brief. The CGE focused on equality arguments 
whilst SWEAT focused on sex workers’ specific rights entitlements.  
When reading the judgment it becomes clear that the Court struggled to reach 
consensus. The equality arguments brought by the CGE played an important role in 
attempts to reach consensus and it could be deduced that the minority judgment first 
enjoyed majority support, but that this depended on the acceptance of the equality 
arguments. The Court’s rejection of the SWEAT arguments was disappointing and 
indicative of the Court’s own social boundaries and liberal views, especially 
regarding choice. Through the SWEAT brief, the amici curiae learned that there are 
certain boundaries which the Court will not cross, despite clear arguments and 
relevant contextual evidence being available. 
                                               
23 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) (hereinafter Jordan); Volks NO v Robinson and 
Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) (hereinafter Volks). 
24 The SWEAT brief was a collaborative brief between SWEAT, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 




Unlike Jordan, women’s groups were actively looking for a case to litigate to extend 
legal protection to women involved in domestic partnerships. The WLC identified a 
suitable case, but the factual scenario was not ideal, as the applicant was relatively 
privileged. This prompted CALS to enter as amicus curiae to present the situation of 
poor women who find themselves in these relationships. Through a research report, 
CALS wanted to provide the Court with the relevant contextual evidence pertaining 
to the changing notion of family in South Africa; gender inequality and its relationship 
to the family; the patterns of cohabitation in South Africa and the features of a 
cohabitative relationship which points to it being a permanent life partnership.  
The majority judgment rejected the evidence contained in the report, as it was 
not incontrovertible or uncontroversial, as required by the relevant rules of the 
Court.25 Both the minority judgments extensively relied on CALS’s evidence with 
Sachs J’s judgment specifically reflecting this. Jordan and Volks are indicative of the 
limits of law in effecting change. Although these judgments could be seen as a step 
back from the Court’s established equality jurisprudence, the strong minority 
judgments indicate that the majority’s conservative approach was not shared by all.  
As stated in the introduction, this study was interested in questions of law and 
social change with a particular focus on how litigation could strategically be used to 
influence the law to benefit women. Through an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s 
key gender jurisprudence, I have questioned whether amicus curiae participation, as 
part of feminist litigation strategy, has contributed to changing the law to benefit 
women. 
As discussed, I have employed an analytical framework to determine the 
direct/indirect impact that amicus curiae participation had on certain judicial 
decisions and to determine, as a result, if the amici were able to represent women’s 
lives to secure legal protection. 
 Several of the cases had a direct impact on women’s lives as a result of 
arguments and contextual evidence brought by the amici curiae. The cases of 
Carmichele, Bhe, Shilubane, Gumede and MM v MN mentioned, secured and 
extended rights protection to women and set important positive precedent. These 
cases demonstrate the importance of employing feminist method as strategy to 
secure and initiate change through legal action. 
                                               
25 See Rule 31 of the Constitutional Court, chapter 2 note 100 above. 
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The decisions, where the Court ignored or rejected the amici curiae arguments, are 
those judgments in which the indirect impact has been the greatest. This confirms 
the sentiments of legal mobilisation scholars that litigation forms part of a wider 
struggle for change and that judicial outcome does not determine the success of 
achieving change through legal action.26 The Masiya case is an example, that 
despite a restrictive judgment, the amici was able to focus attention on the 
implementation of an important piece of legislation.27 The Jordan and Volks 
judgments are other examples that, despite restrictive judgments, the amici’s 
arguments were able to elicit debate within the Court and contributed to an 
understanding of the limits of law in initiating change. 
Overall, the case analysis confirmed the importance of the feminist project in 
law in engaging and harnessing the law’s “rule shifting” capacity which has the 



















                                               
26 Michael W. McCann ‘Reform litigation on trial’ (1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry 715. 




3 RECURRENT THEMES 
 
The discussion that follows, focuses on certain key themes that have been identified 
throughout the different case and amici curiae analyses that warrant specific 
mention: 
 
3.1 The Importance of Minority Judgments 
What has become evident from the case analyses is the extent to which 
minority/dissenting judgments refer to and implement the arguments presented by 
the amici curiae. Although the ultimate goal of amicus curiae participation is to 
influence the majority judgment of a particular court, the possible influence on a 
minority judgment is not without benefits.28 A minority judgment might not set 
precedent, but it highlights the weaknesses of the majority; offers possible avenues 
for future litigation; suggests an alternative interpretation of the majority judgment 
and most importantly, increases the likelihood that a majority judgment would be 
overturned in future.29  
 Collins describes minority judgments as “democratic conversations” where a 
judge engages in a form of “institutional disobedience” by not agreeing with the 
majority.30 Therefore, a judge is able to point out flaws in the majority’s reasoning, 
whilst presenting his/her own interpretation of the correct application of legal 
principles.31 Amici curiae participation assists in this democratic conversation, as the 
information and evidence provided by them, creates a framework for minority 
opinions to develop, which promotes democratic dialogue, specifically indicating to 
the public that the majority’s decision is not supported by all.32 The importance of 
stimulating public debate, coupled with political commitment could see a majority 
judgment overturned in future. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, even if a 
dissent does not become law, its contribution in stimulating judicial and public debate 
                                               
28 L’Heureux-Dube ‘The dissenting opinion: Voice of the future?’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
495; Paul M. Collins Jr ‘Amici curiae and dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2008) 5 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 143 at 145; Claire Ruth Bader Ginsburg ‘The role of dissenting opinions’ 
(2010) 95 Minnesota Law Review 1. 
29 Collins ‘Amici curiae and dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court’ op cit note 28 at 145; also Randall 
T. Shepard ‘Perspectives: Notable dissents in state constitutional cases’ (2005) 68 Albany Law 
Review 337 at 342. 
30 Paul M. Collins Jr Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest groups and judicial decision making 
(Oxford University Press 2008) 144-146. 
31 Ibid 144. 
32 Ibid 146. 
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is invaluable. This confirms the importance of considering the indirect impact that a 
finding might have when devising litigation strategy.33 
Cases without amici curiae participation are usually narrowly defined and the 
justices only consider the issues raised by the litigants, whilst amici curiae 
participation and the evidence they bring, broadens the issues, providing a possible 
different interpretation as to the application of the law.34 Although amici curiae 
participation is not the only reason why judges write minority/dissenting opinions, it 
can play a very significant role in the decision to dissent.35 
The Masiya, Bhe, Volks and Jordan cases all have strong minority judgments 
in which the amici curiae arguments are engaged in and reflected on. The minority 
judgments in Volks and Jordan should be noted as the majority judgments could be 
classified as the most restrictive and conservative pertaining to women’s equality 
and the degree of debate that was elicited and evident in the minority judgments 
indicate that the conservative views of the majority was not shared by all.36  
Subsequent decisions, such as Kylie,37 indicate that minority judgments, and 
particularly the amici’s arguments within these judgments could influence later 
decisions. Amici curiae participation therefore plays a substantial role in court 
decisions, even if its arguments are only reflected in a minority decision. The 
importance of minority judgments and the amici curiae’s contribution in shaping 
these, should not be underestimated, as it could play an important part in shaping 
subsequent jurisprudence, and places arguments and ideas in the public realm that 






                                               
33 Henk Botha ‘Judicial dissent and democratic deliberation’ (2000) 15 SAPL 321 at 328; Pius Langa 
‘The fifth Bram Fischer memorial lecture. The emperor’s new clothes: Bram Fischer and the need for 
dissent’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 364 at 370. 
34 Collins ‘Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest groups and judicial decision-making’ op cit note 30 
at 150.  
35 Ibid 164. 
36 Bonthuys op cit note 3 at 35.  
37 Kylie v CCMA and Others 2012 (4) SA 383 (LAC) (hereinafter Kylie), see the discussion of the case 
in chapter 5. 
38 Robert G. Flanders Jr .‘The utility of separate judicial opinions in appellate courts of last resort: Why 
dissents are valuable’ (1999) 4 Roger Williams University Law Review 401. 
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3.2  Democracy, Voice and Amicus Curiae Participation 
The importance of judicial decision-making within a democratic and transformative 
context has been described as follows: 
 
‘Judges are required to subject public and private power to the demand for dialogic 
justification; to participate in a transformative debate about the relationship between 
the individual and collective. It is their duty to resist normative closure, to renounce 
attempts to make the current boundary between the collective and the individual 
appear natural and necessary; to challenge the assumption that ‘the people’ have a 
fixed identity, or that a broad social consensus is ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. 
It is their responsibility to facilitate democratic deliberation; to promote respect for the 
‘marginalised other’; to allow a multiplicity of voices to be heard. As participants in a 
culture of justification, judges are required to take responsibility for their own actions, 
to spell out the moral and political values upon which their decisions rest.’39 
 
Amicus curiae participation assists in this process as it provides the opportunity for 
persons that might be affected by a judgment to participate and so adds legitimacy to 
the judicial process and reassures the public of the courts receptiveness to the norm 
of democratic inclusion.40 However, amicus curiae participation does much more in 
terms of the democratic process, as it provides real democratic benefits to vulnerable 
groups.41  
In this sense, amicus curiae participation provides an important channel of 
communication with the judiciary, as an amicus is in the position to represent a 
vulnerable group’s interests, allowing for a multiplicity of voices to be heard.42 
Amicus curiae participation fulfils an expressive function that can be equated to the 
feminist method of “consciousness-raising” because it provides a public platform for 
women’s voices to be heard that strengthens the participatory nature of 
democracy.43 Amicus curiae participation is also an important method through which 
                                               
39 Botha op cit note 33 at 322. 
40 Omari Scott Simmons ‘Picking friends from the crowd: Amicus participation as political symbolism’ 
(2009) 42 Connecticut Law Review 187 at 198. 
41 Ibid 199. 
42 Id. 
43 See feminist method as discussed in chapter 2 above; Bartlett op cit note 1; Ruben J. Garcia ‘A 
democratic theory of amicus advocacy’ (2008) 35 Florida State University Law Review 315. 
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social movements and organisations can access the public domain to get their goals 
and messages across.44 
The amici curiae that participated in the customary matters, played an 
especially important role, considering South Africa’s history and the need for claims 
of culture, gender and diversity to be understood in the right context.45 Although all 
the amici curiae that participated allowed for the voices of women to be heard, the 
amici curiae that participated in the customary law matters warrant specific mention, 
as they were able to represent the voices of a specific vulnerable and marginalised 
group and made sure that these women’s voices were heard before the Court and 
that strengthened South Africa’s commitment to democratic participation. Ultimately, 
amici curiae participation fosters democratic ideals by allowing interest groups the 
option of influencing the way in which legal decisions are made, by representing the 
voices of those not before court.46 
 
3.3 Broad Categories of Amicus Curiae Participation 
Amicus curiae participation has enabled us to litigate from a feminist and gendered 
viewpoint. This has allowed us to bring contextual evidence to the Court through 
which current constructs of the law was challenged.47  
Within the strategy employed by the participating amici curiae I have identified 
certain broad categories within which the amici operated in claiming rights and 
advancing gender equality for women within the court system. These categories 
illustrate the broad consequences of amici curiae participation and speak to the “rule 
shifting” capacity that is harnessed by amicus curiae particpation in influencing legal 
decisions; in creating new rights and remedies for victims; in altering the conduct of 
government and in expressing new moral ideals and standards.48 
These categories include: setting new standards of inclusion in developing the 
common law through a representation of women’s voice; extending rights protection 
and advocating for specific remedial gains; defending existing rights protection and 
                                               
44 Garcia op cit note 43 at 318. 
45 Catherine Albertyn ‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’ op cit note 22 at 196. 
46 Garcia op cit note 43. 
47 Catherine Albertyn ‘Law, gender and inequality in South Africa’ (2011) 39 Oxford Development 
Studies 139 at 143. 
48 Stoddard op cit note 5 at 980. 
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interpreting existing rights. For ease of reference the categories are tabled in relation 
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It is within each of these categories that the amici curiae were able to represent the 
complexity of women’s lives to the Court. This framework, coupled with the 
discussion in section 2 above, assists in understanding the purpose and aims of 
amici curiae intervention and highlights the importance of employing a feminist 









3.4 The Importance of Drafting a Proper Amicus Curiae Brief  
When drafting an amicus curiae brief, one has to ensure that it complies with its 
intended and traditional purpose. One of the main concerns relating to these briefs, 
is that they would be a mere duplication of the parties’ arguments, not bringing 
anything new to a court except focusing possible attention on the organisation and 
its politics.49 According to Sungaila, amici curiae should be particularly weary of so 
called “me too” briefs and should focus on the “three C’s” namely communication, 
cooperation and coordination when filing these briefs.50 When contemplating 
participation as amicus curiae, it is important to keep in mind that no undue prejudice 
should be suffered by the original parties to the litigation, and the amicus curiae 
should ask itself whether its arguments would be of assistance to the court.51  
Balancing the actual parties’ needs versus the amici’s and ensuring its 
distinctiveness, is key in bringing a successful amicus curiae brief to a court. It is 
important for the amicus curiae not to usurp the role of one of the parties, as it 
should assist the court in the interpretation of the relevant arguments. The SWEAT 
brief in Jordan might be indicative of a brief that was perceived by the Court to usurp 
the role of the applicant because it introduced intricate rights arguments not argued 
by the parties.  
When drafting an amicus curiae brief the unique dynamics of the court and 
individual judges should be considered. It is important to identify judges that might be 
able to steer the court in a specific direction and attempt, when formulating 
arguments, to catch their attention; to anticipate and to respond to their concerns, 
and to advocate arguments that would attract their votes.52 This is of particular 
relevance in ensuring that although an argument might not enjoy majority support, it 
might be expanded on in a minority finding, ensuring that the amicus curiae’s 
arguments form part of the judgment.  
 It is interesting to note that where the CGE’s briefs relied on a “straight 
forward” equality analysis, it was accepted by the Court (such as in Baloyi and 
Jordan). This could be indicative of the Court’s and specific judges’ reluctance to 
                                               
49 Mary-Christine Sungaila ‘Effective amicus practice before the United States Supreme Court: A case 
study’ (1999) 8 Review of Law and Women’s Studies 187 at 189. 
50 Id. 
51 John Koch ‘Making room: New directions in third party interventions’ (1990) 48 University of 




embrace feminist reasoning, as they might have perceived the arguments of the 
CGE to be more traditional and neutral. Sheehy states: 
 
‘If feminist arguments are successful in that they invoke a judicial response or, indeed, 
win the case, these arguments are often understood in their simplest or most 
conservative forms. The more radical feminist arguments are unfamiliar, not within the 
traditional legal paradigm and profoundly disruptive of established hierarchies.’53 
 
This again highlights the importance of the feminist project in law and the pursuance 
of feminist litigation strategy to confront conservative and formalist judicial reasoning. 
Even if feminist arguments catch the attention of only one or two judges, it could lead 
to a minority judgment that serves as an entry point “into judicial conversations of 
more radical discourses and concepts, which may eventually become more widely 
accepted”.54 
Despite the Court’s acceptance of a neutral and basic analysis, in some 
instances it should not be seen as creating a precedent for amici curiae briefs to be 
drafted in general and neutral terms. This would counter the feminist project in law 
and the purpose of amici curiae participation is to ensure that it serves as entry point 
for feminist discourses and concepts to be heard, which might become more widely 












                                               
53 Elizabeth A. Sheehy ‘Feminist argumentation before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v 
Seaboyer; R. v Gayme: The sound of one hand clapping’ (1991) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 
450 at 462. 
54 Bonthuys op cit note 3 at 32. 
55 Bonthuys op cit note 3. 
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4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The research undertaken in this thesis focused on the purpose and impact of amicus 
curiae participation in advancing gender equality through law. The study has been 
limited to certain key Constitutional Court decisions and an analysis of the relevant 
amicus curiae participation within each of these decisions.  
The finding has been that the amicus curiae briefs were able to promote 
equality and feminist viewpoints through the arguments and information they 
provided and, although a judgment might not have reflected the specific arguments 
advanced by the amici curiae, it is clear that its indirect impact is of equal 
importance.  
This study did not focus much on the indirect impact of amicus curiae 
participation. Future research could focus on this impact and how amici participation 
was able to politically mobilise an issue and how publicity has been used to influence 
public opinion in an organisations favour. Further research could also focus on 
specific feminist theory and how this theory has been and could be applied as 
feminist litigation strategy to better women’s lives.  
Research pertaining to amicus curiae participation in South African courts, 
has been scant and it is important to pursue research in the area to ensure that the 

















ANNEXURE A: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is based on a qualitative analysis of relevant literature, legislation and 
court decisions pertaining to the objectives of the study.  
As stated in Chapter 1, the main body of the thesis is dedicated to a case-
based analysis of the Constitutional Court’s core gender jurisprudence and the amici 
curiae that have participated in these matters. The case discussions are divided into 
three categories namely violence against women, women as part of cultural 
communities and specific areas of vulnerability including prostitution and domestic 
partnerships (between heterosexual couples). The purpose of this analysis is to 
establish whether the amici curiae that have participated in these matters were able 
to influence the judicial decisions reached in any way and how the amici used this 
litigation strategy to bring a feminist and gendered viewpoint across. 
The usual method in analysing case law is based on the court decision itself. 
However, I followed a different approach focusing on the litigating party and amici 
curiae’s submissions. This called for an extensive analysis of court pleadings and 
documents to gain insight into the context in which a decision was given. The 
structure of the case analysis focuses on the contextual and factual background of 
the case, followed by an analysis of the submissions of each of the relevant parties 
and participating amici curiae. The actual court decision is then analysed in relation 
to the participating amici curiae’s arguments, discussing the purpose and impact of 
the amici curiae participation. In order to understand how the judgments were 
received and interpreted, academic responses and discussions were studied. 
To further understand the purpose of the relevant amici curiae participations, 
interviews were undertaken with individuals representing organisations that 
participated as amicus curiae and in some instances the legal counsel that 
represented them. The interviews were informal, with no set structure, and sought to 
establish why organisations decided to enter as amici curiae and to gain insight into 
the specific strategy they employed to reach their set objectives. The importance and 
value of the interviews should be viewed against the background that they enabled 
me to gain a general background to the relevant participations and assisted me in 
understanding the contextual background to the participations. However, they 
generally lacked specific content, as most of the cases were decided some time ago 
leading to deductions having to be made in relation to specific strategy. Another 
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impediment was the inability to interview all relevant individuals as a result of time 
and professional constraints. Ethical considerations pertaining to the interviews were 




































Purpose and impact of amici curiae participation in gender equality cases. 
 
PURPOSE DIRECT IMPACT INDIRECT IMPACT 
Baloyi. 
CGE & Minister of Justice as 
amici curiae 
  
• Specific legislative 
interpretation  
• Reference to academic 
opinion and obligations 
in terms of the 
Convention on the 








• CGE’s arguments 
reflected in judgment 
concerning the possible 
interpretations of sec 
3(5) of the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act; the 
social context of 
domestic violence and 
South Africa’s 
obligations in terms of 
CEDAW. 
• Positive precedent set. 
Court considered and 
utilised the amici curiae 
briefs expanding on 
them and specifically 
acknowledging the 
gendered nature of 
domestic violence. 
• Minister’s participation 







CALS as amicus curiae 
  
• Contextual information 
pertaining to women’s 
vulnerability and the link 
between gender-based 
violence and gender 
inequality. 
• Interpretation of an 
established delictual 
• Judgment specifically 
referred to the 
arguments presented 
by the amicus curiae. 
• Positive precedent set 
concerning the 
acknowledgement that 
the State has a duty to 
• The amicus curiae 
participation in 
Carmichele paved the 




liability for the State and 
                                               




whether there was a 
constitutional obligation 
on the State to prevent 
the violation of certain 
constitutional rights. 
protect women against 
violent crime.  
specifically the police 
when they fail to protect 
women from violence. 
• Stressed the 
importance and need of 
“follow-up” amici curiae 





CALS & TLAC as amici curiae 
  
• Evidence pertaining to 
the historical 
development of the 
common law rape 
definition. 
• Evidence pertaining to 
examining rape, 
focusing on gender 
roles and reinforcement 
of power relations. 
• Provided a comparative 
perspective. 
• What could be 
described as a distorted 
amici curia brief. The 
Court relied on the 
general and 
introductory arguments 
of the amici curiae, but 
rejected or simply 
ignored the arguments 
where they tried to 
provide the Court with 
actual content and 
context reverting in 
those instances to 
Masiya’s arguments. 
• Platform to express its 
dissatisfaction with the 
legislative reform 
process. Engaging with 
the Minister in a public 
forum. 
Zuma 
CALS & TLAC as prospective 
amici curiae 
  
• Expert evidence 
pertaining to victim’s 
response to trauma 
specifically in relation to 
the complainants past, 
sexual abuse and 
previous alleged rape 
allegations. 
• Amici curiae 
participation refused. 
• Resentment towards 
amici curiae reflected in 
final judgment. 
• Important lessons 
learned pertaining to 
amicus curiae 
participation in criminal 
trials and the way briefs 
should be constructed 
for future participation. 









CGE as amicus curiae 
  
• Contextual evidence 
pertaining to the 
distinction between 
official and living 
customary law and the 
importance of focusing 
on living customary law. 
• Contextual evidence as 
to what living customary 
law prescribes in the 
specific situation. 
• Suggested 
interpretation of how 
living customary law 
should be applied and 
suggested remedy that 
would best support 
such an interpretation. 
• Focus on particular 
vulnerable group: 
women in polygynous 
unions. 
• Court stressed the 
importance of taking 
account of living 
customary law although 
it acknowledges the 
difficulty in establishing 
such custom. 
• Remedy specifically 
catered for women in 
polygynous unions. 
 




within a customary law 
framework. 
• Diverging strategies 
emerging between 
women’s groups: rights-
based v customs based 
approach. 
• Minority judgment 
specifically 
implemented the 
arguments of the 
amicus curiae. 
• Focus on living 
customary law provided 
a framework for 
discussion on how 
evidence of living 
custom should be 
placed before a court.  
Shilubana 
CGE, NMRW and 
CONTRALESA  as amici 
curiae 
  
• Stressed the 
importance of accepting 
the nature of customary 
law as living. 
• Focus on the 
• Extensive referencing 
indicating that the 
amici’s arguments had 
a substantial influence 
on the Court’s 
• Clear trend established 
between litigating 
factions supporting a 
rights-based or custom-
based approach. 
                                               
57 See for example the newspaper article by Mathatha Tsedu negatively reflecting on the amici 
participation interpreting it as a publicity stunt by the organisations, Rapport Newspaper, 2 April 2006. 
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• Clear support for the 
NMRW’s arguments 
thus supporting a more 
custom-based 
approach. 
• The CGE indicating 
flexibility in its litigation 
strategy in supporting a 
rights-based approach 
as opposed to Bhe 




WLC as amicus curiae 
  
• Specific contextual 
evidence pertaining to 
the vulnerability and 
marginalization of the 
grouping of women. 
• Reference to relevant 
international and 
regional instruments. 
• Suggested remedy 
pertaining to women in 
polygynous marriages.  
• Referred to the 
arguments presented 
by the amicus curiae 
rejecting the suggested 
remedy. 
 
• Lesson learned that 
courts do not always 
pay attention to amicus 
arguments and that 
despite a rejection an 
equitable outcome is 
still possible.  
MM v MN 
WLC, CGE and NMRW as 
amici curiae 
  
• The WLC explored the 
requirement of consent. 
• The CGE and NMRW 




affidavits in support 
thereof. 
• The Court adopted the 
CGE & NMRW’s 
approach but instead of 
remitting the matter 
back to the High Court 
called for extra 
evidence and 
established the content 
of Xitsonga custom 
itself and developed 
said custom 
accordingly. 
• Indicated clear support 
for the custom-based 
approach. 
• Confirmed the 
importance of amicus 
curiae participation in 
customary matters as 
they are in the ideal 
position to place 
evidence before a court 








CGE and SWEAT, as amici 
curiae 
  
• CGE focuses on 
equality arguments in 
terms of sec 9(1) and 
9(3). 
• CGE & SWEAT 
provided intricate 
arguments regarding 
the constrained choices 
available to women and 
the vulnerability of 
prostitutes. 
• SWEAT described 
particular rights 
entitlements and the 
infringement of these 
through the Sexual 
Offences Act.  
• The majority judgment 
merely refuted the 
minorities’ equality 
arguments. 
• No reference to the 
SWEAT arguments.  
• CGE’s arguments 
featured prominently in 
the minority judgment 
and concurrence 
revolved around these 
arguments. 
• Possible negative effect 
on already initiated 
steps towards 
decriminalisation. 
• Realisation that despite 
solid arguments certain 
boundaries that the 
Court is not prepared to 
cross. 
• Litigation strategy 
altered to focus on 
extending existing legal 
protection within 
particular frameworks 
as evident in the Kylie 
judgment. 
Volks 
CALS as amicus curiae 
  
• Specific evidence 
pertaining to the 
vulnerability of women 
in domestic 
partnerships as well as 
the changing notion of 
family in South Africa; 
gender inequality and 
its relationship to the 
family; the patterns of 
cohabitation in South 
Africa and the features 
of a cohabitative 
• Majority judgment 
rejected evidence 
presented. 
• Majority judgment  
acknowledged 
vulnerability but did not 
engage the issues 
deferring to Parliament. 
 
• The minority judgments 
took specific account of 
the evidence with 
Sachs J stating that the 
relevant context should 
have been considered. 
• Weak precedent set. 
• Indicative of the limits of 
law/litigation in effecting 






points to it being a 
permanent life 
partnership. 
• Draft Domestic 
Partnership Bill was 
initiated but to date it 
has not been 
implemented. 
• Litigation strategy 
altered to focus on 
extending existing 
common law principles 
to provide protection. 
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